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2ABSTRACT
Investigating a range of commonly asserted characteristics relating to British
family firms, this study concluded that, although they retained ownership and
control and did not adopt mass-production, no persuasive evidence was found
to suggest that the family managers of L. Gardner and Sons behaved
unprofessionally or irrationally during the first eighty-seven years of the firm’s
existence.
Analysed from the perspective of markets and workplace industrial relations, it
was found that the Gardner family managers coped reasonably well with most
of the macroenvironmental shifts that occurred between 1955 and 1975.
However, two serious errors were made: the first, which caused a short-term
loss of revenue and a long-term loss of market leadership, was a result of
negligence, the second stemmed from an outdated authoritarian approach to
industrial relations that resulted in intense discord in the workplace, alleviated
only after the management was replaced by a more astute and enlightened
regime.
A third error occurred after Gardner was sold to Hawker Siddeley, a large British
industrial group, in 1977. Based on a perception that Gardner’s plant was
outdated, the new owners invested in expensive computer controlled
manufacturing systems, and increased the volume of subcontracted
components, strategies that caused disruptions to production schedules, eroded
quality standards, and failed to improve output. As a result, Gardner’s
superlative reputation for reliability and service became tarnished and its market
share plummeted. In 1986, when mounting trading losses became
unacceptable, the firm was sold-on to a competitor and production effectively
ceased.
This thesis asserts that, as a family firm, Gardner traded profitably and provided
incomes for thousands of employees for more than a century. Moreover, the
sale to Hawker Siddeley conferred wealth on the family shareholders and
financial security on their descendents. Gardner was not therefore, a failure
either between 1898 and 1955, or before 1978.
3The Last Gardner ‘Family’ Board of Directors, July 1977
The Chairman, Clayton Flint, is seated in the centre
On Flint’s right is John Kynaston Gardner, grandson of the founder, Lawrence
Gardner; on his left is Paul Gardner, Lawrence’s Great Grandson
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6CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
What has happened to the motor industry since the 1950s exemplifies what has
been going wrong in too many other parts of British industry: higher pay not
matched by higher productivity; low profits, so low investment; too little going
into R and D and new design ... and why haven't we had the productivity? Over
manning. Resistance to change. Too many strikes and stoppages.1
Speaking in 1981, the then Prime Minister of Great Britain’s characteristically forthright
observations were patently one-dimensional. Even if they were directed exclusively towards
the motor industry, such sweeping assertions seem unacceptably clichéd and glib, and their
wider association with ‘too many other parts of British industry’ render them whimsical and
far-fetched. It is difficult to understand, for example, how and why so many flawed and
inefficient firms could have survived during the thirty-year period that Thatcher referred to, let
alone have prevailed over the harsh conditions that many would have encountered during
the previous half-century, and yet have foundered seemingly en masse during the 1980s and
1990s. Although something clearly went wrong during the late twentieth century, to indict the
majority of British industrial firms in Thatcher’s depreciative terms is an oversimplified – as
well as fallacious – concept. Nevertheless, her views probably reflected the sentiments of a
large majority of the British population, and several of her comments certainly echo the
opinions of many historians and scholars, both at the time and later. A close analysis of a
typical Greater Manchester-based manufacturing engineering concern, from its foundation in
1868 until 1955, and a detailed examination of the final thirty years of its existence, reveals
many inconsistencies in terms of the conventional mantra of Britain’s industrial ‘failure’.
I Rationale
This thesis evolved from a dissertation submitted in accordance with the requirements of the
Manchester Metropolitan University for the degree of Master of Arts in 2001. Although it was
not surprising that its hypothesis – which was based on the assumption that warfare and
government interference impacted negatively on industrial towns in the Northwest of England
during the twentieth century – was confirmed, the research exposed perceptible
historiographical ambiguities that the time and volume constraints inherent in a Master’s
dissertation made impossible to investigate thoroughly. In particular, it revealed apparent
disparities and gaps in scholarly analyses and inconsistencies in debates and assertions
concerning the question of British industrial ‘decline’ since the mid-nineteenth century, and
the so-called ‘deindustrialization’ of Britain during the late twentieth century. In short, the
1 Margaret Thatcher addressing the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) on 6
October 1981, quoted in Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: Harper
Collins, 1993), p. 119.
7historiography did not seem to correspond to the observable empirical evidence.2
Among the most worrying issues were certain wide-ranging generalizations propounded by a
group of academics and historians often referred to as ‘The Harvard School’. For example:
… in the new, dynamic industries of the Second Industrial Revolution - those at
the centre of industrial and economic growth - there were more failures than
successes in Great Britain.3
Clearly, however, this ‘Chandlerian’ concept of success and failure is highly subjective.
Dictionary definitions broadly agree that success is the accomplishment of a desired end: the
more prosaic meaning, the attainment of wealth, fame, or high-office, having, in recent times,
become somewhat less acceptable, while failure is almost universally defined simply as a
lack of success.4 Undoubtedly, however, there are cases in which the desired end is clearly
implied. For example, the implied purpose of a diesel engine is to function to a specified level
of performance and if it does not do so, or if it breaks down completely, it can accurately be
described as having failed. Likewise, a business, by implication, desires to be profitable or at
least solvent, and when it suffers financial collapse or bankruptcy it can, with complete
justification, be said to have failed. It would be fallacious, however, to subjectively and
superficially impose perceived desired ends on firms, such as a lack of development or
inadequate rates of growth in specific areas, in order to provide evidence for alleged flaws. It
would also be misleading to indict firms with failure simply because they did not pursue a
course of action that historians believe they should have. Moreover, if as Chandler asserted,
‘the British did not even try’ in certain sectors of industry, they may well have had sound
commercial reasons for not doing so, but in any case, they cannot accurately be said to have
failed.5 To adopt an appropriate analogy, the evidence presented in this thesis will show that
although, during its period as a family firm, the Gardner engine occasionally faltered, as a
member of a large industrial corporation, it broke down completely and thus failed.
It is perhaps significant that the above quotation appeared in Chandler’s first major
monograph to encompass industrial firms outside his native USA. It was published in 1990,
at the end of a decade that marked the closure of many long-established small and medium-
sized British industrial firms – including L. Gardner and Sons – whose history this thesis
analyses. Clearly, if the primary goal of such firms was to continue to exist, then they can
accurately be considered to have failed. However, if they perceived the generation of profits
to be their principal purpose, and changes beyond their control had made profitable trading
2 The dissertation can be found at, https://cid-
6a179ec8d625de09.skydrive.live.com/self.aspx/MA%20History%20Dissertation/The%20Impa
ct%20of%20Conflict%20and%20Political%20Change.doc
3 Alfred D. Chandler Jnr., Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 274.
4 Chambers Dictionary of Etymology, s.v. “failure”, “success”.
5 Alfred D. Chandler Jnr., ‘The Enduring Logic of Industrial Success’, in Barry E. Supple (ed.),
The Rise of Big Business, (London: Edward Elgar, 1992), p. 240.
8impossible, then to regard them as failures would be harsh. Moreover, as events of the first
decade of the twenty-first century clearly illustrate, not even the ‘modern’ large-scale
multinational industrial enterprises idealized by Chandlerian scholars are immune to change.
The research undertaken for the above-mentioned dissertation focused on various
manufacturing engineering firms based at Bolton and Oldham between 1890 and 1990. The
findings indicated that the most macroenvironmentally disruptive periods had occurred
during the First World War and the Second World War when production of armaments
superseded all other considerations. Between 1915 and 1918 and again between 1939 and
1945, these firms had one customer, the British Government. While some were fortunate in
that their wartime production closely resembled their peacetime activities, others were
obliged to make considerable changes in practically every aspect of their manufacturing
methods. All, however, became completely detached from their markets, which, especially
after 1918, appear to have changed considerably. It was their ability - and in some cases
their willingness - to respond to such change that had the most profound effect on their long-
term survival.
Some firms chose not to change, and these continued to serve their existing markets for as
long as demand persisted. Others seem to have attempted to resist change, seeking refuge
in cartels and government-subsidized ‘rationalization’ programmes and the like. The more
successful firms embraced change, some more openly and enthusiastically than others,
becoming, in some aspects, leaders in their chosen markets. Most of the firms involved in
the so-called ‘new dynamic industries of the second industrial revolution’ flourished until
1914, and survived the challenging conditions of the first half of the twentieth century. After
the Second World War, they thrived during the 1950s and 1960s, experienced problems
during the 1970s, languished during the 1980s, and by 1990 all but two had shut down. Far
from being uniquely British, these experiences reflect those of similar American firms,
making Chandler’s assertions regarding British ‘failure’ implausible, especially when the
macroeconomic conditions prevailing during this period are considered.
II Focus
Based on the above preliminary findings, it is clear that further research focused on reasons
for survival would reveal more than attempts to explain failure, and that a comparative study
of four different manufacturing engineering concerns facing the same problems would be the
most appropriate approach. Unfortunately, however, the complexities, scope and volume of
such a project made it unrealizable as a doctoral thesis. Alternative analyses based on a
smaller number of firms or a reduced range of criteria were also discarded on the grounds
that either of these compromises would merely produce incomplete and therefore
unsatisfactory conclusions. The eventual decision to undertake an analytical case study of a
single firm was taken on the basis that its results may offer some innovative contrasts to
currently propounded assumptions, and provide a sound basis for future comparative
studies.
9After careful reflection, the existence of a substantial collection of readily accessible primary
source materials made L. Gardner and Sons of Patricroft, one of the four firms originally
considered for inclusion in a comparative study, the most suitable subject for analysis using
a case-study approach. Ostensibly a typical Greater Manchester-based manufacturing
engineering concern, it was a middling-sized firm that, between 1955 and 1986, provided
full-time employment for up to three thousand personnel, most of whom were highly skilled
craftsmen and members of the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) and its successors.
A manufacturer of high-value industrial units, like many such enterprises its products were
purchased by other manufacturers of capital equipment for inclusion in their own end
products, making Gardner central to a network of companies that together formed a discrete
industrial sub-sector. This ‘cluster’ of firms ultimately depended on the same markets,
employed personnel with similar skills and allegiances, and was affected by very similar
technological developments.
Between 1868 and 1975, in response to the many macroenvironmental shifts resulting from
two major conflicts and at least one world recession, Gardner altered its management
structure, and developed close relationships with suppliers, distributors, customers, and
employees. In 1975, Gardner generated annual sales of almost nine million pounds and was,
as it had been for most years since its foundation, a profitable concern. In January 1978,
Gardner was absorbed by a major British multinational industrial Group; by 1984, the firm
was languishing, and in 1986, by then a completely owned subsidiary of a direct competitor,
its much reduced manufacturing plant was in the process of being closed down. This study
attempts to identify the main contributing factors, both macroenvironmental and
microenvironmental, which led to this situation and in doing so it is hoped that the nature of
the firm as a complete organization, not merely a small elite group of managers, or a circle of
trade union officials, will be revealed.
III Methodology
Using a case study approach, this thesis attempts to analyse and connect externally
observable developments with internally recorded events. Formerly the preferred approach
of business historians, the decline of the single firm study corresponds with the ascendancy
of comparative, or institutional, methodology following the publication of Chandler’s Strategy
and Structure.6 Describing comparative methodology as the analysis of the techniques used
by different firms to overcome the same problems, Chandler asserted that it would facilitate
the creation of clearer models relating to the methods used by businessmen in the past,
6 Alfred D. Chandler Jnr., Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American
Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1962); ‘The publication of Strategy and
Structure … redirected the study of big business away from its traditional emphasis on case
histories of companies and individual biographies … and … brought to the fore the
importance of comparative history’. Maury Klein, ‘Coming Full Circle: The Study of Big
Business Since 1950’, Enterprise and Society, 2 (3), 2001, p. 430; see also Barry Supple,
‘Introduction: Approaches to Business History’, in Barry Supple, ed., Essays in British
Business History (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), p. 3.
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thereby making possible the formulation of ‘theories and generalizations’. This, he
anticipated, would establish what effect the broad regulatory and economic environment had
on the development of large-scale American firms, thus leading to a better general
understanding of the American economy. Comparative methodology, he predicted, would
produce ‘the data from which the generalizations are derived’, and its findings would not,
therefore, be presented as ‘mere illustrations’, but as contextual, firm conclusions.7
There can be no doubt that British historians and scholars, especially those with Harvard
connections, found the new approach both original and compelling. Unfortunately, however,
in their enthusiasm to embrace Chandlerian doctrine, some academics occasionally felt
constrained to disparage what they described as the ‘conventional’ approach which,
according to Chandler, resulted in ‘mere case studies’ and offered little scope to researchers
seeking to analyse the ‘deeper, underlying trends in … history’. Particularly critical of what he
regarded as ‘a tradition which, at its best, is a triumph of narrative skill, honest to the facts of
the individual case, but at its worst is narrow, insular, and antiquarian’, Leslie Hannah urged
British historians to ‘study business history in a wider, internationally comparative framework
with more attention to generalization and the kind of conceptual insights which Alfred
Chandler has pioneered in America’.8
Nevertheless, even the most enthusiastic supporters of comparative methodology
acknowledged the need for traditional forms of business history. As Chandler himself
somewhat paradoxically stressed, ‘Only after the accumulation of a multitude of case studies
can generalizations and concepts which are not tied to a specific time and place be induced’,
a stipulation also accentuated by Hannah, Alford, and Wilson.9 Moreover, although Chandler
warned that ‘historical evidence can easily be found to support almost any set of hypotheses,
propositions, or other generalizations’ adding that ‘To be valid [comparative studies] must
compare the histories of enterprises within the same industry’, other scholars have
7 Chandler, Strategy and Structure, pp. 1 – 7.
8 ‘Virtually every work now written on the history of modern, large-scale enterprise must begin
by placing itself within the Chandlerian analytical framework’. Glenn Porter, The Rise of Big
Business, 1860-1920 (Arlington Heights: Harlan Davidson, 1992), p. 128; see also Richard R.
John, ‘Elaborations, revisions, dissents: Alfred D. Chandler, Jnr’.s, The Visible Hand after
twenty years’, Business History Review, 71 (2), 1997, pp. 151 – 201; Supple, ‘Introduction’, in
Supple, Essays, p. 7; Geoffrey Jones and R. Daniel Wadhwani, ‘Entrepreneurship and
Business History: Renewing the Research Agenda’, Working Paper, Harvard Business
School, 2006, p. 1; Leslie Hannah, ‘Business Development and Economic Structure in Britain
Since 1880’, in Leslie Hannah, ed., Management Strategy and Business Development. An
Historical and Comparative Study (London: Macmillan, 1976), p. vii; Leslie Hannah, ‘New
Issues in British Business History’, Business History Review, 57; 1983, p. 166; also John. F.
Wilson, British Business History, 1720 – 1994 (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1995), pp. 1 – 2.
9 Alfred D. Chandler Jnr., ‘Comparative business History’, in: Donald C. Coleman and Peter
Mathias, Enterprise and History, Essays in honour of Charles Wilson (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984), pp. 3 – 26; Leslie Hannah, ‘Visible and Invisible Hands in Great
Britain’, in Alfred D. Chandler Jnr. and Herman Daems, eds., Managerial Hierarchies,
Comparative Perspectives on the Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 52; Bernard W. E. Alford, Britain in the World Economy
Since 1880 (London: Longman, 1996), p. 267; Wilson, British Business, p. 1.
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suggested that he did not always adhere to these conditions. ‘If Chandler's work is
illuminating’ observed Richard B. Du Boff and Edward S. Herman, ‘it is because of certain
insights derived from his selective and partial view of the historical process’.10 Clearly, unless
they are based on objectively and appropriately selected, historically accurate and
competently composed single firm studies, comparative analyses can be highly subjective.
Single firm studies are therefore an important and necessary aspect of business and
economic history research because, if for no other reason, they comprise the essential
foundation for comparative methodology. Without them, as an analysis of an early attempt to
apply the Chandlerian paradigm to British industry illustrates, comparative business history
can result in a synthesis of suppositions based largely on anecdotes and allegories.11
This thesis examines, through the analysis of evidence gathered from primary sources, a
range of issues and hypotheses recurrent in the historiography in economic and business
history relating to family firms and the British manufacturing engineering industry. In this
context, there are several positive reasons for adopting the case study approach, a
technique that has been employed for many years across a variety of academic disciplines.
When used to examine discrete events through empirical evidence, it is especially effective
for the exploration of complex issues. A form of qualitative descriptive investigation, a case
study can clarify a situation, offer possible reasons for its manifestation, and thereby
reinforce, or cast doubt on, extant general theories.12
IV Sources
A major motivational factor leading to the research for this thesis being undertaken was the
existence of a collection of documents, the main substance of which was a complete set of
the minutes of meetings held by the Gardner shop stewards’ committees between 1937 and
1986.13 A comprehensive evaluation of the nature of the evidence contained in these files
revealed an almost complete absence of argument, opinion, or presupposition, thus strongly
suggesting that the principal purpose in their creation had been to record, not to inform. A
preliminary narrative assembled from a refined synthesis of these records confirmed that
they contained sufficient data to warrant the detailed, contextual analysis that would provide
the sound basis for the formation of valid, objective, scholarly deductions.
10 Chandler, Scale and Scope, p. 11; Richard B. Du Boff and Edward S. Herman, ‘Alfred
Chandler’s New Business History: A Review’, in Barry E. Supple, ed., The Rise of Big
Business (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1992), pp. 300 – 323.
11 For example, a survey of Channon’s sources reveals significant weaknesses. Out of a total of
382 sources cited, 195 are identifiable as journalistic articles in newspapers and periodicals;
23 are company produced publicity materials and publications; 49 are government and quasi-
government publications; 61 are private, unpublished papers and transcripts of talks given by
senior company executives; 14 are individual firm case studies, both published and
unpublished; 40 are academic works on general business history, both published and
unpublished. Derek F. Channon, The Strategy and Structure of British Enterprise (London:
Macmillan, 1973).
12 Susan K. Soy, ‘The case study as a research method’ (unpublished paper) University of
Texas at Austin, 1997.
13 National Register of Archives ref. NRA 31932 WCML MSS.
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There followed an exhaustive search for other primary sources, particularly management
records and statements relating to Gardner’s business activities. The National Register of
Archives identified just one such deposit, which comprised three Gardner documents in the
form of hand-written order books dated from 1905 to 1918, held at the historical archive of
Museum of Science and Industry in Manchester.14 Enquiries made at various local history
archives in the Greater Manchester area had mixed and, in one instance, extremely
disappointing results. Although the Manchester Archives and Local Studies section of the
Manchester Central Library recorded that it held a document file relating to Gardner’s
financial performance, the exact nature of which was unclear, it emerged that, to the
archivists’ eternal discredit, this file had been ‘lost’. The Salford Local History Library at Peel
Park holds a fairly substantial number of Gardner related files and documents which,
although very useful, could not in any way be regarded as primary sources. Other enquiries
in this context made to various libraries and historical archives in the North West and in other
regions of Great Britain proved unproductive.
Efforts were then made to contact ex-Gardner employees, especially former managers and
directors, as well as members of the Gardner family. In this context, Paul Gardner, the great
grandson of the founder, was contacted, interviewed and corresponded with. He was a
director of the firm between the mid-1960s until the late 1980s, but when questioned
regarding the existence of original documents he commented that at some stage he had
become ‘so disgusted and upset at the way [Perkins] were treating L. Gardner and Sons and
its workforce that [he] got rid of most of the information that might have helped …’15
Contact with another ex Gardner director, however, proved somewhat more productive. Dion
Houghton, who was a member of the board from 1955 until the mid-1980s, had in his
possession various documents, including records of engine sales and engine production
between the early twentieth-century and 1976. These, he asserted, had been ‘rescued’ from
the firm’s new owners Hawker Siddeley who, because they ‘were only interested in the future
not the past’, were apparently in the process of disposing of all pre-1978 business records
held at Patricroft. Mr. Houghton confirmed that the sales and production figures included in
Graham Edge’s L. Gardner and Sons Limited, Legendary Engineering Excellence published
in 2002 had been derived from the original records held by him, affirming that these were
‘quite correct’.16 Thus, based on this testimony, the statistics that appear in Edge’s book are
regarded as a quasi-primary source.
Letters appealing for any ex Gardner employees with information regarding the period
between 1955 and 1986 were given prominent positions in the Manchester Evening News,
14 National Register of Archives ref. NRA 29510 Manchester Mus. Sc.
15 Paul Gardner, Manchester to M. J. Halton, Horwich 18 March 2002.
16 Graham Edge, L. Gardner and Sons Limited, Legendary Engineering Excellence (Cambridge:
Gingerfold, 2002), pp. 199 – 206; D. G. Houghton, Chichester to M. J. Halton, Horwich, 18
February 2004.
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the Salford Journal and the Bolton Evening News. Although some responses were received,
none of these produced original documents. Likewise, contacts with various websites
relating to Gardner, the HCV industry and diesel engines yielded little more than secondary
or anecdotal evidence.
Detailed analysis of statistical data was considered inappropriate for a qualitative study of
this type. However, where the inclusion of statistics in support of hypotheses seemed
necessary, data was gathered from primary or near-primary sources and cross-referenced
with the figures published regularly by the Department of Trade and Industry and other
government bodies. Information concerning the general economic environment is
synthesized from a number of well-known expertly prepared works by eminent economic
historians including Cairncross, Alford, Richardson, Floud, McCloskey, Supple, Pollard and
others.
Published quantitative data on the British engineering industries is considered too vague and
imprecise to have any meaningful bearing on this thesis. Qualitative data on this topic is
drawn mainly from the above-mentioned sources, augmented by the hypotheses developed
by Piore and Sabel, Zeitlin, Hirst, and others. Qualitative and quantitative information relating
to the British commercial vehicles industry, although relatively vague for the immediate post-
Second World War years, is both plentiful and detailed for most of the period covered by this
thesis. Not merely statistical, the reports published annually by the Society of Motor
Manufacturers and Traders in London, generally considered to be the most reliable, are used
throughout.
Some use was made of scholarly works published during the 1970s. Rhys, The Motor
Industry, and Bhaskar, The Future of the UK Motor Industry, both cover, to some extent, the
British Heavy Commercial Vehicle (HCV) industry. They also include sections on the
structure of the important motor vehicle components sector, and both mention Gardner in the
context of a notable supplier of proprietary diesel engines.17 Unfortunately, neither of these
works can be described as historically-based, and nor can they be regarded as completely
reliable secondary sources.18
17 D. G. Rhys, The Motor Industry: An Economic Survey (London: Butterworth, 1972); K.
Bhaskar, The Future of the UK Motor Industry (London: Kogan Page, 1979).
18 For example, Rhys cites no sources and his book contains no bibliographical references. It
also includes clear factual inaccuracies, such as, ‘The amendment to the 'Construction and
Use' regulations (in 1964) allowed the use of vehicles of up to 32 tons gross vehicle weight.
These larger vehicles required engines of between 170 and 225 bhp to give them sufficient
power, which was a requirement that Gardner was unable to meet until 1966. This initial
demand for more powerful engines plus a long drawn out strike at Gardner's in 1964,
intensified the company's inability to meet all the demands of operators and vehicle builders’.
(p. 92) In fact The Motor Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations, 1955, Statutory
Instrument 1955, No. 482, Regulation No. 70, already permitted vehicles up to 32 tons.
Furthermore, Gardner sold more automotive diesel engines in 1964 than it did in 1963 and,
other than a brief ‘go-slow’ and a ban on overtime, no industrial action at all took place in
1964. See Minutes of the Shop Stewards’ Committee Meeting (L. Gardner and Sons), 24
June 1964; T. F. Farrell, Patricroft, to E. Frow, Manchester, 29 June 1964; Shop Stewards’
Minutes, 22 July 1964; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 19 August 1964; Likewise, Bhaskar’s book
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Other than these two somewhat imperfect volumes, and a factitious assortment of popular
histories aimed at hobbyists and enthusiasts, historiographical works on the British HCV
industry are limited to rare individual essays.19 In the former group, David Whitehead’s
Gardners of Patricroft stands out.20 Commissioned for the firm’s 1968 centenary, this small
volume is typically sympathetic in its narrative, although not as explicitly revisionist as some.
On the other hand, Graham Edge’s, L. Gardner and Sons Limited, Legendary Engineering
Excellence, is overtly so, offering an almost idealized, whimsical, and highly selective
account: a legend indeed.21 Nevertheless, both authors had the benefit of access to at least
some company records, and both books contain ostensibly credible information relating to
dates, places and people. The statistical data in Edge’s book, corroborated by the late Dion
Houghton, an ex Gardner director who held the original documented records in his Vintage
Engine Register, was also informative.
Two other secondary sources were varyingly useful in triangulating and verifying aspects of
the study relating to Gardner’s competitors. Although somewhat typical in that it was written
for – and thus vicariously by – management, the comprehensive history of the Cummins
Engine Company compiled by Jeffrey L. Cruikshank and David B. Sicilia helped to underpin
many of the observations presented in this thesis.22 Similarly, the publicity material produced
on behalf of the Perkins Engine Company, while factually selective and qualitatively
unforthcoming, served as a limited but plausible point of reference.23 It should also be
mentioned that, while Rolls-Royce has attracted much attention in terms of its cars and its
aircraft engine activities, its Shrewsbury-based diesel engine division, now part of the
enigmatic Perkins group, seems to have left practically no trace of its existence.
The evidence presented in the development of the core themes of this thesis is drawn from
records concerning the activities of Gardner shop stewards. The key source is a large
number of minute books, housed at The Working Class Movement Library in Salford,
containing summaries of regularly held meetings concerning the day-to-day issues arising in
the Gardner manufacturing plant at Patricroft. Essentially a chronicle of events between
1955 and 1986, these documents contain a wealth of evidence relating to the hypotheses
explored here. Whereas management-generated records, skilfully crafted and carefully
contains no bibliographical references and nor, curiously, does it include an index, and
although he cites sources, these are extremely sparse.
19 The essays include Michael French, ‘Public Policy and British Commercial Vehicles during
the Export Drive Era, 1945-50’, Business History, 40 (2), 1998. pp. 22 – 44; Howard Cooper,
‘Lorries and Lorry Driving in Britain 1948 – 1968: The End of an Era’, Journal of Popular
Culture, 29, 1996, pp. 69 – 81.
20 David Whitehead, Gardners of Patricroft (Oxford: Pergamon, Newman Neame, 1968).
21 Graham Edge, L. Gardner and Sons Limited, Legendary Engineering Excellence (Cambridge:
Gingerfold, 2002).
22 Jeffrey L. Cruikshank and David B. Sicilia, The Engine That Could, 75 Years of Value Driven
Change at Cummins Engine Company (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1997).
23 Barry Parisson et al, Perkins Heritage (Peterborough: Perkins Engine Company, 2002).
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worded, were usually created to inform, these handwritten and unembellished reports were
intended simply to record, and they therefore represent the purest form of primary historical
source.24
Where clarification, confirmation, or triangulation seemed necessary, specialist and trade
periodicals, national and local newspapers, and written testimonials were consulted. In this
context, attempts were made to engage with ex-Gardner employees, directors, and Gardner
family members. Although most of these met with guarded reticence, a limited – brief – but
valuable correspondence with the above-mentioned Dion Houghton and a similarly
informative sequence of letters from Carl Lingard, an ex-employee and trade union official at
Gardner during most of the period covered by the three empirical chapters of this thesis,
yielded clarifying information.
V Background and Structure
In general, economic historians divide the thirty-year period covered by the empirical
chapters of this thesis into three distinct, but to some extent overlapping, periods.25 The first,
that started shortly after the end of the Second World War and ended with the first ‘oil shock’
in 1973, is usually regarded as a period of sustained growth and prosperity in the
industrialised nations of the world.26 The second period, which began at some stage during
the late 1960s, is generally identified as an era of increasing turbulence and disorder when
rising inflation resulted in slower economic growth in most advanced economies, and severe
sociopolitical upheavals in others.27 The third period is almost universally considered an era
when, especially in post-1979 Britain, the ‘old’ ways of organising the economy were
abandoned to be replaced by a new laissez-faire system, regulated solely by market
forces.28 While the three empirical chapters generally correspond to these phases, their
24 See Marc Bloch, The Historian’s Craft (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1954), pp.
60 – 62; Arthur Marwick, The Nature of History, Third Edition (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989),
pp. 6, 199.
25 For example, ‘The twenty-six years between 1964 and 1990 fall into three contrasting periods
…’ Sir Alexander Cairncross, ‘Economic policy and performance, 1964 – 1990’, in Floud and
McCloskey, Economic History of Britain, Second Edition, Vol. 3, p. 67.
26 ‘The economic performance of the Western economies between 1950 and 1973 is now firmly
inscribed in the annals as the period of the long boom’. Alford, Britain in the World, p. 245;
see also Roger Lloyd-Jones and M. J. Lewis, British Industrial Capitalism since the Industrial
Revolution (London: UCL Press, 1998), p.156; Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, p. 249;
Andrew Gamble, Britain in Decline, Economic Policy, Political Strategy and the British State,
Fourth Edition (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), p. 6; Sir Alexander Cairncross, The British
Economy Since 1945, Second Edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 36 – 38; Peter Howlett,
‘The Wartime Economy, 1939 - 1945’, in Floud and McCloskey, Economic History of Britain,
Second Edition, Vol. 3, p. 27.
27 Cairncross, British Economy, Second Edition, pp. 38 - 39, 183; Richard Coopey and Nicholas
Woodward, ‘The British Economy in the 1970s: an Overview’, in Richard Coopey and
Nicholas W. C. Woodward, eds., Britain in the 1970s: The Troubled Economy (London:
University College London Press, 1996), p. 7; Charles Feinstein, ‘Success and Failure: British
Economic Growth Since 1948’, in Floud and McCloskey, Economic History of Britain, Second
Edition, Vol. 3, p. 114.
28 ‘[The] government which came into power in 1979 was determined to make a complete break
with the past in the management of the British economy’. Geoffrey Maynard, The Economy
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themes reflect the specific macroenvironmental issues that, from time to time, directly or
indirectly influenced the performance of L. Gardner and Sons.
In planning the structure of this thesis, a preliminary survey of primary source materials,
followed by a more rigorous evaluation, revealed a distinct, chronologically segmented
pattern. The first important change at Gardner occurred during the 1950s, when
improvements in Britain’s infrastructure necessitated adjustments in the Gardner product
range, and afforded opportunities for its competitors. The second took place during the
1960s and early 1970s, when the relationship between the firm and its employees
deteriorated, culminating in two prolonged and damaging strikes. The third and final
watershed came about during the 1980s, not long after Gardner became a wholly-owned
subsidiary of a large international engineering group. Within a few years, despite a sizeable
investment in modern, high-technology manufacturing equipment and advanced computer
systems, the firm was on the verge of collapse. Clearly, the most informative approach to the
history of Gardner developed from a detailed examination of these three periods of important
change, with particular attention to the factors that influenced their taking place.
Accordingly, the three principal chapters of this thesis present the findings of a three-
pronged programme of research into the firm’s history concentrating on markets between
1955 and 1960; workplace industrial relations between 1960 and 1975, and manufacturing
engineering technology between 1976 and 1986. In the context of this thesis, the term
‘market’ covers all uncontrollable factors of the business environment, such as economic,
physical, technological, political, legal, and socio-cultural, which affect performance.
‘Workplace industrial relations’ refers both to the internal relationship between the firm’s
managers and its workforce, and the wider relationship concerning trade unions and
business organizations. ‘Manufacturing engineering technology’ is mainly concerned with
developments in machine tools, production systems and automation, and with discrete
changes in the technology relating to Gardner’s products.
Clearly, however, Gardner did not spring Athena-like from the metaphorical forehead of
Britannia industrialis in 1955, but evolved and metamorphosed during the first eighty-seven
years of its existence, making an evaluation of its disposition vis-à-vis the post-war
macroenvironment an essential aspect of the narrative. Thus the first, and in many ways the
most important, task was to undertake research into Gardner’s development between 1898
and 1955 and to compare the evidence gathered thereby with the ways such firms are
represented in the historiography in economic and business history. This was especially
significant in the light of the tenor of works by Chandler and his adherents, whose negative
Under Mrs. Thatcher (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), p. iv; Thatcher’s government ‘… claimed to
be, and indeed was, very different from it's Conservative predecessors’. Ian Gilmour, Dancing
With Dogma (London: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 206; The new administration drew ‘on
the laissez-faire strain of Conservative thought [that] repudiated the consensualist
Keynesianism which had dominated the economic thinking of both parties for forty years …’
Peter A. Hall, ‘The State and Economic Decline’, in Elbaum and Lazonick, Decline of the
British Economy, p. 290.
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views of British industrial firms are both pervasive and profuse: assertions that are explored
fully in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
GARDNER AND THE BRITISH INDUSTRIAL FIRM IN HISTORY AND
HISTORIOGRAPHY
I Introduction
History is more or less bunk. It's tradition. We don't want tradition. We want to
live in the present, and the only history that is worth a tinker's damn is the
history that we make today.29
It is doubtful that Henry Ford appreciated the poignant inconsistency underlying his
somewhat naïve and spontaneous pronouncement. Nevertheless, he was correct in his
implied perception that historical literature should be viewed with at least some
circumspection: a caveat that is, as this chapter expounds, particularly apt in the case of
British industry. For example, in terms of the broad scope of the historiography in economic
and business history, L. Gardner and Sons exemplifies the failing nature of British industrial
enterprise. A manufacturing engineering business founded in Manchester in the 1860s, for
most of its existence it was a middling-sized company engaged in one of the main industrial
sectors of the ‘second industrial revolution’. Starting as an archetypal family firm, it retained
many of the characteristics perceived by some historians as indicators of family influence
until its closure over a century later.30 By no means a mass-producer, Gardner remained a
single-site business that never provided work for more than around three thousand
employees. Seldom analysed on their own merits, such firms are often portrayed as being
afflicted with a range of deep-rooted, innate weaknesses that made their decline and
ultimate downfall inevitable.31 In the face of such persuasively overwhelming evidence, it
would seem that, by 1955, firms like Gardner already carried inherited and potentially
ruinous flaws, inference that reinforces the significance of the following analysis.
II Gardner: Origin, Evolution and Growth, 1868 – 1955, a Concise Narrative History
Like many British engineering firms, Gardner began during the second half of the nineteenth
century as a one-man, general service venture. Its founder Lawrence Gardner had moved to
Manchester from Liverpool, the city of his birth, with his wife Anne, née Kynaston, in 1862,
29 Henry Ford, interview with Charles N. Wheeler, Chicago Tribune, May 25, 1916.
30 For a description of the ‘archetypal’ family firm see Roy Church, ‘Family Firms and
Managerial Capitalism: The Case of the International Motor Industry’, in Supple, The Rise, p.
399.
31 On the tendency of some historians to regard family firms as inherently weak and ineffectual
see Beatrice Craig, ‘The Family Firm in Business History: Beyond Chandler. The Survival of
Family Firms in Europe, Asia and North America in the nineteenth and twentieth Centuries’,
Paper, International Economic History Conference, Helsinki, Finland, August 2006; Alistair
Owens, 'Inheritance and the Life-Cycle of Family Firms in the Early Industrial Revolution',
Business History, 44 (1), 2002, p. 21; James Foreman-Peck, Elisa Boccaletti, and Tom
Nicholas, ‘Entrepreneurs and business performance in nineteenth-century France’, European
Review of Economic History, 2, 1998, p. 236.
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shortly after the birth of their first child.32 A few years later, then in his late 20s, he began to
offer his services as an independent mechanic, choosing, like many other engineering
enterprises of all sizes, to locate his small business in Hulme, a district within easy walking
distance of the city centre, close to the docks of the Bridgewater canal at Knott Mill, and
adjacent to the main rail links with Liverpool, Birmingham and Leeds. 33 In this no doubt
exhilarating environment, whether through diligence, good fortune or, as seems more likely,
a combination of both, Lawrence Gardner’s enterprise survived and flourished.
By 1888 the firm, then styled ‘L. Gardner and Sons’, was employing some of Gardner’s
several children. Edward and Lawrence junior, both trained engine fitters, and their two
younger brothers, Ernest and Joseph, had all joined their father in the family business,
although Thomas Harry, the eldest son, had chosen a different path. In 1875, augmenting
the practical skills that he was no doubt learning from his father, he enrolled at the
Manchester Mechanics' Institute and Technical School as an evening student, where he
studied mathematics, physics, and chemistry. In 1881, he won a technical school exhibition,
tenable at Owens College on Quay Street, resulting in a Whitworth Scholarship that allowed
him to continue his education there, now full-time, for a further four years. Upon passing his
final examinations at the age of 25 in 1885, he was awarded the highly regarded status of
Owens Associate. He did not immediately return to the family firm, choosing instead to join
the civil engineering staff of the Lancashire and North Western Railway Company.34
The premature death of Lawrence Gardner in 1890 at the relatively young age of forty-nine
brought Thomas Harry back into the family firm although not, at first, as a direct member of
its administration. Resigning his post with the LNWR and styling himself as an independent
engineer and ‘Manufacturer of Special Machinery’, he moved to Chorlton Road, Hulme,
close to the new Gardner works on Lund Street. Over the next few years, his positive
influence on the development of Gardner is evidenced by the pace of its progress. In 1892,
the firm’s first commercially viable electricity generating sets emerged, comprising dynamos
designed by Thomas Harry, driven by gas engines made under licence to a design owned by
A. E. and H. Robinson of Albert Square. By then providing work for over eighty employees,
the small family firm founded twenty-two years earlier had become, by any standards, a
32 1881 Census, Public Record Office, Ref. RG11, Folio 3927/35, p. 22.
33 As clearly evidenced in Slater’s Royal National Commercial Directory of Manchester and
Salford With Their Vicinities (Manchester: Isaac Slater, 1868); also N. J. Frangopulo, ed.,
Rich Inheritance, A Guide to the History of Manchester (Wakefield: S. R. Publishers, 1969), p.
217.
34 Slater’s, 1888; 1891 Census, http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/records/census-
records.htm; Whitehead, Gardners, p. 10; David Allan Low, ed., The Whitworth Book
(London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1926), p. 161; In 1904, when Owens College became
part of the University of Manchester, Owens Associates were awarded the degree of
Batchelor of Science, The Manchester University, Register of Graduates 1851 – 1958; The
Manchester University, Development and Alumni Relations Office, Research, Legacies, Gifts
and Services; also E. Fiddes, Chapters in the History of Owens College and of Manchester
University 1851 - 1914 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1937), p. 124.
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substantial enterprise.35
Soon, the increasing demand for electricity stimulated the introduction of larger dynamos and
more powerful engines. Not yet true diesels, the first internal combustion engines to carry the
famous Gardner marque began in 1894. These ‘oil engines’, which were designed by
Thomas Harry and based on a concept developed by Priestman Brothers of Hull, offered a
distinct market advantage in that, because they were fuelled by kerosene, they could be
started instantly from cold. Following their introduction, the expansion of the Gardner product
range accelerated. By 1895, then listed in Slater’s as ‘Electrical Engineers and Gas Engine
Manufacturers’, they were producing generating sets powered by single and multiple cylinder
engines ranging from 0.5 to 25 horsepower, built in horizontal and vertical configurations.36
Towards the close of the old century, a series of important strategic realignments were made
in response to macroenvironmental change. First, as cheap American and German imports
made the small-scale manufacture of dynamos unprofitable, Gardner diversified. Generating
sets were still offered, equipped with dynamos purchased from Mather and Platt of Salford,
but the range of engines was widened to include a more extensive variety of applications,
built to quality standards that mass-production methods could not equal. Next, as engine
production increased, general engineering and various other manufacturing activities were
hived off or discontinued. Finally, responding to the wealth of opportunities in the growing
prime-movers field, serious efforts were made to enter overseas markets. Choosing to start
with the most prudent and least expensive exporting strategy, an established London-based
firm of sales agents was appointed, selected for its well-developed and extensive worldwide
network of contacts. As the new century approached, annual unit production of internal
combustion engines, by then the firm’s main source of revenue, reached five hundred.
Nevertheless, the diversity of sizes, configurations and applications meant that Gardner
remained, by necessity, a craft-based, flexible manufacturer – a system of production that
ostensibly became the basis for rapid development and expansion.37
The impetus of Gardner’s continuing success in one of the emerging sectors of the ‘second
industrial revolution’ brought other more significant changes, made necessary by a need to
expand production and establish a sound long-term financial basis for future development.
35 At first, ‘Thomas and Edward managed the business in partnership with their mother’
Whitehead, Gardners, pp. 10 – 11; in 1926, however, he was listed in The Whitworth Book as
‘Managing Director and Chairman’ Low, Whitworth Book, p. 161; Slater’s (1892); The Iron
and Steel Engineering Industries of Manchester District (London: Iron and Steel Institute,
1935), pp. 100 – 101.
36 Sir Harry Ricardo, Memories and Machines: The Pattern of my Life (London: Constable,
1968), pp. 57 – 59; Iron and Steel, pp. 100 – 101; Slater’s (1895); Slater’s (1897); Whitehead,
Gardners, pp. 11 – 12.
37 Firms’ Order Books, The Museum of Science and Industry in Manchester, Archive, Ref.
MS0185 (paper), Location SM22/32; Whitehead, Gardners, pp. 10 – 12; Edge, Legendary
Engineering, p. 205; on export marketing strategies see Philip Kotler, Marketing
Management: Analysis, Planning and Control, Fifth Edition (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
1984), pp. 450 – 452.
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The first consideration was to find space to grow. Already connected to the telephone
network and the telegraph, the need to remain in close physical proximity to Manchester’s
commercial district no longer restricted the firm to the inner suburbs. Moreover,
improvements and expansions to Manchester’s transportation infrastructure had opened up
previously impracticable outlying districts. Thus, in February 1898, Gardner purchased 1.2
hectares of land at Patricroft, a village about eight kilometres from the city centre, adjacent to
the Bridgewater canal and connected to the main railway system.38 A year later, they moved
into the new Barton Hall works and a year after that the firm incorporated as a limited liability
company. At that time, not all members of the Gardner family became directors and nor were
all the directors Gardner family members: astutely, Thomas Harry inducted Edward Norris;
one of the partners of their London-based sales agents, onto the board.39
During the decade leading up to the outbreak of the First World War, Gardner developed
continuously and expanded rapidly. The Barton Hall manufacturing facilities were augmented
by an additional 160 British, German, and American machine tools, including a significant
number of automatic and semi-automatic turret lathes. (see Appendix 1) Annual engine
production increased almost threefold to over two thousand units, and the number of
employees grew tenfold to over a thousand. In 1912, Gardner moved from indirect to direct
exporting, absorbing its London sales agent and creating a new subsidiary, Norris, Henty
and Gardners, with a board of directors composed of the original partners plus Thomas
Harry Gardner. By 1914, Gardner’s workshops, which by then included an iron foundry,
covered more than three hectares of ground, and the firm’s product range included engines
from five to 220 bhp, used in marine propulsion and for powering stationary equipment such
as pumps, air compressors, generating sets, and other machinery.40
There can be no doubt that the war years were extremely profitable for Gardner, as they
were for many British engineering companies. Engine production fell sharply in 1914, but by
October, a substantial order for gun carriage parts had been received from Vickers, and in
1915, when the factory fell under the direct control of the Ministry of Munitions, shells and
other military equipment were added to the manufacturing programme. Thereafter, the
capacity of the Patricroft plant was expanded by the addition of some fifty-six machine tools
of various types, most of which were built by British companies such as Alfred Herbert of
38 Slater’s, 1895; Slater’s (1898); ‘New Foundry at Winton’, Eccles and Patricroft Journal, 4
March 1898, p. 5; John F. Wilson and John Singleton, ‘The Manchester industrial district,
1750 - 1939: Clustering, networking and performance’, in John F. Wilson and Andrew Popp,
Industrial Clusters and Regional Business Networks in England, 1750 - 1970 (Aldershot:
Ashgate, 2003), p. 58.
39 ‘The authorized capital of £50,000 in £1 shares was half in six per cent preference shares
and half in ordinary shares. Of the ordinary shares, 12,000 were issued to members of the
Gardner family, and of the preference shares, 12,000 were sold. Lawrence, Ernest and
Joseph joined Thomas and Edward on the board of directors, leaving only William to become
of an age to take his share in the business’. Whitehead, Gardners, pp. 12 – 13, 15; Edge,
Legendary Engineering, p. 42; also Slater’s (1903).
40 Whitehead, Gardners, pp. 13 – 15; Edge, Legendary Engineering, p. 42; Ricardo, Memories,
pp. 104 – 105; Firms’ Order Books, Museum of Science and Industry.
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Coventry and Churchill of Pendleton. (see Appendix 1) By 1917, engines for battle tanks
were being produced in co-operation with a group of six other engine manufacturers led by
Mirrlees, as well as specialized machine tools for the manufacture of engine parts. Although
Gardner was fortunate in that it manufactured at least some equipment compatible with
normal production, by 1918 annual engine output, at 391 units, was lower than it had been in
1899.41
The post-war years brought serious difficulties that severely tested the resilience of Gardner
and its senior directors. The abrupt termination of war work was followed by a brief illusory
surge in demand, after which engine sales slumped to their lowest level for over twenty
years. Consequently, by 1924, the size of the workforce had shrunk to less than half the pre-
1914 level. Nevertheless, Gardner’s strategy remained positive. The product range was
enhanced by the addition of true diesel engines, and work began on the development of
lighter, high-speed units, a project that would eventually lead to the firm’s entry into the fast-
growing motor vehicles industry.42
Although Rudolph Carl Christian Diesel’s compression ignition design offered several
advantages over Nikolaus August Otto’s spark-ignited engine, its weight and bulk, derived
from the technical necessity to operate at very high pressures, made it uneconomical for all
but static and marine applications. Thus, although these drawbacks had no bearing on the
diesel powered battle tanks of the First World War, for several years thereafter, commercial
road transport was powered by electricity, petrol or steam. Efforts by British and German
engineers to overcome these disadvantages, centred on the elimination of the need for an
auxiliary air compressor, had begun early in the twentieth century. 43 Suspended after 1914,
their renewed endeavours during the 1920s resulted in a series of breakthroughs, the most
important of which was achieved by the German engineer Prosper L’Orange.44 Thereafter,
41 Allen Skuse, Government Intervention and Industrial Policy, Second Edition (London:
Heinemann, 1978), pp. 21, 27; also John F. Wilson, Ferranti: A History, Building a Family
Business, 1882 – 1975 (Lancaster: Carnegie, 2001), pp. 182 – 184; Firms’ Order Books,
Museum of Science and Industry; Ricardo, Memories, pp. 24, 172 - 175; Whitehead,
Gardners, pp. 21 - 22.
42 ‘Eight days after the Armistice, Mr. Farrell from the Ministry of Munitions wanted to know how
quickly Gardners could cut off the gun carriage work without throwing people out of work’.
Whitehead, Gardners, p. 23; this pattern is typical for the post-war British mechanical
engineering sector, see Peter Dewey, War and Progress, Britain, 1914 – 1945 (Harlow:
Addison Wesley Longman, 1997), p. 97; Ricardo, Memories, p. 24; Edge, Legendary
Engineering, p. 205.
43 On the development of the high-speed diesel engine, see Otto-Peter A. Bühler, ‘Die
Bedeutung des Nutzfahrzeugs für die arbeitsteilige Wirtschaft’ in Mercedes-Benz in Aller Welt
(Stuttgart: Daimler-Benz, 1986), p. 56; Dieter Ritter, Eine zündende Idee brachte den Diesel
in Gang, Vor 75 Jahre Vorkammer- Diesel im Nutzfahrzeug (Stuttgart: Daimler-Benz, 1998);
Dieter Ritter, Die ‘’Vorkammer’’ ebnete den Weg zum Schnellaufenden Diesel, 1909 machte
Prosper L’Orange den Dieselmotor mobil (Stuttgart: Daimler-Chrysler, 1999); Heinz Gottwick,
‘Vorgeschichte der Mercedes-Benz Nutzfahrzeugmotoren’, in 50 Jahre Nutzfahrzeug-
Dieselmotorenbaureihe 300 von Daimler-Benz, 1949 - 1999 (Stuttgart: Daimler-Chrysler,
1999), pp. 8 - 15; Ricardo, Memories, p. 233, Cruikshank and Sicilia, Cummins, p. 59.
44 In 1909, L’Orange, who was at that time working for Benz and Cie of Mannheim, Germany
patented a design for a diesel engine ‘pre-chamber’ (Vorkammer). This device, which created
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based on similar concepts, the pace of development accelerated.45
By no means unaware of these events, by 1928 Gardner had developed a high-speed,
lightweight diesel engine equipped with a fuel injector similar in concept to an earlier Vickers
design. Designated the 4L2, this unit was first introduced to the general public at the 1929
Marine Exhibition at Olympia and was probably, therefore, intended to power marine craft.
However, its potential benefits to the motor vehicle industry were recognized by the owner of
a public transport company who, apparently without Gardner’s prior knowledge, purchased
one and successfully adapted it to drive one of his buses. In comparison with the original
petrol engine, the economies of the diesel proved to be significant - so much so that, as
reports of this innovation spread, other commercial vehicle operators began to make similar
conversions. After around 200 engines had been adapted in the field, Gardner responded to
market demand by offering a unit designed specifically for motor vehicles and, as 4L2 sales
continued to increase, an aluminium foundry was added to the firm’s facilities.46
Thus, largely by proxy, Gardner entered the automotive industry, but although some
exploratory attempts were made to broaden the scope of such activities, these were chiefly
inconsequential and essentially fruitless. In the potentially lucrative market for diesel
powered passenger cars, despite optimistic forecasts and some early success, other than a
few noteworthy hybrids, virtually no headway was made.47 Likewise, licensing agreements
with firms in Belgium and France achieved remarkably little, either in terms of the number of
units produced or in the level of revenue earned. Nevertheless, the advantages of a well-
designed, largely proven and relatively refined product led to steadily increasing annual
a more efficient distribution of power through the ignition of a small quantity of fuel in an outer
chamber connected to the cylinder head, theoretically eliminated the need for a separate
compressor. Patent No. DRP 230 517, 14 March 1909; Ritter Eine Zündende Idee; Gottwick,
Die ‘Vorkammer’; on British developments in the area see Ricardo, Memories, p. 133; also L.
R. C. Lilly, Diesel Engine Reference Book (London: Butterworth, 1984), p. 10/3.
45 MAN of Munich exhibited the first direct fuel injection diesel powered lorry in 1924. Karl Bosl,
Hellmut Droscha, Horst Hausen, Hans Christoph Graf von Seherr-Thoss, Richard Daimer and
Hans Seper, Leistung und Weg, Zur Geshichte des MAN Nutzfahrzeugbaus (Berlin: Springer,
1991); in the same year, Benz und Cie demonstrated a diesel powered lorry using the pre-
chamber principle at an exhibition in Amsterdam, and in 1929, Daimler-Benz began series
production of diesel-powered commercial vehicles. Bühler, ‘Die Bedeutung’, in, in Aller Welt,
p. 56; also DaimlerChrysler, 50 Jahre Nutzfahrzeug, p. 13 – 17.
46 Before 1914, Vickers developed a diesel engine for submarine propulsion incorporating a
very high pressure injection system that sprayed fuel into the combustion chamber through a
‘pepper caster nozzle’ perforated by a large number of very small holes. Commissioned by
the Royal Navy and classified ‘top-secret’ until the outbreak of war, these engines were built
by a number of firms in the Manchester area including Crossley Brothers, Mirrlees and quite
possibly Gardners. Ricardo, Memories, p. 133; Whitehead, Gardners, pp. 26 – 27; Eccles and
Patricroft Journal, 18 July 1936, p. 12.
47 One such experiment was carried out in 1932 on a 1925 Bentley, which some have claimed
as ‘the first all-British diesel-engined motor-car’. Whitehead, Gardners, pp. 31 – 32; ‘Patricroft
Engine: Gardner’s diesel Bentley car first at Monte Carlo’, Eccles and Patricroft Journal, 27
January 1933, p. 5; perhaps the sharp increase in diesel fuel tax imposed by the
Chamberlain government in 1935 did, as was widely predicted at the time, stifle development
and initiative in this area. ‘Tax Handicap, Patricroft Engineers Hard Hit’, Eccles and Patricroft
Journal, 7 June 1935, p. 5.
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sales, which, by the end of 1938, had reached almost 4,000 units. Increasingly reliant on the
British HCV industry, Gardner remained a single-site business linked closely to an
assortment of companies that subsequently formed a specialized sector of the British
manufacturing engineering industry.48
Geographically dispersed, these firms were chiefly connected by the markets they served
and by a common interest in the rules and laws governing the carrying of goods and people
on Britain’s roads. Like Gardner, most were long-established family firms founded in the late
nineteenth century. Before the advent of the high-speed diesel, some had produced their
own steam or petrol engines and, after its introduction, a few had attempted to develop
diesels of their own design. Subsequently, it was the success or failure of such endeavours
that divided the British HCV manufacturing sector into two distinct groups. Of these, the
smallest in terms of the number of firms, but the largest in terms of their collective share of
the HCV market, comprised those with diesel engine manufacturing facilities; but although
they made every effort to encourage their customers to choose their own product, they were
prepared to, and often did, install proprietary engines in their vehicles. Firms in the second
group chose to concentrate on the design and construction of chassis, while allowing their
customers to decide which make of engine was fitted, and it was these nine HCV producers
that, by 1939, formed the basis of Gardner’s increasingly important automotive activities.49
Three such companies, based in the Northwest of England not far from Patricroft, became
Gardner customers in the 1930s. In Preston, Atkinson Lorries began in 1907 as a small
family-owned engineering firm specializing in the maintenance and repair of steam-driven
heavy goods vehicles (HGVs). In Sandbach, Cheshire, E. R. Foden was established in 1887
as a builder of steam powered HGVs. Also based in Sandbach, and a relative newcomer to
the HCV sector, ERF was created in the early 1930s by a group of ex-Foden directors who
initially designed a range of vehicles around Gardner high-speed diesels.50
Two other important Gardner customers were based in the midlands. Daimler Transport
Vehicles of Coventry originally produced steam powered HGVs during the late nineteenth
century, later adding petrol-engined buses to its range. Founded in 1913 as a manufacturer
of petrol-fuelled HGVs, Guy Motors of Wolverhampton later extended its product range to
48 Iron and Steel, pp. 100 – 101; Edge, Legendary Engineering, pp. 78, 92, 205; Heavy
Commercial Vehicle is a relative term, the specification of which has changed over time. In
the context of this thesis, it is used to describe buses and trucks produced, because of
market limitations, in volumes too low to warrant the attention of high-volume vehicle
producers. See Bhaskar, The Future, p. 240; also Rhys, Motor Industry, pp. 79 – 84.
49 Rhys, Motor Industry, pp. 79 – 80; Edge, Legendary Engineering, p. 206
50 Pat Kennett, World Trucks, Number 3: Seddon Atkinson (Yeovil: Patrick Stephens, 1978), pp.
39, 42- 44, 57 and passim; Foden, More Than a Century of Progress (Sandbach: Foden
Trucks, 1978); ‘Engines At The National Boat Show’, The Engineer, 28 January 1955, p.140;
‘Engineering, Marine and Welding Exhibition’, The Engineer, 23 September 1955, p. 433;
Edge, Legendary Engineering, p. 206.
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include buses, trolley buses, and passenger cars.51
Further south, Bristol Commercial Vehicles (BCV) started business in 1908 as a bus service
operator, subsequently designing and building buses powered by petrol engines of its own
manufacture. Founded in the late nineteenth century, Dennis Brothers of Guildford was
originally a manufacturer of bicycles. By the early 1900s Dennis had become well-known as
a producer of HGVs that were particularly suitable for heavy-duty applications and, by the
1920s, the firm was one of Britain’s largest HGV builders with particular strengths in fire-
fighter vehicles. Although Dennis never became a substantial Gardner customer, it was one
of the first to offer Patricroft built diesels in the early 1930s and regularly purchased Gardner
products for many years thereafter. Scammell Lorries began in London in the late nineteenth
century as a family-owned and managed coach building and repair workshop, moving to a
new purpose-built manufacturing facility at Tolpits Lane, Watford in the 1920s. Scammell’s
range of petrol driven HGVs, especially its articulated and rigid eight-wheeled trucks and
heavy-duty six-wheeled off-highway tractors, proved especially successful, and the company
became one of Gardner’s most important customers.52
In 1939, the British HCV sector included a number of firms that subsequently either suffered
bankruptcy, involuntary closure, or remained in existence only as divisions of larger firms.
Perhaps the most important of these was Albion Motors of Glasgow, founded in 1899, and
Scotland’s most enduring automotive firm. Crossley Brothers of Manchester, which began in
the early nineteenth century as a textile machinery manufacturer, was among the world’s first
licenced producers of Otto’s two-stroke engine, and later became one of Britain’s principal
internal combustion engine manufacturers. Having entered the automotive industry in 1903,
by the late 1930s Crossley was the leading producer of buses in the Manchester area and
one of the three largest firms in the British HCV cluster. Others, including Karrier Motors of
Huddersfield, TS Motors, Maudslay Motor Company of Coventry, Shefflex of Sheffield,
Vulcan of Southport, and Birmingham Carriage and Wagon of Smethwick, all disappeared,
leaving little trace of their existence. While some of these firms were undoubtedly Gardner
customers at some stage, none of them purchased Gardner diesels in sufficient numbers to
warrant further investigation.53
The Associated Equipment Company (AEC) of Southall, London, was the second largest
51 Leyland Ninetieth Anniversary Committee, Official History 1896 - 1986 (Leyland: Leyland
Vehicles, 1986), p. 42; Edge, Legendary Engineering, p. 206.
52 T. C. Barker and C. I. Savage, An Economic History of Transport in Britain (London:
Hutchinson, 1974), pp. 211, 228 – 229; Company Information (Guildford: TransBus
International, 2003); Edge, Legendary Engineering, pp. 89, 111, 120, 206; Pat Kennett, World
trucks, No. 8: Scammell (Cambridge: Patrick Stephens, 1979), pp. 5, 7, 33, 50 - 51 and
passim; Whitehead, Gardners, p. 206; Leyland, Official History, p. 26.
53 Sam McKinstry, Sure as the Sunrise: a history of Albion Motors (Edinburgh: John Donald,
1997); Nick Georgano et al, Britain’s Motor Industry The First Hundred Years (Yeovil: Foulis,
1995), p. 73; S. B. Saul, ‘The Motor Industry in Britain to 1914’, Business History, 5 (1), 1962,
pp. 22 – 44; Rhys, Motor Industry, p. 80.
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HCV producer in Britain. It came into existence in 1912 when the London General Omnibus
Company, an organization established in 1855 to regulate the large number of horse-drawn
omnibus services then operating in the capital, hived off its bus and petrol engine production
facilities at Blackhorse Lane, Walthamstow. Thereafter, the firm’s continuing close
relationship with the London Passenger Transport Board assured it of a virtual monopoly
over the supply of buses in the London area. In 1928, AEC erected new purpose built
manufacturing facilities at Windmill Lane, Southall where, by 1931, it had developed a range
of high-speed diesel engines.54
In 1939, Leyland Motors of Chorley, Lancashire, was easily Britain’s largest producer of
diesel-powered HCVs. Founded in 1896 as The Lancashire Steam Motor Company, a
manufacturer of steam powered road vehicles and agricultural equipment, by 1914, Leyland
had developed a range of petrol-fuelled buses. During the First World War, and throughout
the interwar years, the firm steadily increased its manufacturing capacity and established an
impressive network of agencies and subsidiaries in several British overseas territories. In
1931, Leyland introduced its own range of high-speed diesel engines, both as replacements
for existing petrol engines and as standard equipment in the firm’s own trucks and buses.55
The death of Thomas Harry in 1937 at the age of 76 seems to have ushered in a sequence
of misfortunes in the Gardner family that reflected the catastrophic turmoil soon to be
inflicted upon the so-called advanced nations of the world. He was succeeded as chairman
of the board by his 73-year-old brother Edward, the founder’s second son. At the same time
Thomas Harry’s only son, Eric William Lawrence, was appointed Managing Director and
Deputy Chairman. Less than six years later, when Edward Gardner died leaving no heirs, the
chairmanship passed to Joseph, his 70-year-old younger brother. Four years later, Eric
William Lawrence, aged 53, and William, the founder’s youngest son, aged 57, both died
unexpectedly within a few weeks of each other. Shortly thereafter, Joseph Gardner’s two
sons, Joseph Hugh Stott Gardner (called Hugh) and John Kynaston Gardner were made
joint managing directors, while Hugh, ostensibly as the new heir apparent, was appointed
deputy chairman.56
Between 1939 and 1945, under the direction of the Ministry of Supply, Gardner’s
manufacturing programme, with one or two notable exceptions, comprised almost entirely
diesel engines of the firm’s own design. At the end of the War, Gardner employed around
three thousand personnel, producing over three thousand engines a year. The product range
54 S. W. Stevens-Stratten, Trucks in Camera: AEC (London: Ian Allan, 1984), pp. 19, 43 and
passim; ‘Machining Engine Castings’, The Engineer, 25 November 1955, p. 771.
55 Leyland, Official History, pp. 1 - 10, 22 - 26 and passim; Pat Kennett, World Trucks No. 14,
Leyland (Cambridge: Patrick Stephens, 1983), p. 56.
56 Thomas Harry Gardner died in October 1937 at the age of 76. ‘Eccles JP, Death of Mr. T. H.
Gardner, Noted Engineer and Educationist’, Eccles and Patricroft Journal, 29 October 1937,
p. 13; ‘Local Will, Mr. T. H. Gardner Leaves £159,474’, Eccles and Patricroft Journal, 20
October 1938, p. 13; Whitehead, Gardners, pp. 37, 39.
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at that time, although highly attuned to the HCV sector, also included engines for main and
auxiliary marine propulsion, rail traction, electricity generating sets, pumping sets, and other
industrial applications. Many Gardner engines were exported, mainly to British Empire and
dominion countries, as components of vehicles and other capital plant, and some were
shipped directly abroad from Patricroft through a network of overseas agents. Gardner
employed salaried Factory Representatives stationed in Australia, Canada, Hong Kong,
India, and South Africa, each of which handled a chain of localized commission agents.
Established agents in Belgium, Denmark, France, and the Netherlands covered Western
Europe, while in the Americas, apart from Canada, Gardner was represented only in
Argentina.57
When Joseph Gardner, the last surviving son of the founder, died in 1955 at the age of 81,
the appointment of his eldest son Hugh at the age of 51 as Chairman of the Board and Joint
Managing Director, with his younger brother John as Deputy Chairman and Joint Managing
Director, would have surprised few. However, alterations in the structure of the rest of the
Board represented something of a break with the past. Previously the preserve of family
members and a few long-serving executives, four new appointments ostensibly made to
strengthen the technical, marketing, and administrative complexion of the firm, introduced at
least an outward aspect of professionalism.58
The firm’s first graduate engineer, Eric Todd, was born in Manchester in 1903. A close friend
of the Gardner brothers, he attended the Manchester Grammar School at around the same
time as Hugh. Upon leaving, he joined the engineering firm of Hans Renold (later Renold
Chains) before becoming a full-time student at UMIST for three years, graduating in 1924
with BSc (Hons.) in Technology. He then returned to Renold where he worked as a design
engineer until he joined Gardner in 1936.59 William Gordon Thompstone was born in 1909 at
Heaton Norris, Stockport. He attended Stockport Grammar School between 1921 and 1927,
going on to study law at Manchester University from where he graduated with an LLB
(Hons.) in 1930. Whether or not he ever practiced law is unclear, but at some stage,
Thompstone joined the Manchester staff of the Engineering Employers’ Federation (EEF).
Exactly when he joined Gardner is not known, but as works director he undertook, at least
outwardly, responsibility for the day-to-day administration of the Patricroft factory. The rest of
the seven-man board included one other Gardner family member and two newly appointed
57 Second World War production included a small number of special engines for midget
submarines. Whitehead, Gardners, pp. 33 – 35; Gardner product catalogue circa 1950,
Salford Local History Library Archive, ref. L620 GAR (paper).
58 Whitehead, Gardners, p. 38.
59 They were certainly well acquainted through their mutual interest in motorcycle racing in the
1930s. ‘First Link: Racing Bikes’, Eccles and Patricroft Journal, 9 July 1975, p. 10; Old
Mancunians; The Manchester University, Register of Graduates 1851 – 1958.
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directors.60
Frank Gardner Wilkinson, who had been a director since 1947, was the son of Elizabeth
Gardner, the founder’s daughter. Born in 1908, like most of the other Gardners in his age
group he benefited from a privileged private education, attending the Manchester Grammar
School at around the same time as John. What he did thereafter, and when he joined the
family firm is not known. Although, like his two cousins, he does not seem to have gained
any professional qualifications, he was nevertheless appointed to the position of company
secretary in 1934 at the age of 26.61
Although Dion Gordon Houghton was not a member of the Gardner family, he seems to have
vicariously inherited his position from his father, Gordon Oldfield Houghton, who had been a
director of Norris Henty and Gardner since 1926. Beyond this filial association, he does not
seem to have had very much connection with Patricroft, diesel engines, or the HCV industry.
His appointment to the Gardner board shortly after the death of his father, with titular
responsibility for sales, is therefore something of a mystery.62 Finally, William Eric
Bradshaw’s elevation to the rank of director can be safely viewed as a straightforward
reward for many years service.63
Thus, even as the third generation of Gardners assumed control of the business, it remained
in virtually every respect a family concern, a form of governance that, according to
Chandlerian philosophy, was inherently weak. Drawing on Berle and Means, Burnham,
Galbraith, Sargant Florence, Cyert and March, and others, Chandler emphasized the
importance of the separation of ownership from control which, he asserted, was essential to
the development of progressive, large-scale corporations. For adopters of this principle, in
achieving this optimum state, enterprises passed through various phases of development,
reaching a vitally important stage in this process when family shareholders transferred their
decision-making roles to professional managers.64 From this perspective, as ever more
companies attained this ideal administrative structure, family firms became increasingly
restricted to small sectors of industry, based on traditional products. Thus in the twentieth
60 ‘Mr. John Gardner dies’, Eccles and Patricroft Journal, 20 April 1974, p. 3; ‘Death of Joseph
Gardner’, The Engineer, 29 July 1955, p. 170; Whitehead, Gardners, pp. 18, 38; Edge,
Legendary Engineering, p. 153; The Directory of Directors (London: Thomas Skinner, 1954),
pp. 373, 784.
61 Old Mancunians; Directory of Directors, p. 784; Whitehead, Gardners, p. 33, 37; Edge,
Legendary Engineering, pp. 7, 109, 158.
62 Whitehead, Gardners, p. 38; Edge, Legendary Engineering, p. 137.
63 Old Stopfordians Association, Stockport Grammar School; The Manchester University,
Register of Graduates 1851 – 1958; Whitehead, Gardners, pp. 18, 38; Edge, Legendary
Engineering, p. 133.
64 Chandler, Strategy and Structure; Adolph Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern
Corporation and Private Property (New York: Commerce Clearing House, 1932); John
Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (London: Penguin, 1969); James Burnham, The
Managerial Revolution (London: Penguin, 1962); Philip Sargant Florence, The Logic of British
and American Industry (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953); Richard M. Cyert and
James G. March, A Behavioural Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963).
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century, ‘managerial capitalism’ became the defining characteristic of the modern enterprise,
surpassing both ‘personal and entrepreneurial’ forms, both of which were, allegedly,
nineteenth-century systems. Moreover, according to Chandler and his followers, by the early
twentieth century, while many managerial enterprises populated the industries of America
and Germany, in Britain far fewer firms had completed this transition.65
Instead, most British firms remained committed to ‘personal capitalism’ and ‘for this reason
the British story provides a counterpoint - an antithesis - to the American experience’. As
successive generations inherited family firms, family managers occupied the same offices
and continued to supervise day-to-day business activities, maintaining constant contact with
lower management and staff. Consequently, in spite of increases in size, complexity, and
specialization, ‘myopic’ personal management persisted well into the twentieth century and
even when mergers created large-scale businesses, these remained essentially
uncoordinated ‘loose federations’ of family enterprises.66
Thus, family-owned and managed firms like Gardner have been indicted with a range of
alleged failings, which made them generally inefficient and uncompetitive. According to some
scholars, it was the proliferation and persistence of such firms that led to ‘prolonged
technological backwardness’, making Britain ‘a late industrialiser in many of the new
industries of the Second Industrial Revolution’ and bringing about the decline of the British
economy.67 The rest of this chapter examines the premises upon which many such
assertions are based, seeking justification or otherwise for Henry Ford’s somewhat puerile
and artless portrayal of history.
III The Question of British Industrial Decline
‘Of all the debates in British economic history’, reflected Roger Lloyd-Jones and Myrddin
John Lewis in their recently published study of the British machine tool industry, ‘that of the
65 Alfred D. Chandler Jnr. and Herman Daems, ‘The Rise of Managerial Capitalism and its
Impact on Investment Strategy in the Western World and Japan’, in Herman Daems and
Herman van der Wee, eds., The Rise of Managerial Capitalism (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1974), pp. 5 – 6; Chandler and Daems, Managerial Hierarchies, pp. 1 – 8; Alfred D. Chandler
Jnr. and Herman Daems, ‘The United States, Seedbed of Managerial Capitalism’, in Chandler
and Daems, Managerial Hierarchies, pp. 12 – 14; Alfred D. Chandler Jnr., ‘The Emergence of
Managerial Capitalism’, Business History Review, 58 (4), 1984, pp. 473 – 503.
66 Chandler, Scale and Scope, pp. 236 – 237, 241, 252, 288 – 289, 317, 358; Donald C.
Coleman and Christine Macleod, ‘Attitudes to New Techniques: British Businessmen, 1800-
1950’, Economic History Review, 39 (4), 1986, p. 610; Nick Crafts, ‘Reversing Relative
Economic Decline? The 1980s in Historical Perspective’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy,
7 (3), 1991, p. 92.
67 Chandler, Scale and Scope, pp. 4 – 5, 242; Hannah, ‘Business Development’, in Hannah,
Management Strategy, p.12; William Lazonick, ‘The Cotton Industry’, in Bernard Elbaum and
William Lazonick, eds., The Decline of the British Economy (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986),
p. 45; also Chandler and Daems, ‘Rise of Managerial Capitalism’, in Daems and van der
Wee, Rise of Managerial Capitalism, pp. 1 - 7; Alfred D. Chandler Jnr., ‘The Development of
Modern Management in the US and UK’, in Hannah, Management Strategy, p. 49; Chandler
and Daems, Hierarchies, pp. 1, 9 – 39.
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alleged relative decline of the British economy … is perhaps the most enduring’.68 Clearly
stated the verb ‘decline’ means to bend or slope downwards, as well as to refuse politely.69
For historians, decline often connotes that something, for example the British (or Roman)
empire, is approaching a terminal period in its existence, while in the historiography in
economic and business history, it is usually used in the sense of a quantitative or a
qualitative reduction; a deterioration in strength or degree. Apparently to indicate a slowing
down or deceleration rather than a decline in absolute terms, some economic historians elect
to use ‘retardation’ in its place, and others, ostensible for similar discretionary reasons,
choose to use the term ‘relative decline’.70 As Edgerton proposed, ‘By economic decline
historians usually mean relative economic decline, that is to say a decline in comparison with
other economies.’71 Consistent with the concept of the product life cycle, some technologies,
for example the reciprocating steam engine, have declined and no longer exist, but these
have invariably been replaced by other more efficient technologies.72 Moreover, although
aspects of the British (and the US) economy have declined both relatively and absolutely, it
is clear that, doomsayers past and present notwithstanding, the British nation was not and is
not on the verge of economic collapse.73 Thus, although some historians tacitly attempt to
invoke a sense of termination, for most the clarity is either implicitly or explicitly expressed,
and the meaning of ‘decline’ needs little further explanation.
The relevance of the question of decline in the context of this thesis lies in the vast anthology
of scholarly literature it has inspired, not all of which can be described as ‘declinist’.
Nevertheless, there exists a broad but far from unanimous consensus among economic
historians that the pace of British economic growth slowed down after 1870, although it is
clear that hypotheses both regarding degree and rate of deceleration, and on the reasons for
68 Roger Lloyd-Jones and Myrddin John Lewis, Alfred Herbert Ltd and the British machine tool
industry, 1887–1983 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), p. 19.
69 Chambers Dictionary of Etymology, s.v. “decline”
70 Derek H. Aldcroft and Harry W. Richardson, The British Economy 1870 – 1939 (London:
Macmillan, 1969), p. 101; Lloyd-Jones and Lewis, Alfred Herbert, pp. 20, 182, 204, 208; S. N.
Broadberry and N. F. R. Crafts, 'British Economic Policy and Industrial Performance in the
Early Post-War Period', Business History, 38 (4), 1996, pp. 65, 72, 86; D. C. Coleman and
Christine Macleod, ‘Attitudes to New Techniques: British Businessmen, 1800-1950’,
Economic History Review, 39 (4), 1986, p. 598; Roy Church, ‘The family firm in industrial
capitalism: international perspectives on hypotheses and history’, Business History, 35,(4),
1993, pp 17 – 44, passim.
71 David Edgerton, Science, technology and the British industrial ‘decline’, 1870 – 1970,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 4; see also Dllek Cetindamar
Kakaomerlioglu and Bo Carlsson, (1999) 'Manufacturing In Decline? A Matter Of Definition',
Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 8 (3), 1999, pp. 175 – 196.
72 Philip Kotler, Marketing Management: Analysis, Planning and Control, Fifth Edition
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1984), pp. 353 – 375.
73 Prominent among these is Alfred D. Chandler Jnr., Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of
Industrial Capitalism, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), esp. pp. 235 –
392, passim.
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its occurring, vary considerably.74 Clearly, while the first element of this question remains a
fertile area of debate, even a concise discourse on its quantitative characteristics would
require, in Chandler's words, 'a second volume as extensive as this one’.75 Moreover, the
qualitative aspects of declinist theory, especially the assumptions of scholars seeking
evidence to explain decline, have more enduringly shaped perceptions of firms like Gardner.
As Tomlinson observed, ‘Declinism …embraces the belief that something could and should
be done to improve [British] economic performance’. Assumptions of decline, therefore, lead
not just to scholarly hypotheses relating to cause, but also to exhortations for change, which,
if they find approval in the right circles, can lead to well intentioned, but ultimately damaging,
interventions. In this context, the old maxim ‘if it isn’t broken, don’t fix it’ pertains and is
especially relevant to the 1960s and 1970s when ‘the frequency of … changes [of policies to
deal with ‘decline’] threatened to be part of the problem rather than part of the solution’.76
Thus, although the periods covered by the three empirical chapters of this thesis relate to the
mid- to late twentieth century, it is important to examine the substance of academic thought
relating to earlier periods, and to contemplate its possible affects on the post-Second World
War sociopolitical and business environment.
It should be stressed that a degree of circumspection is necessary when considering
hypotheses relating to British industrial decline, especially when these relate to the second
half of the twentieth century. Unfortunately, and especially following the publication of
Chandler’s first two major monographs in 1962 and 1977, the topic has been somewhat
obfuscated by a tendency among economic and business historians to accentuate the
historical pre-eminence of large-scale multinational enterprise.77 Often disregarding the
‘different economic, legal and cultural trends and traditions’, much of this work has
converged on critical comparisons between Britain’s largest firms and their American,
74 Somewhat lyrically narrated in E. J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1968), pp. 172 – 193; analytically in Peter Mathias, The First Industrial Nation, An
Economic History of Britain, 1700 – 1914 (London: Methuen, 1969), pp. 369 – 393; prudently
in Derek H. Aldcroft and Harry W. Richardson, The British Economy 1870 – 1939 (London:
Macmillan, 1969), p. 101; from a technological perspective in David Edgerton, Science,
technology and the British industrial ‘decline’, 1870 – 1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), pp. 1 – 13; critically in Stephen N. Broadberry, ‘How Did the United
States and Germany Overtake Britain? A Sectoral Analysis of Comparative Productivity
Levels, 1870-1990’, Journal of Economic History, 58 (2), 1998: 375 – 407. There are also
many other sources dealing with assumptions of ‘decline’.
75 Chandler, Scale and Scope, p. 13; for an appraisal of ‘declinism’ from an ‘anti-declinist’
perspective see David Edgerton, ‘The Decline of Declinism’, Business History Review, 71 (2),
1997, pp. 201 – 207.
76 Jim Tomlinson, ‘Inventing ‘decline’: the falling behind of the British economy in the post-war
years’, Economic History Review, 49 (4), 1996, p. 731; also Nick Crafts, ‘Forging Ahead and
Falling Behind: The Rise and Relative Decline of the First Industrial Nation’, Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 12 (2) 1998: 193 – 210, p. 204; R. H. Barback, The Firm and its
Environment (Oxford: Philip Allan, 1984), pp. 206 – 209.
77 Chandler, Strategy and Structure; Alfred D. Chandler Jnr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial
Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977).
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German and Japanese counterparts.78 Typical of this genre, for example, was Derek
Channon’s The Strategy and Structure of British Enterprise, that sought to identify perceived
problems confronting British industry during the early 1970s. Comparing ‘the largest 100
British manufacturing firms in 1969/70 as measured by sales volume’ with ‘their nearest US
equivalents’ based on ‘a single year's performance’, Channon predictably found that British
industrial firms were different, claiming also that they had ‘performed notably worse than
their American counterparts’.79
The importance of this work lies less in its veracity – Channon was not an historian, and his
book was not intended as a work on business history – than in its autogenous affect on other
comparative studies. Drawing somewhat fervently on the authority of Chandler’s similarly
titled work, The Strategy and Structure of British Enterprise formed the substance of many of
Hannah’s assertions in his The Rise of the Corporate Economy, and Chandler himself later
drew heavily on both Channon and Hannah for several of his assertions regarding the
shortcomings of British industrial firms. What connects these works to the topic of this thesis
is that they were typical in their emphasis on the proliferation of family-controlled enterprise
in British industry, and their assertions that such firms represented a threat to the health of
the British economy in general and to the survival of British industry in particular. Although
these assumptions appear to have originated not from contemporary studies of mid-
twentieth-century British firms, but from much earlier accounts relating to the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century, it is, of course, quite possible that Path Dependence, a
somewhat overstated, imprecise and much debated concept, left firms like Gardner trapped
in the past, predestined to repeat the mistakes of previous generations.80
Clearly, the British economy did not actually fail at all in any rational sense but according to
‘declinist’ philosophy, the gradual shift away from manufacturing towards services that took
place during the twentieth century represents something of a defeat. Based on this
assumption, the received wisdom is that Britain needed a large manufacturing sector
dominated by large-scale industrial enterprises like Krupp, General Motors and Mitsubishi,
and it was the persistence of small family firms like Gardner that prevented this from
78 For an analysis of this trend see Klein; ‘full circle’; examples include P. L. Payne, ‘The
Emergence of the Large-scale Company in Great Britain, 1870 – 1914’, in Supple, The Rise,
pp. 355 – 378; Channon, Structure of British Enterprise; Leslie Hannah, The Rise of the
Corporate Economy (London: Methuen, 1976 and 1983), Hannah, Management Strategy, pp.
1 – 19; Chandler and Daems, Managerial Hierarchies; Chandler, Scale and Scope, pp. 235 –
392; Porter, Big Business; John F. Wilson and Andrew Thomson, The Making of Modern
Management, British Management in Historical Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2006), p. 3.
79 Channon, Structure of British Enterprise, p. 221.
80 Chandler, Scale and Scope, pp. 235 – 392, passim; Hannah, Corporate Economy (both
editions), pp. 6, 61, 62, 65, 66, 67, 69, 77, 173 – 174, 181; Channon, Structure of British
Enterprise, p. 17 and passim; Naomi R Lamoreaux, ‘Reframing the past: Thoughts about
business leadership and decision making under uncertainty’, Enterprise and Society, 2 (4),
2001, p. 632; Lloyd-Jones and Lewis, Alfred Herbert, p. 19; for a general appraisal of the
concept of Path Dependence see Gerard Alexander, ‘Institutions, Path Dependence, and
Democratic Consolidation’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 13 (3), 2001, pp. 253 – 260.
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happening. Postulations on how and why they were able to impinge on the structure of
British industry are discussed more fully below, but there is much evidence in the works of
declinist scholars to suggest elements of selectivity concerning the definition of family firms,
which are usually vague, often merely implied, and occasionally modified to suit hypotheses.
IV The Family Firm Defined?
Roy Church’s observation that, although family firms are often discussed, they are seldom
defined is not wholly supported by the literature, and it is clear that several scholars,
especially those whose objective is to group firms together under various headings, have
attempted to construct a set of observable criteria.81 In this context, one of the most detailed
definitions has been offered by Channon, who proposed that:
A company was … termed family-controlled if a family member was the chief
executive officer, if there had been at least two generations of family control,
and if a minimum of five per cent of the voting stock was still held by the family
or trust interests associated with it.82
Occasionally he extended even this wide-ranging and loose specification to include firms that
‘contained significant elements of family control’ and firms in which a ‘degree of father-to-son
continuity’ took place, either at management levels or among the workers.83
The most surprising aspect of Channon’s findings was that, using this definition, he was only
able to categorize around a third of Britain’s largest companies as family firms. Even so, in
order to substantiate his hypothesis, he appears to have found it necessary to introduce a
degree of selective re-categorization based on a palpably syllogistic approach. For example,
while there was no doubt that Guinness ‘was family-owned and controlled at board level’, it
was also a progressive enterprise that achieved significant commercial success, leading
Channon to assert that ‘there was apparently little family intervention in management’ at
Guinness.84
81 Church, ‘Family Firms and Managerial Capitalism’, in Supple, The Rise, p. 398; also Roy
Church, ‘The family firm in industrial capitalism: international perspectives on hypotheses and
history’, Business History, 35 (4), 1993, pp 17 – 44; some recent definitions include, for
example, ‘Enterprises were classified as “family-owned” if individuals related by blood or
marriage ties controlled over 50 per cent of the capital’. Robin Mackie, ‘Family Ownership and
Business Survival: Kirkcaldy, 1870–1970’, Business History, 43 (3), 2001, pp. 1–32; ‘… a
family firm is defined as a business in which more than 50 per cent of the shares are owned
by a single family that is involved in the management of the business and where there is an
intention of transferring the business from one generation of this family to another’.
Emmanuel Ogbonna and Lloyd C. Harris, ‘The adoption and use of information technology: a
longitudinal study of a mature family firm’, New Technology, Work and Employment, 20 (1),
2005, p. 3; ‘By a family business we mean one that is partly owned by one or more family
members who together control at least twenty per cent of the total votes outstanding’. Danny
Miller and Isabelle Le Breton-Miller, ‘Family Governance and Firm Performance: Agency,
Stewardship, and Capabilities’, Family Business Review, 19 (1), 2006; There are many more.
82 Channon, Structure of British Enterprise, p. 16.
83 Ibid., pp. 15 – 16, 75 – 76, 150.
84 ‘[Guinness’] rate of return remained substantially higher than that of any other brewing
company …’ Channon, Structure of British Enterprise, pp. 96 – 97; ‘the Guinness family soon
had a staff of full-time salaried managers’. Chandler, Scale and Scope, p. 267.
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Andrea Colli, who has written much on the subject, proposed that a ‘realistic definition’ of a
family firm is one in which ‘the family’ is able, through its shareholdings, to impose its
preferences in the appointment of individual senior executives and to affect business
strategies.85 Similarly, Chandler and Daems proposed that companies remained within the
family firm category (either ‘personal’ or ‘entrepreneurial’ enterprises) as long as ‘an
entrepreneur, or family, or a few individuals’ could control them through majority
shareholdings.86 One of the broadest definitions, even more wide-ranging than Channon’s,
was Chandler’s later proposal that firms remained ‘personal’ or ‘entrepreneurial’ until ‘the
executives in the administrative hierarchy have no connection with the founders or their
families and have little or no equity in the company’.87 Curiously, whereas three of these
definitions called for a degree of consanguinity, part of the Chandler and Daems model
required only a modicum of collusion. Unfortunately, none of them attempted to define the
term ‘family’ which, as any dictionary shows, has culturally-based ambiguities and can be
interpreted in various ways.
It is interesting to speculate on the probable outcome of the studies of British firms carried
out by Channon and – respectively – Chandler, if these very different definitions could be
applied to each in turn. For example, if Channon had used the Chandler and Daems model,
significantly fewer large-scale British firms would have been classified as family-controlled,
while Chandler’s Scale and Scope model would have encompassed most of them. Further
speculation regarding possible motives for the re-categorization of firms is also tempting. For
example, Scale and Scope was published in 1990, a time when the manufacturing industries
of Britain and America were rapidly contracting.88 Among the large-scale firms in serious
difficulties on both sides of the Atlantic were some that Channon had identified as McKinsey-
reformed, managerially restructured, ‘modern’ enterprises, leading Philip Scranton to
evocatively observe; ‘From the vantage point of the 1990s one cannot celebrate [American]
corporate giants’ optimization of factor efficiencies as uncritically as was possible a
generation ago, now that even managerial jobs are haemorrhaging amid a sea of debts and
restructuring’.89 A cynical observer may well reflect that, while the Chandler and Daems
85 Andrea Colli, The History of Family Business, 1850 – 2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), p. 74.
86 Chandler and Daems, Managerial Capitalism, p. 6.
87 Chandler, Scale and Scope, p. 241.
88 On American industrial ‘decline’ see Michael L. Dertouzos, Richard K. Lester, and Robert M.
Solow, Made in America: Regaining the Productive Edge (Cambridge, Mass: The
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1989); Robert Forrant, ‘Too Many Bends in the River:
The Decline of the Connecticut River Valley Machine Tool Industry 1950 – 2002’, Journal of
Industrial History, 5 (2), 2002, p. 71; ‘the entire U.S. machine tool industry experienced a
debilitating decline during the 1980s’ http://ech.case.edu/ech-cgi/article.pl?id=MT; also Kotler,
Marketing Management, pp. 1 – 2.
89 Philip Scranton, Endless Novelty, Speciality Production and American Industrialization, 1865
– 1925 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 7; Channon, Structure of British
Enterprise, pp. 103, 110, 115, 122, 132, 134, 136, 137, 141, 143, 144, 145, 155, 166, 168,
170, 172, 179, 183, 187, 192.
35
definition, as well as Channon’s, would have classified most of these firms as ‘managerial’,
Chandler’s later specification places nearly all of them well within the family firm category.
Although it would be harsh to surmise that Chandler modified his definitions in order to
portray failing firms as family firms, in a major work on American industry published in the
same year as Scale and Scope, Neil Fligstein, questioning several of Chandler’s deductions
and assumptions, implied a certain level of selectivity.90 Similarly, but more forcefully,
Hannah pointedly criticized what he believed was Chandler’s partiality, alleging that while
many American and German firms administered by boards of directors ‘stuffed full of family
members’ had been classified as managerial enterprises, British firms with much less family
participation had been categorized as family-controlled and managed. Furthermore, and
somewhat sarcastically, Hannah accused Chandler of regarding some British companies as
family firms simply because their chief executives, who were also minority shareholders,
were ‘suspected of having a mother and a father’.91
Thus, the issue of clearly defining the ‘family firm’ in economic and business history
literature, and in several other academic disciplines, continues to challenge. In the
meantime, meaning different things to different people, it will continue to permit researchers
to infer negative or positive characteristics, confirm or refute a range of preconceived
hypotheses, and produce problematic conclusions. Moreover, the uncertainties inherent in
translating generic expressions across economic and cultural boundaries make international
comparisons based on ‘family firms’ largely ineffective. As a term, therefore, ‘family firm’ is
surely too general and imprecise to be useful for economic and business history research.92
V Perceived Measures of Inadequacy
Such ambiguities notwithstanding, the cumulative nature of the general discussion was
summarized by Aldcroft and Richardson as ‘Once retardation is established … the problem
is such that one can carry on adding cause upon cause until one has a very long,
impressive, but meaningless list’. Moreover, their caveat that ‘There are so many arguments
possible that its comprehensiveness is scarcely profitable’ has not discouraged those who
accept the assumption of decline from adding to an increasingly copious body of ‘declinist’
work, and nor has it deterred other, less convinced, scholars from expounding their
90 Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1990), pp. vii, 57, 73, 133, 154, 323; also William Lazonick,
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1 - 35; Andrea Colli, Paloma Fernandez Perez, and Mary B. Rose, ‘National Determinants of
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confutations.93 Appearing regularly in such narratives, propositions that British family firms
were amateurish, riven by classism and snobbery, repressed by conservative and short-term
strategies, and enfeebled through nepotism, are appraised below.
Amateurism
Following a simple schema, in the historiography in economic and business history the
amateurism allegory develops from hypotheses relating to British industrial decline. Applied
to companies of all types and sizes over an extensive timescale, its fundamental argument is
that, with the possible exception of a brief period in the late twentieth century, at no time did
the British education system adequately serve the needs of industry. Revealing scant
awareness of the concept of Newtonian dwarves and giants, still less of the genius of
bootstrap technology, the customary narratives centre on the notion that, during the early
stages of the industrial revolution, most British inventors and designers were self-taught
enthusiasts whose unsophisticated discoveries were the result of pure chance or random
experimentation. This situation was acceptable for as long as industrial products remained
‘basic’ and ‘traditional’, but with the advent of the ‘science-based industries’ of the ‘second
industrial revolution’, innovation increasingly depended on the application of scientific and
technological expertise. In Germany, and to a somewhat lesser extent in the USA, this was
provided by universities, both through their direct links with industry and as sources of highly
qualified ‘professionals’. In Britain, especially in England, no such institutional ties existed
until the early twentieth century, and even then the concept of vocationally centred higher
education was disapproved of by most academics. Moreover, according to some historians,
although the number of ‘professionally qualified’ graduates increased thereafter, because the
majority of British managers were not themselves university educated, they failed to
appreciate the value of university degrees.94
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Few contemporary writers appear to have been concerned that deficiencies in the
nineteenth-century British education system were adversely affecting industry. Indeed, a
perfunctory examination of the works of Samuel Smiles reveals a tacitly favourable opinion
of Britain’s universities and various other educational institutions in addition to, of course, the
value of ‘self help’.95 Even Alfred Marshall, one of the first academic writers to introduce the
concept of a German ‘zeal for solid education’, made many positive comments regarding
Britain’s universities, particularly the ‘new Universities [that] have sprung up in several great
centres, modelled in some respects on that at Manchester’. Although he praised the German
education system ‘as a preparation for the work of modern business’, observing that
‘Germany [held] a leading place in scientific studies’ which was ‘the foundation of industrial
progress’ making Germany ‘without a rival in the organized application of science to practical
problems’, his approval was by no means unqualified. Expressing ‘reasons for doubting
whether the average student at a German University is as well taught, or takes his studies as
seriously as the average student at English Universities’, Marshall divulged other, more
ominous misgivings. Prominent among these was his opinion that, while ‘A chief strength of
German education lies in its order and system. Discipline is indeed a foe to spontaneity;
while spontaneity is the chief creator of original work, and especially of that which makes
epochs in thought’. Such discipline, moreover, was ‘a good preparation for subordinate work
in factory’ but achieved ‘only a partial success in the education of self-reliance; of the ability
to forbear as well as to bear; and of quick intuitive sympathy’: strongly portentous reflections
in view of the sociopolitical catastrophe that was even then fermenting.96
Marshall’s observations were made as part of his assessment of Germany’s improved
performance in steel production and chemicals. However, later and more generalized
analyses, ostensibly expanding on his evaluation, accentuated what they believed to be
Britain’s increasingly unprofessional approach to industry once the first benefits of
industrialization were spent. According to Mathias, for example, by the end of the nineteenth
century, ‘…the brilliant amateur, the practical man with no systematic education in science or
technology … was becoming a liability’.97 Such broad assumptions, unsupported by
empirical evidence, are common in declinist narratives in which idiomatic expressions like
‘practical tinkerers’ and ‘rule-of-thumb’ methods proliferate.98 Discussions regarding the
Economy Since 1880 (Harlow: Longman, 1996), p. 267; Wilson and Thomson, The Making of
Modern, pp. 157 – 161; Lloyd-Jones and Lewis, Alfred Herbert, pp. 198 – 199.
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British education system are also replete with similarly hyperbolized propositions. Whereas
Germany’s numerous universities and colleges ‘provided an army of technicians and
scientists for the new science-intensive industries’, Britain’s mechanics’ institutes ‘trained
only the “non-commissioned officers”… the literate artisan anxious to improve himself into
the foreman or master-fitter status’. 99
Thus, the assumed decline of British industry has often been explained by an alleged failure
of the British education system during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Thereafter, although the number of universities in Britain increased, as did the volume of
undergraduates studying science and technology, these developments did not, according to
the declinist view, restore Britain’s competitive edge. Seeking other causative associations,
many scholars apparently discovered correlations between family firms and amateurism. For
example, although Hannah later recanted his anti-familial stance, in his earlier work he
claimed that in the 1930s ‘public company boards retained strong controlling family
elements, excluding professional[s] in favour of amateurs’.100 His justification for this bland
assertion is discussed more fully below, but he was by no means alone in this view.
Gourvish also referred to the ‘cosy amateurishness’ of ‘conservative family management’
that endured in firms of all sizes between the wars ‘whether … management was dominated
by owners, or salaried managers, or neither’.101 For Wilson and Thomson, a ‘highly
amateurish approach to business’ endured until the post-Second World War era, manifesting
in firms in which vestiges of family influence persisted, regardless of structure, size, or
ownership.102
Chandler’s comprehensive critique of British industry, especially the quality of its leaders,
encompassed all these negative aspects and more besides. Bound up with notions of
snobbery and class distinction, which are discussed below, he claimed that in Britain only
‘the sons of the founding fathers’ received a university education. In Chandler’s opinion,
Oxford and Cambridge were both ‘nurser[ies] for gentlemen, statesmen and administrators’
where the pursuit of knowledge was of little importance; attitudes which, he proposed, were
diffused to ‘the new "red brick" civic universities’ in the twentieth century. In a thinly disguised
manipulation of evidence, a stratagem often adopted by Chandler, he compared the number
of ‘engineering students graduating from the universities of England and Wales’, with ‘three
or four of the leading American engineering schools’ and ‘engineers graduating from German
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 121; Roger Lloyd-Jones and Myrddin J.
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universities and institutes’. The fallaciousness of this ‘comparison’ lies in its exclusion of
Scottish universities and other British technical colleges on the one hand, and the inclusion
of American ‘engineering schools’ and German ‘institutes’ on the other. Moreover, his
observations regarding ‘the years when business schools in the United States and the
Handelshochschulen (literally “commercial colleges”) in Germany were growing rapidly [and]
Oxford and Cambridge taught no business subjects’, which specified no dates and excluded
British commercial colleges, is also misleading. Nevertheless, according to Chandler, with
very few exceptions, British providers of higher education offered ‘no graduate work in …
commerce or business’ until ‘long after World War II’. Typically, he did not clarify just how
long, but he was quite clear that before then ‘Production managers or engineers, as they
were termed, and accountants’ were ‘trained on the job’. Their only means of achieving
managerial status was through ‘serving as apprentices in production or as articled clerks in
accounting and finance’ and subsequent entry into ‘professional societies [which had been
established] well before the turn of the century’.103
Thus, perceptions of ‘amateurism’ with their implicit and explicit associations with ‘family
firms’ are extended from the late nineteenth century and the self-taught ‘mechanics’ to the
impractical intellectuals produced by Oxbridge and the ‘Redbrick’ establishments of the early
to mid-twentieth century and beyond. However, while there appears to be little disagreement
with the general concept that British industry’s perceived ills could have been cured by the
generous application of university graduates, it is not clear what their primary role would
have been. For Marshall, it was obvious that Britain needed more scientists, especially
applied scientists employed in specific aspects of industrial development and production,
while Chandler saw the function of ‘colleges, universities, and institutes’ as ‘generating
scientific information and in graduating trained managers’. In his opinion, scientific learning
was not among the range of shortcomings that made British firms fail in emerging sectors of
the ‘second industrial revolution’. ‘British inventors such as Joseph Swan and Sebastian Z.
Ferranti were as technologically able as Edison, Westinghouse, and Thomson in the United
States and Werner Siemens and his associates in Germany’, and British ‘workers were as
skilled as those in Germany and the United States’. British firms ‘failed’ because they ‘did not
believe that extensive investment in manufacturing, marketing, or management was
necessary’ and for this reason they ‘remained of little significance in the development of the
British electrical machinery industry’.104
In similar context, it may be worth considering some of the influential people in the
development of the internal combustion engine, one of the key ‘dynamic new industries’ that
emerged in the late nineteenth century. Although the Frenchman Philippe Lebon is usually
afforded the title ‘father of the gas engine’, it is generally recognized that the first practical
unit was designed in 1820 by the Englishman William Cecil, a clergyman and a Fellow of
103 Chandler, Scale and Scope, pp. 292 – 293.
104 Ibid., p. 276.
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Magdalene College, Cambridge. In 1860, the self-taught Belgian chemist Jean Joseph
Etienne Lenoir built what many regard as the first gas-powered car, and in 1876, the
German, Nikolaus August Otto, who was a high-school dropout, a shop assistant, and a
travelling salesman, patented the precursor of the modern petrol engine. Henry Ford, whose
name is synonymous with the passenger car industry, left school at 15, worked on his
father's farm, and subsequently served as an apprentice in a machine shop.105 Little
suggestion here of the systematic application of science to industry and, apart from Cecil’s
attachment to the Cambridge Philosophical Society, even less of the university educated
‘professional’.
Like many other implied definitions to be found in the historiography in economic and
business history, ‘amateurism’ is rarely, if ever, clearly explained. Used by some historians to
describe someone who is not professionally qualified, it is usually meant as a pejorative term
to imply incompetence. In some cases, there are hints of unwarranted and largely outmoded
disdain for vocational qualifications gained via systems such as apprenticeships rather than
through higher education. In the engineering industries, master fitters and artisans, whether
literate or not, were at least as necessary to a firm’s success as were designers. Hospitals
need skilled nurses as well as highly qualified surgeons, but to imply that the former are
amateurs is clearly fallacious, as it illogically fails to recognize that they are two
complementary branches of the same profession. While Edgerton’s work has cast some
doubt on the general perceptions of the inferiority of the British education system in relation
to that of Germany, Mary B. Rose has proposed that British enterprise failed ‘to value human
resources during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries’.106 However, while there has
clearly been a prolonged and continuing disregard for the importance of the quality of human
capital, it would be a distortion to attach much, if any, of this negligence to the existence of
family firms, however defined.
Classism and Snobbery
Difficult to prove but easy to allege, classism and snobbery are among the least satisfactory
explanations put forward to support assumptions of British industrial decline. In the absence
of formally instituted social rankings, their existence can only be inferred from behaviour, the
one being cited as an indicator of the other, and the evidence offered for their existence is
therefore largely based upon anecdote and opinion. By nature impressionistic, perceptions of
classism and snobbery, while seeming real enough to those who believe that they exist, can
be neither proven nor refuted. Closely connected to amateurism, they are derogatory,
bilateral, value-loaded terms that from the perspective of the early twenty-first century need
to be treated with caution.
For example, Alfred Marshall’s work abounds with references to the social strata of
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nineteenth-century Britain, such as labouring class, working class, trading class, middle
class, employing class, governing class, etc. However, while his use of such expressions
may appear to demonstrate the existence of class distinction, consideration must be given to
more modern classifications such as JICNAR ratings and the like. Marshall was an
economist, not a sociologist, and it therefore seems reasonable to infer that his terminology
was based on income groups rather than elites.107
Superficially more accusatory, Donald C. Coleman’s much cited ‘Gentleman and Players’
explored the perspective that class distinction negatively influenced the nature of British
entrepreneurial skills. In essence, the essay offered one possible explanation for the
perceived decline of industrial Britain in the late nineteenth century, when ‘the business and
technological drive of the English industrial revolution [had lost] some of its momentum’. Its
core assumption was that ‘The social structure of pre-industrial revolution England had only
one really important division: between those who were Gentlemen and those who were
Players’. Educated at public schools and at Oxford and Cambridge, the ‘Gentlemen’
comprised an exclusive socio-political group which, as the industrial revolution unfolded, the
newly enriched ‘Players’, ‘practical men’ who had been ‘trained’ but not ‘educated’, wished to
join.108
According to Coleman, in striving for recognition and social status, the ‘Players’ diminished
their own and their descendants’ ability to function as entrepreneurs. While the first
generation used their affluence to acquire country estates in order to become accepted as
part of the ‘landed gentry’, the second or third generation were sent to public school and
Oxbridge, institutes that were ‘in many respects … club[s] for young men of the nobility and
gentry, or at least of wealth’. Here they received a ‘Gentleman’s’ education, which
emphasized ‘classical learning’ and chivalrous grooming in preparation for a life of idleness
and leisure. In such establishments, industry or ‘the making of things’ was associated with
‘manual labour and thus to be comprehended within the proper tasks not of the gentleman’.
Instead, the descendents of wealthy industrialists were instructed in the esoteric and abstract
facets of the arts and the classics; anything in fact that could not be regarded as ‘functional
training directly aimed at a specific vocation’. Thus, according to Coleman, Britain’s industrial
dynamism may have weakened between 1870 and 1914 because the second and third
generation of the Players were by then ‘too busy becoming gentlemen’.109
The chief obstruction to correctly understanding Coleman’s otherwise perceptive essay is the
clearly implied but generally false analogy between the game of cricket and the structure of
management in British industry. In the famous and long-lasting Gentlemen and Players
107 Marshall, Industry and Trade, passim; on social stratification and its influence on consumer
behaviour in a modern context see Kotler, Marketing Management, pp. 126 – 127.
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92– 98, 100 – 102, 105 – 107.
109 Coleman, ‘Gentlemen’, pp. 92– 98, 100 – 102, 105 – 107.
42
series of matches, a team of unpaid ‘amateurs’ played against a team of paid ‘professionals’;
ambiguous terms that Coleman neglected to delineate. Unfortunately, his casualness
encouraged the reader to interpret ‘amateur’ not merely as non-professional, but as
unprofessional in the sense of being untrained and incompetent, both ‘gentlemanly’
characteristics that formed one of the key aspects of his hypothesis. In reality, W. G. Grace,
thought by many to be the finest cricketer of all time, was neither a public school pupil nor an
Oxbridge graduate. Thus, at least as determined by Coleman’s analogy, although he was a
‘Gentleman’ in terms of the game of cricket, he was a ‘Player’ in terms of his ‘class’.110
As Coleman later maintained, his ‘Gentlemen and Players’ essay posed many questions and
stated no firm conclusions. He was clear, moreover, that it offered no ‘causal relationship’
with ‘entrepreneurial failure’ and was not meant to disparage the ‘great majority’ of British
managers who ‘had never attended public schools and ancient universities’. Nevertheless,
although he expressed surprise at ‘its use by others to support much more sweeping
contentions’, he must surely have been aware of the appealingly provocative nature of many
of its observations, and especially its connotations with the quintessentially English game of
cricket.111 Thus, predictably, other historians and scholars have made the ‘gentlemen and
players’ analogy a key device in their attempts to illustrate the existence of snobbery and
class distinction in British industrial firms, not just in the late nineteenth century, but in the
post-Second World War era and after.
Hannah, for example, writing about British industry in the 1960s, asserted that ‘the peculiar
British tradition of (in cricketing terms) excluding professional 'players' from [family-
controlled] board positions in favour of “gentlemen” amateurs [had] died slowly’. However,
other than citing Coleman’s essay in general, Hannah offered no evidence to support this
assumption, thereby casting doubt on its veracity.112
Chandler, who was unequivocally in agreement with Hannah’s position, extended the
‘Gentlemen and Players’ analogy even further, subtly altering the nature of its fundamental,
but speculative, propositions in order to support his negative views of British family firms.
Again citing Coleman as the only ‘evidence’ for his hypothesis, he claimed that in British
industry there were two ranks of managers, the ‘gentleman’ and the ‘players’ – an
amplification also assumed by Wilson and Thompson, who alluded to ‘the traditional
distinction between “gentlemen” at the head of a business and the “players” who performed
the mundane managerial and supervisory tasks’. The former, Chandler asserted, were ‘the
sons of the founding fathers’ (and therefore family members) while the latter were ‘the
110 Lord Hawke, Lord Harris, Sir Home Gordon, The Memorial Biography of Dr. W. G. Grace
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salaried managers, the practical men’. In his view, although the ‘players’ were competent
administrators who had achieved their status through their ability, their main ambitions were
to become ‘gentlemen’, and they therefore had little interest in the long-term growth and
security of the firm.113
Writing in 1973, Derek F. Channon ascribed what he perceived as the relatively deficient
state of British managers, their ‘attitudes and … level of technical competence’, and their
‘low degree of professionalism and effectiveness’, to ‘the persistent emphasis on social
class’. The evidence offered for this assertion was that ‘many directors [of British firms] had
been educated at public schools and [at] Oxford or Cambridge’ which, he proposed,
‘reflected the relative immobility of the British social structure [and] tended to reinforce class
barriers’. This situation created ‘negative attitudes in worker-management relationships,
characterized by a "them" and "us" dichotomy’. How and why a public school education
created substandard managers was not made clear, and Channon’s negative opinion of
Oxbridge culture appears to have been based entirely on Anthony Sampson’s somewhat
whimsical, and anecdotal, caricature of British university life, replete with Wodehousian
images of an ‘unchanging calendar of boat-races, college balls and summer frolics’.114 In the
absence of clear evidence or realistic examples, Channon’s assertions were merely claims
of value that, because they cannot be proven true or false, must be regarded with utmost
circumspection.
Taking a somewhat different perspective on the snobbery and class distinction hypothesis,
Wilson and Thompson pointed to the negative image created by ‘evocative writings, such as
Blake's “dark satanic mills” and Dickens' Bleak House’ which, they claimed, ‘associated
[industry] with lower-class activities’. Such ‘negative social attitudes’ deterred even ‘middle-
class Britain’ whose members preferred a career in ‘the professions, and especially the
“learned” professions, law and medicine, finance and commerce, and the civil service in
Britain and the Empire’ to a job in industrial management. The railway companies, on the
other hand, had no such problems. These large-scale, vertically integrated enterprises not
only ‘recruited [managers] from upper middle-class backgrounds’ they also undertook
‘training [that] was mostly in-house and practical’. Nevertheless, Wilson and Thompson were
adamant that ‘one can easily exaggerate the impact of any innovations in British railway
management, while the persistence of a “gentlemen and players” structure severely limited
the elevation in [the] status of salaried managers’. However, outside these purportedly
exceptional conditions, and especially in the engineering industries, a career in industry was
not the first choice of anyone whose background could be considered much above
proletariat. Such attitudes, suggested Wilson and Thomson, contrast with those in the
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(purportedly egalitarian) United Sates where ‘most of those who practiced mechanical
engineering were from the upper middle class’, while in Britain such things were ‘of course’
uncommon and consequently British engineers ‘could never be described as an elite’.115
While it should be re-emphasized that the existence of imprecise and veiled phenomena like
classism and snobbery are virtually impossible to establish or refute, some contradictory
evidence exists that casts at least some doubt on the elitist hypothesis. Charles Parsons, the
son of an earl and certainly therefore a member of the British ‘upper class’, graduated with a
first class honours degree in mathematics at Cambridge university in 1877. He then joined
Clarke, Chapman, an engineering firm on Tyne and Wear, as an apprentice, working there
for several years before designing his revolutionary range of steam turbines. Harry Ricardo,
designer of internal combustion engines and the founder of the global technology group
Ricardo plc, came from a family of bankers. Born in 1885, and educated at Rugby, he was
also a Cambridge graduate. Edwin Alliott Verdon Roe, founder of AVRO, was born in 1877.
The son of a medical doctor, he served an apprenticeship at the Lancashire and Yorkshire
Railway’s locomotive factory at Horwich and later studied marine engineering at King's
College, London.116 These well-known engineers and entrepreneurs were by no means the
only British ‘gentlemen’ whose curricula vitae cast doubt on assumptions of classism and
snobbery, as well as on allegations of ‘amateurishness and stupidity’.117 As Broadberry and
Crafts and others have suggested, to portray British management in such terms is an illusion
created by attempts to discover ‘simple answers to what is a complex problem’.118
Nepotism
Unlike most of the other shortcomings with which family firms are commonly indicted,
nepotism is – or at least should be – precisely definable. According to Chambers Dictionary
of Etymology, and therefore losing nothing in its transatlantic voyage, it is the practice of
‘favouritism shown towards relatives [which] In its early use … referred to the practice of
popes and other church dignitaries of showing special favour to nephews or other relatives in
115 Wilson and Thomson, The Making of Modern, pp. 44 – 45, 57 – 58, 148.
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conferring office’. Expressly, it is not the same as patronage which, although it presumes the
power to appoint people to vacant positions, has no familial or subjectively preferential
connotations.119 Nepotism is not the same as ‘inherited business ownership’ or having
friends and relatives working in senior positions, and nor is it merely a value-loaded term
with ‘a pejorative connotation’. 120 It is the unambiguous and illegitimate use of position; a
malpractice that unfairly favours relatives or friends over all others, regardless of ability.
In the historiography in economic and business history, fallacious assumptions of the
persistence of nepotism in British family firms are common. For example, in the censoriously
unrestrained style available only to the Pulitzer Prize winner, and offering practically no
supporting evidence, Chandler asserted that ‘In the United States nepotism had a pejorative
connotation [while in] Britain it was an accepted way of life’.121 Making a similarly sweeping
and equally reproachful comparison, Payne fallaciously stated that ‘In American companies
… one man was as good as another’: unless, presumably, one was not a Native American,
an African American, or an Asian American.122 Paraphrasing Chandler, he proposed that
‘Nepotism among [American] professional entrepreneurs was frowned upon’ whereas in
Britain ‘Leadership by inheritance applied in a great range of industrial activities’, a practice
that ‘inhibited the ascent of the brilliant salaried official’. Ascribing this situation to the
proliferation of family firms in certain industries, Payne suggested that ‘the channels of
advancement were blocked by family control’. Like Chandler, however, he submitted sparse
evidence to support this assumption other than a reference to Habakkuk's, American
Technology in the Nineteenth Century, and even this appears to have been quoted
somewhat out of context. When Habakkuk referred to ‘a haemorrhage of capital and ability
from industry and trade’ he did not attribute this to family firms and nepotism, but to what he
described as ‘sources of power and prestige besides business’ such as ‘bureaucracy, the
army and the professions’, that existed ‘in other countries of Western Europe as well as in
England’.123 Moreover, when Habakkuk did refer specifically to nepotism he proposed that it
came about as a symptom of ‘purely economic circumstances’ in Britain which, after the
1870s, had adversely, and temporarily, affected recruitment.124
Patronage, according to Wilson and Thompson, ‘must be distinguished from nepotism,
119 Chambers Dictionary of Etymology, s.v. “nepotism”, “patronage”.
120 The term ‘inherited business ownership’ is culled from Nicholas, ‘Clogs to Clogs’, pp. 688 –
689.
121 Chandler, Scale and Scope, p. 292.
122 On the mythical nature of American egalitarianism see, for example, Pyong Gap Min, ed.,
Encyclopaedia of Racism in the Unites States (Westpoint: Greenwood, 2005); Payne,
‘Emergence’, in Supple, The Rise, p. 374.
123 Payne, idem; H. J. Habakkuk, American Technology in the Nineteenth Century, The Search
for Labour-Saving Inventions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), pp. 190 – 191;
on the mythical nature of American egalitarianism see, for example, Pyong Gap Min, ed.,
Encyclopaedia of Racism in the Unites States (Westpoint: Greenwood, 2005).
124 Habakkuk, American Technology, pp. 212 – 213.
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because in non-family firms directors regarded the ability to find employment for friends as
part of their privileges’. Clearly, however, as the above-mentioned Chambers definitions
show, this view is erroneous in that a licence to appoint friends, willy-nilly, to vacant positions
is a key aspect of nepotism and an obvious malpractice. Referring to the early years of
British industrialization as ‘the personal stage of industrial capitalism, with families taking
responsibility for creating, financing, and running the vast majority of firms’ Wilson and
Thompson suggested that ‘Nepotism … dominated recruitment patterns, with family
members featuring at all levels of the organization’. Given that, ‘the central issue was trust …
especially as professional managers were regarded as highly unreliable’, it is unclear why
they elected to use this pejorative term. Considering the perceptibly Chandlerian locus of
their book, it is also rather odd that they draw on Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations and his
distrustful observations regarding the eighteenth-century form of joint stock company vis-à-
vis the virtues of the ‘private copartnery’ for authority. Moreover, if, as Smith asserted and
Pollard contended, managers at that time were negligent, profuse and deceitful drunkards, it
seems somewhat contrary to regard the employment of ostensibly more trustworthy friends
and relatives as nepotism.125
To refer to the employment of friends and relatives, regardless of the circumstances, as
‘nepotism’ is to misuse the term and to diminish its pejorative essence. Furthermore, it is
logically unsound to assume that managers were untrained and incompetent simply because
they were friends and relatives of the owners. As Tom Nicholas observed, there is little
evidence to support such contentions, and while some case studies have produced evidence
to substantiate recurrent ‘dynastic downfall’, others show that many British family managed
firms enjoyed long-term success. Moreover, it cannot be asserted with complete confidence
that all ‘professional’ managers, whether related to the owners or not, were well trained and
efficient. It can, however, be argued that testimonials from tried and trusted colleagues or
personal recommendations are the most reliable references, and there are clearly some
distinct advantages in employing blood relatives. Fidelity and loyalty are more readily
assured, as is the discipline derived from the availability of extracurricular and significantly
more subtle sanctions.126
Short-termism and Conservatism
Short-termism and conservatism, both relative terms, are among the most frequently
presented explanations for assumptions of the deterioration of Britain’s industrial dynamism.
The scenario usually derives from comparisons, made at various stages between the late
125 Wilson and Thomson, The Making of Modern, pp. 52, 67; Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the
Nature And Causes of the Wealth of Nations, http://www.adamsmith.org/smith/won-b5-c1-
article-1-ss3.htm; Sidney Pollard, The Genesis of Modern Management; a study of the
industrial revolution in Great Britain (London: Edward Arnold, 1965), p. 21.
126 Nicholas, ‘Clogs to Clogs’, pp. 688 – 713; Wilson and Thomson, The Making of Modern, p.
52; for specific examples of personal and familial ‘guarantees’ of fidelity see Alan McKinlay
and Robbie Guerriero Wilson, ‘Small acts of “cunning”: Bureaucracy, inspection and the
career, c. 1890 – 1914’, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 17, 2006, pp. 657 – 678.
47
nineteenth and the mid-twentieth centuries, between the size of Britain’s largest companies
and those of Germany, America, Japan and others. Typically, the outcomes of these
evaluations deduce that British firms were unable to compete, either at home or abroad,
because they were too small to realize the economic benefits of large-scale production.
Developing and extending this line of reasoning, historians and scholars have interpreted
these conditions as evidence of an unwillingness to accept change and a reluctance to
progress and expand. Based on the hypothesis that many British firms were either family-
owned and controlled or strongly influenced by familial interests, and bound up with
assumptions of amateurism, classism, snobbery and nepotism, explanations for the
persistence of small firms have centred on two main interrelated causes. The most often
cited reason for a lack of growth is that family members, usually the descendents of the
founder, awarded themselves overgenerous dividends and salaries, thus depriving family
firms of the cash they needed in order to grow. Another recurring explanation is based on the
perception that family managers were reluctant to raise investment capital because this
would have involved the appointment of institutional representatives to the board of directors,
thereby allowing ‘outsiders’ to participate in management. In essence, family directors and
managers are accused of viewing their firms as a source of income, a provider of secure
employment, and a vehicle for social recognition, rather than a responsibility to be
altruistically cultivated for the benefit of others.
Perceptions of the ‘cash cow’ interpretation of short-termism are by no means new to the
historiography in economic thought or economic history. As early as 1920, Alfred Marshall
referred to an article in The Times which had reported, somewhat anecdotally, that some of
the descendents of the founders of some west country textile manufacturers were, having
retired from business, living on rural estates. Ostensibly, and arguably, a step towards the
‘separation of ownership and management’ Marshall viewed such developments as evidence
of a ‘falling off among the trading classes of this country from the more energetic practice of
former periods’.127 In similar vein, Mathias asserted that, by the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, ‘the mill was mainly thought of as the provider of revenues … rather than
as the centre of ambitions of the industrialist’.128 Initially ascribed to the sociopolitical
ambitions of Victorian and Edwardian family owners, short-termism has also been offered as
evidence to explain the perceived shortcomings of British industry during the mid-twentieth
century.129 Chandler described the intervallic disbursement of profits as one of British
industry’s weaknesses, alleging that it stemmed from ‘owner-managers’ who ‘often preferred
to payout profits in current dividends rather than reinvesting them in the firm for long-term
127 "Decay of a famous industry", The Times, 19 December 1904, quoted in Marshall, Industry
and Trade, p. 68; Chandler and Daems, ‘Rise of Managerial Capitalism’, in Daems and van
der Wee, Rise of Managerial Capitalism, p. 6.
128 Mathias, First Industrial, p. 385; this tendency was also stressed in Coleman, ‘Gentlemen’, p.
110.
129 Stressed, for example, in Coleman and Macleod, ‘Attitudes’, pp. 588 – 611.
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growth’. According to Chandler, short-termism was one of the main reasons why, compared
to American managerial enterprises, ‘British firms remained smaller and more personally
managed [and] they often failed to develop the facilities and skills necessary to grow by
expanding into new markets abroad or into related industries’.130 Curiously, this view runs
counter to Channon’s somewhat unconvincing and totally insupportable suggestion that,
among the ‘several reasons for Britain's weakness’ compared to the United States, was ‘the
fact that [in British family firms] high profits were considered somehow immoral’.131
The xenophobia hypothesis seems to have developed somewhat later and from a limited
number of mainly general sources published in the 1920s and 1930s including Clapham’s
much-cited An Economic History of Britain.132 Aldcroft and Richardson, for example, drew on
Clapham as well as Sturmey’s narrowly focused British Shipping and World Competition for
their assertion that British ‘Firms remained small through lack of finance only in so far as
family entrepreneurs were reluctant to enter the capital market for fear of letting in “foreign”
control’: a view nuanced by others including Church, Payne, Wilson and Thompson, and
argued ad nauseam by Chandler.133 Others, however, have proposed that concerns about
‘outsiders’ in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century may well, at least in some
cases, have been warranted, and as Geoffrey Jones and others have suggested, for many
firms, ‘going public’ in the post-Second World War era led to short-termism of a different
kind.134
Short-termism and conservatism are both imprecise and somewhat bifurcated concepts.
Because they can only be assumed, the parameters of ‘long-term’ and ‘short term’ are never
specified, and the mutual exclusivity of investment for growth and the regular payment of
dividends are never substantiated.135 In response to such assertions, it can be argued that
the primary purpose of enterprise is to generate profits, and that individuals and institutions
that invest in firms do so in the expectation of realizing a premium. It is questionable,
therefore, whether shareholders – either family members or others – would be satisfied with
130 Chandler, Scale and Scope, pp. 298, 310, 348, 390.
131 Channon, Structure of British Enterprise, pp. 16, 225.
132 J. H. Clapham, An Economic History of Britain, vols. 1 – 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1926 - 1938); on the relevance of this and other sources see Coleman and Macleod,
‘Attitudes’, pp. 588 – 589.
133 Aldcroft and Richardson, British Economy, p. 164; S. G. Sturmey, British Shipbuilding and
World Competition (London: Athlone, 1962); Roy Church, ‘Family and Failure: Archibald
Kenrick and Sons Ltd., 1900 – 1950’, in Supple, Essays, p. 121; Chandler, Scale and Scope,
p. 286 and passim; Payne, ‘Emergence’, in Supple, The Rise, p. 370; Wilson and Thomson,
The Making of Modern, pp. 41, 146, 258 – 260.
134 Lucy Newton, ‘Capital networks in the Sheffield region, 1850 – 1885’, in Wilson and Popp,
Industrial Clusters, pp. 134 – 135; Geoffrey Jones, ‘Global perspectives and British
paradoxes’, Business History Review, 71 (2), 1997, pp. 291 – 299.
135 Church, ‘The family firm in industrial capitalism’, p. 3; Aldcroft and Richardson, British
Economy, p. 184.
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‘increased assets’ and ‘long-term tenure for managers and ... workers’ instead.136 As
Penrose emphasized, the profit motive is more important than growth and the ‘attainment of
[other “objectives”] is associated directly with the ability to make profits’.137 Moreover, as
Owens logically demonstrated, to suggest that the distribution of dividends somehow
jeopardized firms’ viability is clearly unreasonable, because family owners of firms on which
their future prosperity depended obviously had a stake in their survival.138 There are,
furthermore, sound commercial reasons relating to firms’ reluctance to expand beyond the
optimum size in relation to markets that they serve. While large-scale firms may benefit from
technical economies of scale in some industry sectors, in others the level of demand favours
small or medium-sized enterprises, and in such cases increased capacity would simply result
in diseconomies.139
VI Perceptions of the British Manufacturing Engineering Industry
In addition to the range of alleged family firm weaknesses, other evidence to explain
assumptions of British industrial decline has been drawn from perceived shortcomings in the
British manufacturing engineering sector. Again largely centred on assertions of late-
nineteenth and early twentieth-century industrial retardation, the general hypotheses offer
various causal connections with alleged entrenched weakness and inherently flawed
technology evidenced by a failure to devise more productive manufacturing systems, and
compounded by a reluctance to adopt the superior technology developed by other more
inventive cultures. Arguments to support the backward technology concept are usually based
on the premise that, although Britain was the world’s leader in manufacturing engineering
technology at the time of the Industrial Revolution, during the nineteenth century, newly
industrialised nations, particularly America and Germany, developed superior manufacturing
techniques and more advanced machine tools so that, by 1914, they had moved ahead of
Britain in a number of important industry sectors. This scenario is then extended to include
the rest of the twentieth century during which Britain is perceived to have continued to fall
behind, a trend that culminated in a series of major crises during the nineteen-seventies and
the subsequent ‘deindustrialization’ of the world’s first industrial nation.
Usually based on comparisons with America, the obsolete systems theory holds that the
most progressive innovations and techniques were created, and became established
136 Chandler, Scale and Scope, p. 390.
137 Edith Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959),
p. 30.
138 Alistair Owens, 'Inheritance and the Life-Cycle of Family Firms in the Early Industrial
Revolution', Business History, 44 (1), 2002, pp. 21 – 46; For an illuminating discussion on the
‘the extended horizons of family firms’ see Harvey S. James Jnr., ‘Owner as Manager,
Extended Horizons and the Family Firm’, International Journal of the Economics of Business,
6 (1), 1999, pp. 41 – 55.
139 Barback, The Firm, pp. 142 – 145; E. Victor Morgan, Economics (London: Pitman, 1973), pp.
113 – 123; Bhaskar, The Future, p. 251; French, ‘Public Policy and British Commercial’, p.
38.
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practice, in the United States, whereas Britain’s manufacturing engineering firms continued
to embrace outdated methods and systems. Such assertions are often centred on the advent
of an ‘American Invasion’ when an influx of goods of all types, including relatively large
numbers of machine tools, entered Britain from the USA during the 1890s. Why this should
be accepted as evidence of British engineering backwardness is not clear, and it certainly
casts doubt on suggestions that British firms were reluctant to embrace ‘superior American
methods’. An analysis of around 160 machine tools purchased by Gardner between 1905
and 1912 shows that most were British, and although many were of American origin, these
do not appear to have been especially advanced, and the most innovative and sophisticated
were a small number of German built automatic gear cutting machines. (see Appendix 1)
Moreover, given the highly cyclical nature of the machine tool market, there could well be a
more straightforward explanation for the ‘America invasion’ than those routinely offered.140
The American System
Perhaps the most extravagant of these claims relate to the now largely discredited, but still
occasionally cited, concept of a unique ‘American system’ (usually of manufacture,
manufacturing or manufactures), which is supposed to have begun in Massachusetts in the
late eighteenth century and which had matured into a discrete and highly efficient production
paradigm by the mid-nineteenth century.141 Inference is drawn from interpretations of
historical events; particularly the Great Exhibition of 1851 in London and the subsequent
purchase of a quantity of American built machine tools for installation at a newly constructed
British government arms factory. The hypothesis advanced is that visitors to the Crystal
Palace exhibition were greatly impressed by the quality of American weapons and other
goods exhibited there. Consequently the government, which was at that time planning to
build a plant at Enfield for the production of muskets and rifles, decided to send a team of
experts to America to obtain first hand knowledge of American manufacturing methods.
During their tour of inspection, they became aware of the superior nature of American
production techniques in a range of industries, so much so that they immediately
recommended that the Enfield plant be equipped almost exclusively with American machine
tools. Some scholars have presented this, and an assortment of contiguous evidence, as
140 S. B. Saul, ‘The American Impact on British Industry 1895-1914’, Business History, 3 (1),
1960, pp. 19 – 38.
141 Roe used ‘manufacture’ Joseph Wickham Roe, English and American Tool Builders (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1916), p. 129; others used ‘manufacturing’, for example John
E. Sawyer, ‘The Social Basis of the American System of Manufacturing’, Journal of Economic
History, 14 (4), 1954, pp. 361-379; also Alfred D. Chandler Jnr. ‘The Enduring Logic of
Industrial Success’, in Supple, The Rise, p. 240; others used ‘manufactures’, for example
Nathan Rosenberg, ed., The American System of Manufactures, The Report of the
Committee on the Machinery of the United States, 1855, and the Special Reports of George
Wallis and Joseph Whitworth 1854 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1969), pp. 1 –
86; also Otto Mayr and Robert C. Post, eds., Yankee Enterprise, The Rise of the American
System of Manufactures (Washington DC: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1981); also Jonathan
Zeitlin, ‘Between flexibility and mass-production: strategic ambiguity and selective adaptation
in the British engineering industry, 1830-1914’, in Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin,
eds., World of Possibilities, Flexibility and Mass Production in Western Industrialization
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 241, 252.
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irrefutable proof that manufacturing engineering technology was, at that time, more
advanced in America than in Britain.
Accounts of American exhibits at Crystal Palace, including ‘Colonel’ Samuel Colt’s revolvers,
Robbins and Lawrence’s rifles, and McCormick’s agricultural equipment, are presented as
evidence of the existence in America of the means to produce, without the use of skilled
workers, large quantities of standardized, high-quality goods. It has also been claimed that,
when these were seen at the Great Exhibition in 1851, the term ‘American system’ was
‘promptly’ created to exemplify their ‘novel and original’ attributes.142 Such assertions,
however, are difficult to sustain, and the origins of the expression ‘American system’ are
somewhat obscure.143 The earliest use appeared in The Report of the Committee on the
Machinery of the United States, compiled by a group of British government representatives
following their visit to America in 1855.144 It also appeared in James Nasmyth’s
autobiography, edited by Samuel Smiles, written in 1863 and published some years later, but
neither of these sources attributed any specific qualities or characteristics in any acceptable
way.145 More tangible references can be found in late nineteenth-century publications. For
example, in 1881, a Manchester-based firm was advertising itself as a manufacturer of
‘Special machinery for wood working; line shaft fittings on the ‘American system’’.146 Other
references, used to denote specific variations in the details and arrangements of machinery,
such as mill gearing and lathe beds, appear in technical reference books, but none of these
convey a set of features in the context adopted in later scholarly works.147
The first historiographical work to describe the ‘American system’ in paradigmatic terms was
published in 1916 by Joseph Wickham Roe who asserted that it was ‘The system of
interchangeable manufacture’ which embodied ‘the art of producing complete machines or
142 Rosenberg, The American System of Manufactures, pp. 1 – 86, esp. p. 5; also, Merritt Roe
Smith, ‘Military Entrepreneurship’, in Mayr and Post, Yankee Enterprise, p. 64; Ferguson,
‘History and Historiography’, in Mayr and Post, Yankee Enterprise, p. 1; David A. Hounshell,
From the American System to Mass Production, 1800 - 1932, The Development of
Manufacturing Technology in the United States (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1984), p. 16.
143 ‘The exact point of origin is elusive … as is the first use of the term by historians’ Ferguson,
‘History and Historiography’, p. 1 – 23; also Mayr and Post, Yankee Enterprise, pp. xv – xx.
144 The complete sentence reads, ‘After having heard what was said at the Parliamentary
Committee, by those who were opposed to the New Armoury, and having now seen the
American system in operation, the Committee are of opinion that the expectations which were
held out to result from the proposed Armoury will be more than realized’. Rosenberg, The
American System of Manufactures, p. 66.
145 ‘The (British) Government resolved to introduce the American system, by which Arms might
be produced much more perfectly, and at a great diminution of cost’. James Nasmyth, James
Nasmyth: Engineer: An Autobiography, edited by Samuel Smiles (New York: John Murray,
1897), p. 260; It may be significant, however, that Smiles made no mention of this remark in
his Industrial Biography, published in 1863, in which he dedicates a chapter to Nasmyth.
Samuel Smiles, Industrial Biography, Iron Workers and Tool Makers (London: Murray, 1863).
146 ‘Richards and Atkinson, 7 Blackfriars St., Salford. Special machinery for wood working; line
shaft fittings on the American system’. Slater’s, 1881, p. 78.
147 For example, Henry J. Spooner, Machine Design, Construction and Drawing (London:
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mechanisms, the corresponding parts of which are so nearly alike that any part may be fitted
into any of the given mechanisms’. According to Roe, the ‘American System’ had been
adopted by Eli Whitney to facilitate the production of muskets for the American army in
‘about 1800’. His vague descriptions of Whitney’s methods and machinery were limited
mainly to a proposal to use ‘machinery moved by water’ to reduce the number of workers
required, and his portrayal of Samuel Colt’s plant at Hartford, Connecticut, built in 1854 –
1855, was only slightly less ambiguous. Colt, he suggested, ‘adopted the principles of
interchangeable manufacture … in a most advanced form’, and equipped his factory with
‘automatic and semi-automatic machinery’ which ‘practically eliminated’ manual labour.
However, only two of these machines are described: one was ‘A type of manufacturing miller
... still known as the Lincoln miller’, and the other was ‘a type of hammer’ operated ‘first by a
set of dogs, later by a central screw’ but not at any time without ‘the operator [who] walked
around the machine’.148 Unsurprisingly, other scholars have defined the ‘American system’
somewhat differently, often referring to ‘uniformity’ in the same or similar context as
‘interchangeability’.149
According to H. J. Habakkuk, the ‘American system’ embodied various techniques, but its
most important function was a reduction in the use of manual labour. In reaching this
assumption, he proceeded from the questionable premise that ‘mechanization,
standardization and mass-production … appeared (in America) before 1850’. Placing less
emphasis on interchangeability, the development of which he attributed to Whitney and
North, Habakkuk accepted only that it may have contributed to ‘the early mechanization of
the US arms industry’, and that the use of ‘very specialized’ machine tools was a more
significant feature of the ‘American system’.150 Nathan Rosenberg, who appears to be the
first academic to have used the complete expression 'American System of Manufacturing’,
148 Roe, English and American, pp. 128 – 129, 132 – 133, 137.
149 For example ‘uniformity was assured by the use of jigs and fixtures’. Edward Ames and
Nathan Rosenberg, ‘The Enfield Arsenal in Theory and History’, Economic Journal, 78, 1968,
p. 840 (note); ‘Lee adopted … North's … "uniform system of manufacture." Edwin A. Battison,
‘A New Look at the Whitney Milling Machine’, Technology and Culture, 14 (2), 1973: p. 593;
‘without greater uniformity of parts further multiplication of output would entail massive
problems’. David A. Hounshell, ‘The System: Theory and Practice’, in Mayr and Post, Yankee
Enterprise, p. 136; also Hounshell, American System to Mass Production, pp. 1 – 65; Robert
A. Howard, ‘Interchangeable Parts Re-examined: The Private Sector of the American Arms
Industry on the Eve of the Civil War’, Technology and Culture, 19 (4), 1978, pp. 633 – 649;
Rosenberg, The American System of Manufactures, pp. 1 – 86; Merritt Roe Smith, ‘John H.
Hall, Simeon North, and the Milling Machine: The Nature of Innovation among Antebellum
Arms Makers’, Technology and Culture, 14 (2), 1973, pp. 573 – 59; Merritt Roe Smith,
‘Military Entrepreneurship’, in Mayr and Post, Yankee Enterprise, pp. 63 – 102; Robert S.
Woodbury, ‘The Legend of Eli Whitney and Interchangeable Parts’, Technology and Culture,
1 (4), 1960, pp. 235 – 253.
150 Habakkuk, American Technology, pp. 5, 104 - 107, 151; on the issue of US labour scarcity
also E. Rothbarth, ‘Causes of the Superior Efficiency of USA Industry Compared with British
Industry’, Economic Journal, 56, 1946, pp. 383 – 390; for a spectacularly chauvinistic
depiction of the superiority of early American machine tool technology see Pamela Lowry,
‘The Development of American Machine Tools’, Executive Intelligence Review, 33(25), 2006:
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included the use of automatic machinery amongst its constituent qualities, but placed more
emphasis on interchangeable parts and the use of gauges.151 Among a range of non-
technical qualities attributed to the ‘American system’ are intangible aspects such as good
housekeeping and amicable employee relations.152
From the above sources, and especially from the works of Roe, Rothbarth, Habakkuk and
Rosenberg, a concept of the ‘American system’, as depicted in historiographical literature,
can be formulated. In essence, it was an approach to the manufacture of mechanical devices
based on the elimination of hand fitting during assembly. This was accomplished through the
production of interchangeable components by the extensive use of automatic, semi-
automatic and special machine tools, together with specially made limit gauges. Either as an
indirect benefit, or as its primary purpose, the ‘American system’ greatly reduced the need
for firms to employ skilled workers. Moreover, although it was first envisaged as a method for
the production of small arms, its distinct advantages made the ‘American system’ attractive
to manufacturers of other machinery. Its use, therefore, was widely adopted in the United
States, giving firms such as McCormick and Singer distinct advantages over their
competitors. It later spread to other parts of the industrialised world, becoming a paradigm of
efficient manufacturing engineering practice, and forming the basis for modern mass-
production.153
Some historians and scholars have cast doubts on several of the assumptions surrounding
the concept of an ‘American system’, and for Rosenberg, ‘The notion that the system of
interchangeable parts sprang full-blown from Whitney's genius in musket manufacture has
now been accorded a decent burial’.154 George H. Daniels concurred, writing in 1970 that ‘no
one except writers of American history textbooks believes any longer that a complete system
of interchangeable-parts manufacture sprang full-blown from the mind of Eli Whitney’.155 In
probably the most detailed and comprehensive study of the ‘American system’ ever
undertaken, David A. Hounshell concluded that Whitney never achieved interchangeability,
one of its core characteristics. Moreover, he also questioned whether this was achieved by
American manufacturers either as easily, or as early, as some have claimed. Drawing on the
essays of Robert S. Woodbury, Edwin A. Battison, and others, as well as on empirical
sources, Hounshell also found that the pursuit of interchangeability in the mid-nineteenth
century did not lead to lower production costs in the manufacture of small arms, and nor did
151 Rosenberg, ‘Technological Change’, pp. 414 – 443; Rosenberg, The American System of
Manufactures, pp. 1 – 86.
152 See for example Daniel Nelson, ‘The American System and the American Worker’, in Mayr
and Post, Yankee Enterprise, pp. 171 – 187.
153 Chandler, ‘American System and Modern Management’, in Mayr and Post, Yankee
Enterprise, p. 169.
154 Rosenberg, ‘Technological Change’, p. 427.
155 George H. Daniels, ‘The Big Questions in the History of American Technology’, Technology
and Culture, 11, 1970, p. 13.
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he discover any evidence to support the commonly held perception that the system of
interchangeability had spread to several sectors of the American manufacturing industry
before the twentieth century.156 In some respects Hounshell’s findings were confirmed by
Wayne Lewchuk who suggested that, although interchangeability was realized in the mid-
nineteenth-century American small arms industry, it was achieved ‘slowly and at great cost’,
to a limited degree, and mainly through the application of wider tolerances and the
acceptance of looser fits. In general terms, he proposed, firms operating the ‘American
system’ were unable to compete, either on price or volume supply, with firms using the
equally nebulous ‘European system’ of craft-production.157
Other and much earlier sources, including a treatise published in America in 1921 by Earle
Buckingham, an engineer employed by Pratt and Whitney, also cast doubt on assertions that
interchangeability had become established in the USA by the mid-nineteenth century. This
work strongly indicates that, at the time of its publication, interchangeability was still largely
an aspiration, and although he proposed that ‘interchangeable manufacturing is closely
interwoven with many distinctly American manufacturing methods and processes’ he did not
refer to it as the ‘American system’.158 Nor did Buckingham ascribe its origins to any
particular person, firm, or branch of industry: a noteworthy omission in view of Roe’s claim
that ‘Francis A. Pratt … and Amos Whitney … who later founded the firm of Pratt and
Whitney’ were instrumental in the development of the ‘American system’.159 In fact,
Buckingham, a specialist in interchangeability, believed that ‘Different plants working along
independent lines … often achieved [interchangeability] by widely different methods’.160
Another, somewhat less emphasized, aspect of the ‘American system’ concerns claims that
early American manufacturing engineers developed advanced equipment such as turret
lathes and milling machines.161 However, as the work of Edwin A. Battison, Merritt Roe
156 Hounshell, American System to Mass Production, pp. 3, 6 – 10; Hounshell, ‘Theory and
Practice’, in Mayr and Post, Yankee Enterprise, pp. 127 – 152; Woodbury, ‘Legend of Eli
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Smith, Paul Uselding, and Robert S. Woodbury have shown, the origins of these machine
tools are far from clear.162 Moreover, neither was as innovative as Habakkuk has suggested,
at least not in their original, mid-nineteenth-century form. Milling, a technique whereby the
work-piece is clamped and the cutting tool is rotated, certainly took place long before the
term ‘milling’ was coined, and, as L. T. C. Rolt has accurately described, milling was
routinely performed on centre lathes before the advent of specialized milling machines, and
machine tools designed in Britain specifically for milling operations predate even the dubious
‘Whitney miller’.163 Described in Samuel Smiles’ Industrial Biography as ‘a machine with
revolving cutters to plane metallic surfaces’ capable of machining ‘straight, smooth, and
parallel surfaces on wood and other materials requiring truth’ and which used ‘tools … fixed
on frames driven by machinery … moving in a rotary direction’, patented in 1802 by Joseph
Bramah, and used by him in his lock factory at Pimlico at around the same time, was
undoubtedly a milling machine.164 Furthermore, a ‘self acting’, ‘nut cutting’ machine,
designed and built in 1829 by James Nasmyth while he was employed as Henry Maudslay’s
personal assistant, and built in series by him in Manchester which used ‘a hard steel circular
cutter’ to automatically produce the six flat sides of hexagon nuts was also, clearly, a milling
machine.165 Anecdotally, several American, British and German lathe manufacturers have
claimed, either openly or tacitly, to have invented the turret which, in its original form, was an
attachment for centre lathes.
The Optimum Scale of Production
Hypotheses of a ‘second industrial revolution’, one of the most entrenched concepts in the
historiography in economic and business history, are rooted in assertions that, at the end of
the nineteenth century, large scale enterprises emerged as a result of growing demand for
Post, Yankee Enterprise, p. 27; Nathan Rosenberg, ‘Why in America?’, in Mayr and Post,
Yankee Enterprise, p. 58; Hounshell, American System to Mass Production, pp. 1 – 65;
Nathan Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1976).
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products related to the internal combustion engine, electricity generation equipment,
chemicals, and ‘light machinery’.166 According to Chandler, ‘In order to benefit from the cost
advantages of … high-volume technologies of production, entrepreneurs had to make three
sets of interrelated investments’. These he described as the ‘three-pronged investment in
production, distribution, and management that brought the modern industrial enterprise into
being’. Production facilities, especially ‘mass-production [that] grew after the 1880s’ needed
to be ‘large enough to exploit a technology's potential economies of scale or scope’ and
were thus ‘capital-intensive’. However, although some British firms endeavoured to enter
these markets, ‘their investments in production were usually large enough to benefit from the
economies of scale and scope but often not large enough to utilize their full potential’.
Moreover, characteristically citing his own work, Chandler asserted that ‘In machinery, the
British did not even try’ and while German manufacturers ‘quickly dominated the production
of heavy processing machinery’, the Americans ‘acquired a near global monopoly in
machinery which was produced in volume’.167
If definitions of concepts like ‘family firm’ and the ‘American system’ seem ambiguous, those
relating to ‘mass-production’ are omnifarious by comparison. The expression appears to
have originated in 1925 when an article published in the New York Times described mass-
production as ‘single-purpose manufacture combined with the smooth flow of materials; the
assembly line; large-volume production; high wages initiated by the five-dollar day; and low
prices’. Its clear association with passenger cars, especially Henry Ford’s scheme ‘to make
automobiles ... all alike ... just as one pin is like another pin, when it comes from the pin
factory’ appears to have ‘led to its widespread use and identification with the assembly line
manufacturing techniques’. Although it excluded firms that manufactured goods in large
quantities without adopting automation and unskilled workers, and included the production of
simple items like nuts and bolts, the model propounded more recently by Michael J. Piore
and Charles F. Sabel as ‘the use of special-purpose (product-specific) machines and of
semiskilled workers to produce standardized goods’, at least had the advantage of clarity.168
While the ability of mass-production methods to manufacture complex mechanical
equipment at low prices for a large and expanding market is clearly a significant advantage,
166 Chandler, Scale and Scope, p. 250; Chandler, Strategy and Structure, p. 386; also
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The Economic History of Britain Since 1700, Second Edition, Vol. 2, 1860 - 1939 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 64 – 70; Wilson, British Business, p. 7; Boyce and
Ville, Development of Modern Business, pp. 151, 155.
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it also incorporates a number of inherent weaknesses. Some of these have been illuminated
in the history of the Ford Motor company, especially in scholarly examinations of Ford’s
Highland Park and Rouge River plants and of the vast number of specially designed
machine tools installed there to produce the famous Model T. Although these innovative
facilities soon made Ford a point of reference against which other passenger car builders
measured their mass-production efficiencies, they later became an example of the limitations
of overspecialization. Planned and equipped to produce large volumes at extraordinarily low
costs, when the Model T’s popularity declined, the introduction of its replacement could only
be achieved by completely re-equipping the Rouge River plant, a process that necessitated
its closure for approximately a year. Thus, according to Hounshell, ‘Ford and his production
experts had driven mass-production into a deep cul-de-sac’ and for this reason, ‘Ford proved
incapable of making a smooth transition to a new model’. While some have interpreted these
outcomes as stagnation resulting from a deliberate trade-off between low unit cost and
technical progress, others believe that they were simply the inevitable, but unforeseen,
results of inflexible production technology. Either way, it is a clear demonstration that low
price does not always secure a firm’s market position and that mass-production in its purest
manifestation can engender serious rigidities.169
At the opposite end of the scale, ‘craft-production’ is perhaps more clearly definable.
According to Womack, Jones, and Roos, it is characterized by the employment of skilled
craftsmen using multi-purpose machinery for the manufacture of either ‘bespoke’ single
items, or batches of items in very low quantities, especially where ‘the scale of production is
limited and the range of ... products is mixed and variable’. Many historians, including
Gilbert, Aldcroft, Boyce and Ville, have associated craft-production with obsolete practices
used in the early period of the Industrial Revolution, and thus with high costs and
inefficiency, deductions which are clearly illogical and unsound. On the one hand, skilled
craftsmen using universal machine tools are as capable of producing large volumes of
interchangeable components as are semiskilled and unskilled workers using single- and
special-purpose machines: on the other hand, craft-production has discernable market
values in that it is universally associated with high-quality, allowing firms using it to command
169 Hounshell, American System to Mass Production, pp. 1, 9, 12, 215, 227 – 228, 230 – 233,
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premium prices.170
Sandwiched between mass-production and craft-production there undoubtedly existed a
range of manufacturing systems, which, according to some scholars, comprised an infinitely
variable array of hybrid solutions applied to everyday problems in most engineering factories
and workshops. Unfortunately, attempts to subdivide them into a set of rigid categories have
occasionally led to technical and logical fallacies and oxymoronic expressions such as
‘flexible mass-production’ that used ‘flexible, multipurpose machine tools’, all of which,
because they lack consistency, are fundamentally unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, there can be
no doubt that mass-production and craft-production, however defined, were not the only
systems accessible, and nor was mass-production the only profitable method used by
manufacturing engineering firms either before, during, or after the ‘second industrial
revolution’.171
Flexible Specialization
Writing in 1984, Piore and Sabel described ‘Flexible Specialization’ as the use of ‘flexible-
multi-use-equipment [and] skilled workers’. Operating within a politically created ‘industrial
community that restricts the forms of competition to those favouring innovation’ they argued
that such systems, which had existed in Britain and elsewhere in the past, allowed firms to
respond quickly and effectively to sudden and constant changes in demand. The ostensible
appeal of ‘Flexible Specialization’, stemming from its hypothetical potential to assuage the
burgeoning unemployment in the manufacturing engineering industries of North America and
Western Europe in the 1980s, stimulated others to investigate its historical authenticity.
Adopting quasi-comparative methodology, scholars attempted to discover evidence for
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viable alternatives to the ‘Chandlerian’ mass producers whose markets were being
successfully usurped. Their findings suggested that clusters of small firms, tacitly or formally
co-operating, could successfully compete with large-scale corporations. For this relatively
small corps of academics, firms that had adopted ‘Flexible Specialization’ were more
efficient, more profitable, and less threatened by macro- and microenvironmental shifts.
Especially in markets in which change occurred regularly and rapidly, flexible specialists
were purportedly able to prevail over larger, more rigidly equipped, and more formally
organized, rivals. Such firms had survived and flourished by selecting manufacturing
techniques to suit the markets they served, making the correct choice of machinery of major
importance. Thus, while the functioning of the ‘market-cum-technological’ dynamic may have
driven some firms towards mass-production, it had presented others with opportunities to
create manufacturing systems more suited to serving their non-mass markets.172
In Search of a ‘British System’
Other than those implied in contrasting comparisons with the American, German, and
Japanese engineering industries, no discernable British equivalent to the ‘American system’
appears in the historiography in economic and business history. As Lloyd-Jones and Lewis
somewhat wryly observed, the ‘list of deficiencies familiar to the modern economic historian
[has been] rolled out’ as historians and scholars offered an accretion of reasons, both
technical and non-technical, for the perceived failure of the British engineering industry.173
The ‘American system’, the Great Exhibition of 1851, and the ‘ironic’ Enfield small arms
order featured prominently among Coleman and Macleod’s ‘mountain of apparently damning
evidence’ which, they alleged, could be amassed against the leaders of Britain’s engineering
firms. Spanning an eighty-year period from the mid-nineteenth century to the 1930s, they
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drew their – markedly hyperbolised – assumptions from a small number of ‘Reports on
various overseas exhibitions and evidence given to sundry committees and commissions’
together with the views of miscellaneous ‘commentators in trade journals’. These, they
asserted, confirm that ‘The English engineering employer was damned as more prejudiced
against innovation than his foreign rivals’ and that ‘the British businessman … can be
presented as sliding into incompetence, displaying the while an attitude to new techniques
which combined ignorance, indifference, hostility, prejudice and complacency in a dosage
which ranged from the damaging to the lethal’.174
Within this sweepingly bifurcated context, British engineers are usually depicted as
traditionalists and conservatives who, at least until the end of the nineteenth century,
preferred to retain outdated, labour intensive, craft-based systems, reminiscent of the
earliest period of the Industrial Revolution. This view is often supported by claims that,
although some British engineering firms recognized the superiority of American methods,
these were too few in number, their attempts to adopt the ‘American system’ were too late,
and their efforts were largely ineffectual.175 Most British engineering firms, however, are
viewed as being ‘prejudiced against innovation’ and because they persisted with their
expensive and old-fashioned techniques, they failed to achieve interchangeability, the
technical precursor of low-cost mass-production, before the end of the nineteenth century.176
Needless to say, charges of familial amateurism, classism, nepotism and short-termism,
already examined above, regularly intersperse the ‘familiar’ list of shortcomings, with the
recent addition of Wilson and Thomson’s critical postulations regarding the training of skilled
engineering artisans through the apprenticeship system, one of the British engineering
industry’s elemental institutions. Apprenticeships ‘linked being an engineer with the working
class’ and ‘was not … a strong base for skill development’ being ‘at its best … dependent on
the willingness and abilities of the craftsmen who supervised the apprentices, while at its
worst, it was only a cheap form of direct labour for employers’.177
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In the face of this seemingly irresistible lobby of unfavourable criticism, other than indulging
in the largely pointless employment of reciprocal argumentation, it is not surprising that
relatively few historians have sought to offer alternatives, let alone refutations. Some,
however, have elected to challenge the more tangible aspects of the wide-ranging
assumptions of the majority. Musson, for example, has produced illuminating insights into
the whole area of the ‘American system’ allegory, logically and convincingly arguing that ‘The
conventional view – that mass-production methods did not exist in Britain until introduced
from the United States for firearms manufacture in the 1850s – is largely erroneous’. His
narrative included references to the many British engineers whose outstanding abilities, he
suggested, surpassed ‘the early pioneering achievements of Whitney, Simeon North, and
others [which] have been exaggerated’.178 Saul, who generally supported Musson’s position,
maintained that, before the 1850s, in sectors where the level of demand was appropriate,
such as textile machinery, specialization and standardization were regularly applied. Under
these conditions, the advantages of interchangeable parts were well understood and
appreciated by British engineering firms and mass-production techniques were routinely
adopted.179 Cantrell, in his impeccably researched study of entrepreneurship in the
nineteenth-century British engineering industry, also discovered many instances of
standardized manufacture and mass-production that predate the ‘American system’.180 Nor,
according to Jonathan Zeitlin, were British manufacturing engineering firms reluctant to
utilize automation and labour saving equipment. ‘By the 1830s and 1840s’ he proposed,
‘[they] were producing textile machinery and locomotives in substantial batches to gauge and
template, while advertising their own range of standard gear-wheels, machine tools and
other engineering products in printed catalogues’.181
The Manufacture of Internal Combustion Engines
When the complexity of the internal combustion engine is considered, the construction of a
machining system for automatically producing its major components presents a considerable
challenge. Nevertheless, between 1919 and the start of the Second World War,
entrepreneurs and engineers in the passenger car industry steadily applied their efforts in
this area. Early experiments in Britain and America centred on a logical progression from the
dedicated flow-line system in which machine tools were arranged sequentially according to
178 Musson, ‘British Origins’, in Mayr and Post, Yankee Enterprise, pp. 25 – 48; also A. E.
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the operations required to produce a single component.182 In a ‘transfer line’ a series of
special or single-purpose automatic machine tools or ‘work stations’ were connected by a
conveyor system which automatically loaded and unloaded parts, and transferred them
between operations. In theory, human intervention was limited to feeding un-machined
components in one end, and removing finished ones from the other.183
Not an entirely new concept, transfer line technology was based on techniques first used in
Britain in about 1807 by Marc Brunel in his rope-block making machinery, and in the
American watch-making industry of the 1890s. It proved extremely costly, however, when
applied to the manufacture of internal combustion engine parts. According to Zeitlin, the
earliest twentieth-century versions were ‘overcomplicated’, difficult to modify and reset and
their electrical systems were especially troublesome; and for these reasons, ‘management
soon broke them up into a series of individual machines’. Thus considered ‘Costly [and]
"ahead of its time," [transfer technology] was not widely imitated in the United States’.
Nevertheless, improvements slowly progressed until, by the late 1930s, perseverance by
Ford of Detroit had led to the development of a more-or-less fully automatic transfer line for
the manufacture of engine blocks.184
During the Second World War, interest in transfer technology in the American automotive
industry was stimulated by an exceptionally high demand for internal combustion engines
combined with US government funded investment in enhanced manufacturing processes.
After 1945, however, the disadvantages began to manifest. Transfer lines were extremely
expensive, took many months – often years – to design, build, and install, and their inability
to accommodate relatively minor design changes created profound problems for marketing
departments. Unsurprisingly, therefore, by the early 1950s, discussions in the technical and
trade press relating to transfer technology revolved around efforts to increase their flexibility,
enhance their efficiency, and improve their reliability. However, although some progress was
made in these areas, the transfer line remained largely confined to the high volume
production of standard components.185 Thus, for firms like Gardner, a form of ‘flexible
specialization’ based on universal machine tools and skilled craftsmen continued to be the
most effective system, at least until the 1960s, when the advent of new, electronically-based,
182 For a concise description of the flow line system see, J. T. Black, The Design of the Factory
with a Future (New York: McGraw Hill, 1991), pp. 36 – 37.
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machinery, and mass-production in the US automobile industry in the post-World War II era’,
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184 Zeitlin, ‘Reconciling’, p. 15; Hounshell, American System, p. 38; Hounshell, ‘Automation’, pp.
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automation promised a more efficient, and an even more flexible, solution.
VII Summary, Gardner’s Disposition in 1955
Given the degree of ambiguity surrounding assumptions of weakness and incompetence in
British industrial firms and the doubts raised by historians and scholars concerning both the
nature and the existence of decline, it is not surprising that L. Gardner and Sons appears to
be largely atypical. In one way, however, it was not. Unquestionably a family firm, there
appears to have been a manifest aversion to ‘outsiders’. Ownership and control were closely
linked, and for most of the twentieth century the chief executive was the oldest surviving
family member, a system with possible, but not necessarily probable, negative aspects.
Nevertheless, if this quasi-dynastic system can be viewed as a weakness, other regularly
asserted flaws are difficult to discover.
If Lawrence Gardner was in any way an ‘amateur’, it is doubtful whether his ostensibly many
customers saw him as such, otherwise his embryonic enterprise would not have flourished
as it did. Many industrial firms were set up in the late nineteenth century as small
independent ventures, performing services or manufacturing products that were very
different to those in which, as more developed enterprises, they came to specialize.186
Although his small firm continued to offer general engineering services during his lifetime,
and did not emerge as a mass-producing ‘modern’ manufacturing company in the 1880s, it is
clear that Lawrence invested in the human capital that secured its future. Presumably with
their father’s active support, at least two of his sons underwent systematic and advanced
training in their chosen profession, illustrating an appreciation of the long-term needs of the
developing firm.187
Undoubtedly professionally qualified and technically proficient, Thomas Harry Gardner
appears incongruous when placed among the ranks of uneducated ‘rule of thumb’ tinkerers
that, according to some scholars, exemplified late-nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
British engineers. His manifest desire to broaden his knowledge and experience are
demonstrated by his pursuit of a career beyond the limits of his father’s firm. His
entrepreneurial abilities and his solid grasp of the potential of the emerging markets of the
second industrial revolution are evidenced in the move from general to specialized
engineering, and his awareness of advances in manufacturing engineering technology is
demonstrated in the records of machine tool acquisitions between 1898 and 1914. Moreover,
in view of the relatively high number of similarly gifted young Mancunians who took
advantage of Whitworth scholarships in the late nineteenth century, it seems highly unlikely
186 See for example, Paul Simsa, ‘Anlauf in Cannstatt und Mannheim’, in in Aller Welt, pp. 19 –
21; also ‚’The founding years 1873 – 1918’, in A History of Progress (Ingolstadt: Audi AG,
1992), pp. 7 – 38.
187 Thomas Harry Gardner and Edward Gardner were both Whitworth Scholars, Low, Whitworth
Book, pp. 160 – 161.
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that Thomas Harry was particularly exceptional.188
The period of growth that began after the establishment of the new Patricroft factory ended
only with the approach of conflict with Germany and the obligation to conform to the
demands of a nation at war. Thereafter, like many other British manufacturing engineering
firms, Gardner’s survival depended on its ability to adapt to its macroenvironment and to
respond to the needs of its customers. Thus, the ‘market-cum-technology’ dynamic that
shaped its strategy and its structure led to the development of new products as well as the
capacity to contend with the imperfections inherent in a largely ‘buyers market’.
The production of relatively large numbers of similar engines became feasible only after the
developments of the early 1930s and even then, given the diversity of the Gardner product
range, it is unlikely that the adoption of full-scale mass-production would have benefited the
firm. However, regardless of the opportunities there undoubtedly were for further expansion,
the approach of war with Germany once again curtailed its possible implementation.
Nevertheless, apart from the brief period examined below, as a family firm Gardner was a
profitable concern that provided incomes for up to three thousand employees and for these
reasons, it would be unreasonable to describe it as a failure simply because it did not
become one of Britain’s largest companies.
To suggest that class distinction and snobbery influenced the behaviour of the first or second
generation of Gardner’s would be mere speculation. Far from retiring to country estates,
which may well have been within their financial means, each of Lawrence Gardner’s children
continued to maintain a direct connection to the family business until illness or death
intervened. There can be little doubt that, by the time that the administration of Gardner had
passed to the third generation, the shareholding descendents of the founder, including those
directly employed in the family firm, expected to receive regular dividends. However, it
seems reasonable to assume that such expectations were no different to those of other
investors, and there is little evidence to support assumptions that the preservation of family
control and the generation of income limited the firm’s ability to expand thereafter.
The appointment of Lawrence Gardner’s grandson to the post of chief executive in 1955 was
dynastic as well as, at least arguably, quasi-nepotistic. The family shareholders probably
saw this as an advantage in that he was an ‘insider’ who they could trust, but their
reservations regarding Hugh’s abilities are evidenced by the simultaneous appointment of
highly qualified non-family directors. Although the seven-man board included two other
Gardner family members as well as one other who almost certainly gained his position
through family influence, the inclusion of Todd in technology, and Thompstone in legal and
trade union affairs indicates that someone, somewhere, appreciated the benefits of balance.
What could not have been foreseen, however, was the degree of autocracy that Hugh
Gardner was able to exercise. Thus, as the following chapters reveal, the attempt to achieve
188 Ibid. and passim.
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at least a partial separation of ownership from control failed, in that it did not prevent the
expertise of the educated ‘professionals’ being cancelled out by the domineering personality
of the unqualified ‘amateur’.
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CHAPTER 3
MARKETS
I Introduction
I am the largest employer of labour in Eccles: I’ve got a twelve months order
book, and I make a respectable profit. Where am I wrong?189
The theme propounded in this chapter is that between 1955 and 1960, L. Gardner and Sons
irrevocably lost its dominant position as a supplier of proprietary diesel engines to the British
HCV industry as a result of entrepreneurial deficiency. Its wider purpose is to examine the
changes that took place in the British HCV sector during the late 1950s from the perspective
of one of its key constituent firms. The research focused on a relatively brief but pivotally
significant period in Gardner’s history, concentrating on macroenvironmental shifts that
called for microenvironmental adjustments. Essentially an investigation into the
circumstances surrounding a change of market leadership, the study analyses internally
recorded events derived from primary sources, and the conclusions drawn are supported by
externally observable developments and empirical evidence. Particular attention is given to
the conduct of the Gardner senior managers, the nature of their responses to developing
conditions, and to the effectiveness of their chosen approach.
In 1955, protected by sterling area tariffs, only two other British manufacturers were capable
of competing with Gardner in the market for proprietary automotive diesel engines, but
because their main business was the supply of complete vehicles, many independent
chassis builders regarded them more as competitors than as potential suppliers. The
production of British built HCVs had been rising steadily since the end of the Second World
War, and Gardner’s well-developed relationship with Britain’s leading independent HCV
specialists placed it in a particularly advantageous position. Thus, at that time, Gardner
enjoyed a virtually competition free market, exerting a degree of dominance that led some
customers to accuse it of enforcing rigid conditions and imposing quotas. Nevertheless, by
1957, and for the first time since the early 1930s, the firm was facing a severe crisis. The
following narrative strongly indicates that the Gardner management failed to respond to a
shift in demand, deliberately choosing inaction in the belief that the firm’s dominant market
position obviated the necessity to respond to its customers’ changing requirements.
II Thematic Issues
Other than an occasional brief reference, the advent of a practicable internal combustion
engine during the late nineteenth century has received little scholarly attention. Among the
new technological developments that fundamentally shaped the future direction of practically
every sector of industry in the twentieth century and beyond, accounts of its development in
189 Hugh Gardner’s response to criticism, circa 1968, is quoted in, Edge, Legendary Engineering,
p. 158 – 159.
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Britain before 1914 conform, almost exclusively, to the customary themes of backwardness,
inefficiency and failure.190 Moreover, outside its association with motor vehicles after 1918,
no scholarly historical works exist which provide definitive accounts of their manufacture in
Britain.191 Although road transport has attracted sufficient academic interest to generate a
relatively small but noteworthy collection of ‘declinist’ works, this has focused largely on
passenger cars and light commercials.192 A few of these, however, acknowledge the
importance of the HCV sector.193
The inadequacy of this sparse body of literature is compounded by the tendency of authors
to perceive the history of the British motor vehicle industry after the 1960s as the history of
Leyland Motors, whose significant HCV activities are subsumed in ruminative accounts of
the problems of its passenger car divisions. However, the two scholarly works by Rhys and,
respectively, Bhaskar both cover, to some extent, the HCV industry. They also, as previously
mentioned, include sections on the structure of the important motor vehicle components
190 For example: ‘Britain’s performance may certainly be judged to be unsatisfactory ... in the
internal combustion engine’. Lloyd-Jones and Lewis, Capitalism, p. 83; also Habakkuk,
American Technology, pp 202 – 203, 214; Saul ‘The Engineering Industry’, in Aldcroft,
Development, pp. 209 – 210, 230; Mathias, First Industrial, p. 376; Broadberry and Crafts,
‘British Economic Policy’, p. 85; Roger Munting, 'Agricultural Engineering and European
Exports Before 1914', Business History, 27 (2), 1985, p. 137; Chandler, Scale and Scope, p.
338; Pollard, Development, p. 210; James Foreman-Peck, Sue Bowden, and Alan McKinlay,
The British Motor Industry (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), p. 93, 137;
Geoffrey Jones, ‘Global perspectives and British paradoxes’, Business History Review, 71
(2), 1977; Peter J. S. Dunnett, The Decline of the British Motor Industry: The Effects of
Government Policy, 1945-1979 (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p. 31.
191 ‘… historians have … largely ignored the formative years of one of Britain's major industries’.
Saul, ‘Motor Industry’, p. 22; however, Ricardo’s autobiography embodies a rare and
outstanding primary source, see Ricardo, Memories.
192 For example, ‘In what was to become one of the most powerful engines of growth in the next
generation, the motor car industry ... Britain made a relatively poor showing in comparison
with the United States … ’ Mathias, First Industrial, p. 388; also Hobsbawm, Industry and
Empire, pp. 174, 178; Wayne Lewchuk, ‘The Motor Vehicle Industry’, in Elbaum and
Lazonick, Decline of the British Economy, pp. 133 - 161; Roy Church and Michael Miller, ‘The
Big Three: Competition, Management, and Marketing in the British Motor Industry, 1922 –
1939’ in Supple, Essays, pp. 163 – 186; Roy Church, The Rise and Decline of the British
Motor Industry (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994); Martin Adeney, The Motor Makers, The
Turbulent History of Britain's Car Industry (London: Collins 1988); Roy Church, Herbert
Austin: The British Motor Car Industry to 1941 (London: Europa, 1979); Georgano et al,
Motor Industry; Lewchuk, American Technology; George Maxcy and Aubrey Silberston, The
Motor Industry (London: Allen and Unwin, 1959); Stephen Wilks, Industrial Policy and the
Motor Industry, Second Edition (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988). Millward,
‘Industrial and Commercial’, in Floud and McCloskey, Economic History of Britain, Second
Edition, Vol. 3, pp. 141 – 144; Sue Bowden, James Foreman-Peck and Tom Richardson,
‘The Post-War Productivity Failure: Insights from Oxford (Cowley)’, Business History, 43 (3),
2001, pp. 54 – 78; Timothy R. Whistler, The British Motor Industry, 1945 – 1994: A Case
Study in Industrial Decline (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
193 ‘… the production and market characteristics in the heavy commercial vehicle sector
contrasted markedly with the mass produced car sector’. Church, Rise and Decline, p. 91;
HCVs ‘… accounted for one-tenth of the total number of commercial vehicles produced, but
much more than one-tenth of the value of commercial vehicle production’. Cairncross, British
Economy, Second Edition, p. 106; Pollard, Wasting, p. 82; Zeitlin, ‘Reconciling automation’,
pp. 9 – 62; a concise and rare discussion on the pre-1939 HCV developments in Britain
appears in H. G. Castle, Britain’s Motor Industry (London: Clerke and Cockeran, 1950), pp.
197 – 209.
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sector, and both mention Gardner in the context of a notable supplier of proprietary diesel
engines.194
Unsurprisingly, given the paucity of scholarly literature on the British HCV industry, sources
concerning the nature and structure of its markets are equally lacking. Moreover, beyond
elaborately reasoned discourses on what Chandler really meant when he proposed that 'the
visible hand of management replaced Adam Smith's invisible hand of market forces' few
scholars attempt to analyse markets. Those who do often fail to discriminate between
markets, marketing, advertising, and selling, and although some historians concur with the
specialists, it is clear that most are uncertain about the difference between consumer
markets and industrial markets.195
Rarely purchased by individual consumers, diesel engines are mainly sold to industrial firms
that are usually themselves suppliers of equipment to other firms and organizations such as
builders, haulage contractors, passenger transport concerns, government departments and
municipal institutions. Designated variously as ‘capital’, ‘business’, ‘producer’, or ‘industrial’,
such markets clearly have ‘certain characteristics that contrast sharply with consumer
markets’. Demand is relatively inelastic and prone to fluctuations, and buyers are fewer,
larger and more geographically concentrated. In general, therefore, although it may be
possible to influence the end user’s selection of equipment that incorporate a particular
brand, the demand for diesel engines is derived from the demand for other capital goods. In
Gardner’s case, the most important marketing consideration was the necessity to convince
end users, who were actually their customer’s customers, to specify Gardner engines, and to
be constantly aware of their needs as well as their wants.196
According to Rhys and Bhaskar, the constituent firms of the British HCV industry sector
enjoyed a steadily growing market during the 1950s, their prosperity being based on a strong
demand for highly individualized vehicles which called for custom-built products that the high
volume producers were unable to satisfy. Although some HCVs, particularly buses, were
occasionally ordered in numbers that afforded the manufacturer a certain level of
standardization, the quantities involved were rarely conducive to the employment of mass-
194 Rhys, Motor Industry, pp. 79 – 119, 341 – 357; Bhaskar, The Future, pp. 239 – 312.
195 Chandler, Visible Hand, p. 1; The confusion of marketing and selling is particularly
exemplified in Geoffrey Tweedale, ‘Marketing in the second industrial revolution: a case study
of the Ferranti Computer Group, 1949-63’, Business History, 34 (1), 1992, pp. 96 – 128; also
vividly illustrated by Aldcroft and Richardson’s spectacularly sweeping assertion that
‘Americans and … Germans were more willing to purchase large quantities of standardized
and relatively cheap goods … ‘, made even less cogent by their short and equally over-
generalized discussion, on ‘ … the way in which market forces affect the pattern of technical
progress’. Aldcroft and Richardson, British Economy, pp. 159, 184 – 186; also in the
somewhat jargonized chapter on marketing, devoid of any authentic appraisal of capital
goods markets, in Boyce and Ville, Development of Modern Business, pp 175 – 226; Mathias,
however, at least recognized that ‘The capital goods industries have special problems’.
Mathias, First Industrial, p. 110; for a succinct overview of different types of markets and their
unique characteristics see Kotler, Marketing Management, p. 185.
196 Kotler, Marketing Management, p. 185.
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production methods. More typically in this market sector, the HCV specialists concentrated
on designing and building vehicle chassis in accordance with their customers’ specification.
These were usually bus service operators or a heavy haulage contractors who also selected
major components such as the engine, the rear axle, and the gearbox. Once finished,
chassis were delivered to another specialist firm where they were fitted with a body and
painted in accordance with the end user’s requirements. Especially in conditions of
fluctuating demand which tended to prevail in the post-war capital goods sector, this type of
market structure was prone to fragmentation and imperfections.197
III Macroenvironmental Background
Throughout most of the second half of the twentieth century, the actions of successive
governments impacted greatly on British industry. Between 1955 and 1964, a series of
induced economic cycles, designed to dampen down demand in order to contain inflation or
to stimulate demand in order to advance economic growth, are seen as being especially
detrimental. Often referred to as ‘stop-go’, these sequences, according to Pollard, produced
a ‘ratchet effect’ that progressively increased British dependence on imports. While some
scholars have suggested that these cycles merely served to expose inherent weaknesses in
the British economy, such as ‘institutional constraints’ that manifested in resistance to adopt
new methods and advanced technology in the manufacturing engineering industries, for
others, including Lloyd-Jones and Lewis, they gave ‘inconsistent signs to entrepreneurial
decision makers’.198
The first recession of this period occurred during 1956 and 1958 as a result of government
action taken in response to public anxiety over the balance of payments and inflation.
Reinforcing earlier deflationary measures, the budget of September 1957 increased the bank
rate to seven per cent - hitherto the highest post-war level – and cut public spending. As a
result, economic activity decreased significantly and unemployment began to rise, continuing
to do so throughout 1958. To counter these politically undesirable developments, the bank
rate was gradually reduced to four per cent and, in September 1958, credit restrictions were
eased. In April 1959, an expansionary pre-election budget established a boom phase with
cuts in taxation and a resurgence of public spending, causing industrial output to rise by
more than six per cent and, in consequence, a fall in unemployment. By 1960, however, the
slowing pace of industrial production, combined with rapidly worsening balance of payments
figures, signalled an impending slump.199
197 Rhys, Motor Industry, pp. 79 – 119, 341 – 357; Bhaskar, The Future, pp. 239 – 312; Morgan,
Economics, pp. 61, 173 – 179, 239.
198 ‘… stop-go’ policy’ impacted greatly on the UK motor vehicle industry, particularly after 1953’.
Pollard, Development, p. 305; on ‘stop-go’ during this period also Cairncross, British
Economy, pp. 95 – 99, 118; Dunnett, Decline, p. 61; Lloyd-Jones and Lewis, Capitalism,
p.182.
199 Sir Alexander Cairncross, ‘Economic Policy and Performance, 1945 – 1964’, in Floud and
McCloskey, Economic History of Britain, Second Edition, Vol. 3, pp. 56 – 61; Feinstein,
‘Success and Failure’, in Floud and McCloskey, Economic History of Britain, Second Edition,
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IV Microenvironmental Background
By 1955, although direct government control of Britain’s post-war transport infrastructure was
largely confined to the railways, the road transport industry, and thereby the characteristics
of motor vehicles, continued to be influenced through legislation. In particular, a series of
amendments to the Ministry of Transport’s Motor Vehicles (Construction and Use)
Regulations enacted between 1955 and 1957, increased the maximum permitted weight of
heavy trucks and the maximum permitted length of double-deck buses, and raised the
erstwhile highly restrictive maximum speed limits for all HCVs. Together with improvements
to existing roads and the construction of new ones, these changes stimulated a need for
larger, faster, and more efficient vehicles. Between 1956 and 1960, in terms of billion tons
per kilometre, the amount of freight carried on Britain’s roads almost doubled, while that
carried by rail fell by more than ten per cent during the same period. (see Appendix 2, tables
1 and 2) As a result, the number of HGVs produced in Britain increased by 267%, and at the
same time bus production increased by 221%. (see Appendix 2, tables 3 and 4) While it
should be stressed that not all of these vehicles were large enough to require engines in
Gardner’s power range, the figures reflect the level of growth in the market for engines for
trucks and buses.200
By the mid-1950s, the cluster of firms that specialized in the production of HCVs had begun
a process of ultimately internecine consolidation.201 In 1948, AEC purchased Crossley
Motors of Manchester, a company with a similarly advantageous market position as a
supplier of buses in the North West of England, and in the following year, they acquired
Maudslay Motor Co. of Coventry, another producer of buses and commercial vehicles. By
1951, the business and manufacturing activities of both of these companies had been closed
down and their names had disappeared; developments that strongly suggest that the
motivation behind these takeovers had more to do with the eradication of competition than
with streamlining and improved efficiency. The scope of AEC’s ambitions is also evidenced
by the installation of a new ‘Detroit-style’ automatic machining facility for the production of
diesel engine components in 1955. The adoption of this highly productive but, as previously
discussed, extremely inflexible technology suggests aspirations to supply proprietary diesel
Vol. 3, pp. 104, 116; Jim Tomlinson, ‘British Economic Policy Since 1945’, in Floud and
McCloskey, Economic History of Britain, Second Edition, Vol. 3, pp. 260, 267, 269, 278, 283;
Barry Supple, ‘British Economic Decline Since 1945’’ in Floud and McCloskey, Economic
History of Britain, Second Edition, Vol. 3, p. 338.
200 Barker and Savage, Transport in Britain, pp. 211 – 212, 226 – 229; French, ‘Public Policy and
British Commercial’, p. 37; Statutory Instrument No. 2101, Motor Vehicles (Construction and
Use) Regulations (London: HMSO, 1951); Statutory Instrument No. 1453, Motor Vehicles
(Construction and Use) Regulations (London: HMSO, 1952); Statutory Instrument No. 482,
Motor Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations (London: HMSO, 1955); Motor Vehicles
(Variation of Speed Limit), 1955; Motor Vehicles (Variation of Speed Limit) Regulations
(London: HMSO, 1955).
201 Foreman-Peck, Bowden, and McKinlay, Motor Industry, pp. 106 - 109; Church, Rise and
Decline, p. 76.
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engines as well as complete vehicles.202
In 1951, Leyland Motors began a series of mergers and take-overs with the acquisition of
Albion Motors, Scotland’s only commercial vehicle producer, and in 1955, they purchased
Scammell Lorries of Watford, an important Gardner customer that, notwithstanding the
takeover, continued to offer Gardner engines for many years. Unlike AEC, Leyland
consolidated, or at least assimilated, the activities of both of these firms, maintaining some of
their manufacturing activities and astutely preserving both well-known marques. By then
Leyland, which employed approximately 14,000 personnel producing over 8,000 chassis a
year, 60 per cent of which were exported, was easily Britain’s largest HCV producer.203
By 1955, what little post-war competition that had existed in the supply of proprietary diesel
engines to the HCV sector had disappeared. A relative latecomer to the industry, Perkins of
Peterborough was founded in 1932 specifically to develop and manufacture lightweight,
high-speed diesel engines, and its success in that area of the automotive market is
evidenced by its growth. By 1948, in terms of unit production, Perkins had outstripped
Gardner, and by 1950, with around 4,000 personnel producing over 15,000 engines a year, it
had become Britain’s largest manufacturer of automotive diesels. In 1953, Perkins had made
an abortive attempt to enter the HCV market in direct competition with Gardner. However, its
R6 unit soon earned a reputation for unreliability and high maintenance costs, resulting in
substantial warranty claims that plunged the firm into a deep financial crisis that ultimately
cost it its independence.204
Although not yet fully engaged with the British automotive industry, by 1955 the Cummins
Engine Company of Columbus, Indiana, USA, had been drawn into establishing a diesel
engine manufacturing plant in Britain. This came about as an indirect result of exchange
controls introduced to support sterling, which had effectively excluded the Euclid Road
Machinery Company of Cleveland, Ohio, USA, a manufacturer of heavy strip mining
equipment and one of Cummins’ important American customers, from its lucrative Canadian
markets. In 1951, reluctant to forego this important source of revenue, Euclid established a
manufacturing plant near Glasgow, thus regaining access to Canada. Still, however,
prohibited by British import controls from fitting the Cummins engines they normally supplied,
Euclid was obliged instead to install British made Rolls-Royce diesels. Shortly thereafter, and
with the assistance of the British government and Scottish regional agencies, the Cummins
management decided to emulate Euclid, establishing a production facility at Shotts that soon
202 Stevens-Stratten, AEC, pp. 19, 43 and passim; ‘Machining Engine Castings’, The Engineer,
25 November 1955, p. 771.
203 Leyland, Official History, pp. 1 - 10, 22 - 26 and passim; Kennett, Leyland, p. 56.
204 ‘The 1950s: Perkins as a Public Company’, in Parisson et al, Perkins; Alec Osborn, ‘Tales of
an Engine Designer’, George Stephenson Lecture, Institute of Mechanical Engineers, 2006.
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became a truly formidable Gardner competitor.205
V Findings
1956 was an all-time record year for Gardner, both in terms of the number of engines
delivered and the number of orders received from the firm’s important automotive industry
customers. As a result, the Patricroft plant was operating at maximum capacity, and delivery
schedules were becoming increasingly extended. Finding it difficult to recruit much needed
additional skilled personnel, the management approached the Works Committee (see pp. 88
– 89 below) for permission to assign dilutees to several vacant positions that were proving
particularly hard to fill. This request received an unenthusiastic response from members of
the AEU District Committee who were concerned about the prevailing high level of
unemployment among skilled machinists in the Manchester area, but their decision to deny
Gardner permission to dilute was tempered with an undertaking to direct unemployed union
members to present themselves at the Patricroft plant.206 Soon, however, concerns about
staffing levels were overshadowed by more serious problems.
By January 1957, it had become clear that the workload had eased considerably and
rumours were circulating throughout the plant that a dearth of orders would soon lead to
short-time working. Union representatives, who felt constrained to approach the
management in order to clarify the situation, were informed that the problems were being
caused by the on-going shortage of skilled machinists and could therefore be solved if the
AEU would agree to dilution. Accepting this explanation, the shop stewards wrote to the
District Committee on behalf of the firm, urging them to reconsider. They in turn referred the
appeal to the National Executive who, in April, gave their consent. By October, however, the
management had completely altered its position. Acknowledging that the firm was indeed
suffering adverse trading conditions, they offered the workforce a choice between
redundancies and short-time working. The Works Committee reluctantly elected to accept
the latter and, in November, the plant was put on a four-day a week.207
During 1958, when HCV production in Great Britain increased significantly, engine output at
Patricroft fell by thirty-six per cent, and orders received for automotive engines fell by thirty-
eight per cent, making it Gardner’s worst year since 1936. Long-standing customers
including Daimler, Scammell, Guy, Foden, ERF, and Atkinson all purchased significantly
205 Cruikshank and Sicilia, Cummins, pp. 78, 156, 185, 187; ‘Euclid Road Machinery Co’., The
Engineer, 4 February 1955, p. 142.
206 Dilution was ‘the use of semi-skilled and unskilled labour in skilled jobs’ Garside,
‘Management and Men’, in Supple, Essays, pp. 244 – 267; also Zeitlin, ‘Flexibility and Mass
Production’, pp. 46 – 49; Pollard, Development, p. 32; James B. Jefferys, The Story of the
Engineers, 1800 – 1945 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1945), pp. 174 – 176; Report of the
District 11 Organizer, The AEU Monthly Journal, August 1956, p. 251; Shop Stewards’
Minutes, 15 October 1956; Edge, Legendary Engineering, pp. 133, 205 – 206.
207 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 23 January 1957; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 17 April 1957; Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 30 October 1957; Report of the District 11 Organizer, The AEU Monthly
Journal, October 1956, p. 315; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 13 November 1957; Shop Stewards’
Minutes, 11 June 1958.
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reduced numbers of Gardner engines. Only the level of orders placed by the bus builder
Bristol Commercial Vehicles remained steady and non-automotive business appears to have
held up reasonably well. (see Appendix 3, tables 3 and 4)
Exactly when the Gardner management came to terms with the prospect that the firm’s
difficulties stemmed from a weakness in the product range is not known, but it is clear that
when the nature of the problem was finally perceived, it moved quickly to provide a solution.
Although the 6LX was not an entirely new design – in reality it was an enlarged version of an
existing engine – it offered Gardner’s customers the extra power they were clearly
demanding. The first production batch of twenty-five passed through the works in February
1958. By mid-April, after a very brief period of prototype proving, the first unit had been
tested and the new engines went on offer to the market almost immediately. With the
introduction of the 6LX, the situation gradually began to ease, although sales to automotive
customers continued to fall until mid-1958. By August the order position was reported to be
‘somewhat improved’, by November, it had become ‘satisfactory’, and as the new engine
went into full production, the level of orders received continued to recover.208
In April 1959, the management reported that the current satisfactory level of business was
being maintained. However, because short-time working had led many employees to seek
full-time work elsewhere, as the workload increased, staff shortages caused production
delays and bottlenecks in several departments. Nevertheless, conditions gradually improved
thereafter, but it would be nine years before output volumes recovered to the five thousand a
year level that had been reached in 1956 and for two or three years, between 1957 and
1959, the company was almost certainly trading at a net loss.209 Moreover, when measured
as a percentage of total UK unit production of HCVs, Gardner irretrievably lost approximately
half its market share. (see Appendix 2, tables 5, 7, 8, and 9)
VI Analysis
Although Gardner’s poor performance coincides with the economic downturn of 1958, the
research indicates that the recession in the general economy was not reflected in the market
for trucks and buses. Moreover, the evidence presented above indicates clearly that Gardner
lost its leadership of the British market for proprietary diesel engines for HCVs because it
failed to respond to a shift in demand. The speed with which the firm was able to introduce a
larger engine once the seriousness of the situation had been appreciated shows that the
inertia did not result from constraints imposed by rigidities inherent in the disposition of the
firm’s employees or in the nature of its manufacturing plant. Logically, therefore, there can
only be three bases for the Gardner managers’ inaction: either they simply did not know
208 Edge, Legendary Engineering, pp. 144, 203.
209 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 23 July 1958; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 28 October 1958; Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 7 January 1959; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 4 February 1959; Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 4 March 1959; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 18 March 1959; Shop Stewards’
Minutes, 1 April 1959.
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about the impending increases in the maximum permitted vehicle sizes and speeds; or they
knew about them but did not appreciate that they would lead to a demand for more powerful
engines; or they believed that Gardner’s customers would continue to purchase the firm’s
existing but, by then, underpowered units. Any of these conditions would constitute a failure
by the Gardner senior managers to safeguard of the long-term health of the company: their
primary entrepreneurial responsibility.
It seems reasonable to assume that other firms had recognized that observable
improvements to Britain’s network of roads and the clearly signalled and well-publicized
increases in the permitted speeds and sizes of trucks and buses would lead to a shift in
demand.210 During the early 1950s, as well as Perkins’ abortive attempt, Britain’s two largest
HCV builders, AEC and Leyland, both extended and updated their manufacturing facilities in
order to produce larger automotive diesel engines.211 More significant, however, were
developments taking place at the newly commissioned Cummins engine plant at Shotts,
near Glasgow.212 Primarily set up to produce much larger diesels for off-road applications, by
mid-1957 the demand from British vehicle operators for more powerful HCV engines had
stimulated a change to their original business plan. The first British built Cummins truck
engines were assembled from kits of components airfreighted in from the firm’s American
headquarters, but within two years increasing demand led to 100% British manufacture.213
In 1957, the largest automotive engine in the Gardner range was the 112 bhp 6LW, originally
designed during the administration of Thomas Harry Gardner in the early 1930s. By
comparison, AEC’s 159 bhp AV590 and 192 bhp AV690, and Leyland’s 154 bhp O.680 were
all considerably larger, and the Glasgow built Cummins range, designed for the North
American market, had ample power.214 Clearly, therefore, if vehicle operators placing orders
for the heavier and faster vehicles allowed by the new legislation considered the Gardner
210 For example, ‘Between 1944 and 1952 (HCV) manufacturers lobbied persistently for
increases in the size of domestic lorries and buses on the grounds of reducing the range of
models and promoting economies of scale’. French, ‘Public Policy and British Commercial’, p.
37; Changes in Construction and Use Regulations, as detailed in various Acts and Orders,
were readily obtainable from HM Stationery Office. They were also rendered more clearly
understandable in the series Leslie Deans Kitchin, Kitchin’s Road Transport Law, A Summary
of the Legislation Affecting the Construction, Equipment and Use of Motor Vehicles, first
published by Iliffe in 1944 and regularly, usually annually, updated thereafter.
211 AEC’s 159 bhp AV590 and the 192 bhp AV690 were both produced on advanced
manufacturing facilities commissioned in 1955. ‘Machining Engine Castings’, The Engineer,
25 November 1955, p. 771; Stevens-Stratten, AEC, p. 57; Leyland’s extended manufacturing
facilities, recently acquired from the Ministry of Supply, were capable of turning out more
powerful engines, including the 154 bhp O.680, originally introduced in 1951. Leyland, Official
History, pp. 24, 28; Kennett, Leyland, p. 87.
212 Gardner was probably aware of Cummins’ plans to manufacture diesel engines in Britain, see
Cruikshank and Sicilia, Cummins, p. 81; also Edge, Legendary Engineering, pp. 162 – 164.
213 Cruikshank and Sicilia, Cummins, p. 190.
214 ‘Buy then [the late 1950s] the motorways picked up, and trucking in Britain moved into our
horsepower range, and the higher weight laws came into effect, and Shotts became a
profitable outfit’. J. Irwin Miller, quoted in Cruikshank and Sicilia, Cummins, p. 190; also Rhys,
Motor Industry, p. 93.
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product to be underpowered, there was no shortage of alternative suppliers for them to turn
to. That they did so is evidenced by the sharp fall in Gardner’s sales as long-standing
customers began to order competitor’s engines, and by the steady improvement that
followed the hasty introduction of the more powerful 6LX in 1958.215
The contention that Gardner lost its market leadership because it did not respond to a
change in demand is supported by the concurrent increases in the permitted maximum sizes
and weights of HCVs, as well as the developments at AEC, Cummins, Leyland, and Perkins.
The key issue, therefore, is to discover reasons why Gardner’s position was successfully
challenged by a newcomer, whose ‘powerful, but thirsty’ engines were virtually unknown in
Britain.216 Fundamentally, it is inconceivable that Gardner simply missed ‘a turn in the
road’.217 Even if their own vigilance was lacking, Gardner’s customers, as well as their
customers, could not possibly have failed to recognize the implications of the impending
changes and communicated their requirements accordingly. The only plausible explanation
is that Gardner believed, naively, that the market would continue to accept their existing
reliable, economical, but decidedly underpowered units and for this Hugh Gardner, as chief
executive officer, must bear responsibility.
As Manfred F. R. Kets de Vries and Danny Miller’s examination of what they describe as
‘common dysfunctional managerial styles’ appears to demonstrate, the ‘psychological
orientations of managers’ may remarkably and dramatically influence a range of factors
concerning a firm’s performance. In particular, they proposed that the ‘personality’ of the
CEO has an important bearing on a firm’s organizational culture, and is of considerable
importance in the formulation of business strategies.218 Thus, in seeking reasons for
Gardner’s lack of preparedness for easily foreseeable market change, an examination of the
personality of its chief executive may reveal much.
To begin with, while his appointment to the post of CEO on the death of his father in 1955
was more-or-less inevitable, other than his birthright and a lengthy ‘apprenticeship’ in the
family firm, Hugh had few discernible qualifications to offer. Certainly, given his relatively
privileged background, his education and academic achievements were at best average.
After attending a private primary school in Cheshire, he spent the four years between 1916
and 1920 at the Manchester Grammar School.219 In January 1921, at the age of seventeen,
215 ‘Machining Engine Castings’, The Engineer, 25 November 1955, p. 771; Stevens-Stratten,
AEC, p. 57; Leyland, Official History, pp. 24 – 25; Kennett, Leyland, p. 87; Although Gardner
did make a 150 bhp eight-cylinder in-line unit at that time, its shear size and weight made it
unsuitable for most trucks and buses. Edge, Legendary Engineering, pp. 138 – 139, 205 –
206.
216 Cruikshank and Sicilia, Cummins, p. 190.
217 See Kotler, Marketing Management, p. 386.
218 Manfred F. R. Kets de Vries and Danny Miller, The Neurotic Organization, (San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass, 1984), pp. 2, 18.
219 Manchester Grammar School, A Biographical Register of Old Mancunians 1888 – 1951
(Manchester: Manchester Grammar School, 1965).
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he took his place on the shopfloor of the Patricroft works, purportedly studying part time at
Salford Technical College, but if he sat any examinations, either academic or vocational,
during these years, no records exist and no detectable accolades were conferred.220
In fact, rather than the pursuit of knowledge and the attainment of professional qualifications,
he appears to have spent his youth indulging an ostensible passion for fast cars and
motorcycles. In this, he was a winner, or at least he usually came first, which is not
necessarily the same thing. During the 1920s, together with his younger brother John, he
competed frequently in motorcycle races regularly held on the sands at Southport,
specializing in the fifty-mile events that seem to have been more like endurance tests. Given
the obvious advantages of the support of a large team of highly skilled engine fitters, it is not
surprising that the Gardners frequently led the field, the usual result being Hugh first and
John second. Only on one occasion, and that was when Hugh’s machine had broken down,
did John succeed in winning, suggesting that sibling rivalries had been resolved at some
earlier stage in their relationship.221 Moreover, a few years later, when the Gardner brothers
turned their attention to sports cars, a more comfortable activity that held Hugh’s interest
until he was well into his seventies, he again assumed the leading role, while John literally
took a back seat.222
Hugh Gardner’s assertive disposition was not only demonstrated on the sports field, and nor
were his exigencies confined to his immediate relatives. Although he was not the only
grandson of the founder to have shown an interest in the role, it is clear that at some stage
he assumed control of the design department; a position that he seems to have regarded as
his birthright and one that he was evidently prepared to aggressively defend. In the late
1930s, and without Hugh’s knowledge, some ‘junior Gardner family members’ – perhaps
Ernest’s sons Thomas Joseph and Ernest Edward – designed and built a new small diesel
engine. Upon hearing of this Hugh became infuriated, literally walking out of the factory and
refusing to return until the engine was dismantled and his authority reaffirmed.223 Not the last
time that Hugh Gardner adopted a blustering strategy in order to impose his will, his
intractability later deprived the firm of potentially beneficial developments.
On a least three other recorded occasions, Hugh Gardner exhibited obdurate inflexibility,
entrepreneurial deficiency, and technical incompetence. For example, he emphatically
refused to allow Gardner engines to incorporate turbo-charger technology, even though this
was, certainly by the mid-1950s, a well-established and thoroughly proven method of
boosting engine power. In 1974, he vetoed a proposition presented to the board by Paul
220 Glynn, ‘Mr. Hughie’.
221 The Southport Visiter, various editions, August 1925 – August 1928; John Gardner’s first and
only recorded win took place in September 1927, ibid.; Glynn, 'Mr. Hughie’; Glynn, ‘First Link’.
222 ‘On 5 February 1932, with Hugh Gardner at the wheel, John Gardner in the back … they
drove [the diesel powered Bentley] to Kirkstone Pass in the Lake District, and back, a
distance of 171 miles’. Whitehead, Gardners, p. 31.
223 Edge, Legendary Engineering, p. 178.
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Gardner, Hugh’s nephew and a director. This bold and imaginative suggestion, which Hugh
refused even to discuss, involved the acquisition by Gardner of the Rolls-Royce diesel
engine plant at Shrewsbury, which was at that time in the hands of official receivers. Hugh’s
strategy for dealing with both of these challenges to his authority was to threaten to resign
unless the shareholders accepted his position. On another occasion, and against the advice
of his fellow directors, he vigorously resisted the incorporation of a fully proven proprietary
pump-seal in Gardner engines, insisting instead that the firm persevere with his own
expensive and faulty design. This time, however, stimulated by substantial and increasing
warranty costs, common sense eventually prevailed.224
According to more than one of his co-directors, Hugh Gardner ‘could not and would not
delegate’, and after 1955, he rapidly imposed his own inflexible style of management on the
family firm. Intolerant of dissent, board meetings were little more than orchestrated
implementations of Hugh’s predetermined policies, and anyone having the temerity to
question his judgement received a curt rebuttal. He also brought every important aspect of
the firm’s business under his direct control. Together with his brother John, he soon took
personal charge of communications with the firm’s most important customers, as well as
responsibility for the major portion of domestic sales. Only exports and non-automotive
markets were left to Norris Henty and Gardners, whose London headquarters was
subsequently relegated to branch office status.225
Thereafter, very little in the way of strategic market planning took place. Other than their
attendance at annual commercial vehicle shows, advertising, both above- and below-the-
line, virtually ceased and the gathering of market information, conventionally the
responsibility of either the marketing or the sales departments, was largely neglected.
Gardner also began to withdraw from some its traditionally successful non-automotive
markets, and to downgrade its once extensive overseas presence. In key export territories,
including Southern Africa and the Antipodes, directly employed factory representatives were
dismissed and replaced with local commission agents.226
224 On the advantages of turbo-charged diesel engines see Cruikshank and Sicilia, Cummins,
pp. 145 – 146, 189, 307 – 310; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 10 March 1976; Paul Gardner,
Manchester to M. Halton, Horwich 13 August 2003.
225 ‘While it would not be entirely accurate to say that Hugh Gardner ran the company 'single-
handedly' his management style was rather autocratic …’ Edge, Legendary Engineering, pp.
133, 136 – 137, 154 – 156, 160, 508; D. G. Houghton, Chichester to M. J. Halton, Horwich, 8
September 2003; D. G. Houghton, Chichester to M. J. Halton, Horwich, 24 October 2003;
Paul Gardner, Manchester to M. J. Halton, Horwich 13 August 2003.
226 See ‘Patricroft Engines for S. America’, Eccles and Patricroft Journal, 30 August 1929, p. 5;
In the late 1940s, Gardner’s established network of overseas representatives and agents
included factory representatives in Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, India and South Africa. In
Europe, the firm had agents in Belgium, Denmark, France and the Netherlands; in the
Americas, other than Canada, they were represented only in Argentina. Gardner product
catalogue circa 1950, Salford Local History Library Archive, ref. L620 GAR (paper); ‘Engines
At The National Boat Show’, The Engineer, 28 January 1955, p.140; ‘Engineering, Marine
and Welding Exhibition’, The Engineer, 23 September 1955, p. 433; Whitehead, Gardners, p.
38.
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While it would be extremely unrealistic to claim that the foregoing assortment of largely
anecdotal accounts and incidents represent anything approaching a comprehensive analysis
of Hugh Gardner’s character, together they amount to a reasonably persuasive measure of
inference. Moreover, their implication that Hugh’s conduct manifested a passionate
preoccupation with control appears to resonate with aspects of what Kets de Vries and Miller
depicted as a typical ‘Compulsive Organization’. In particular, such firms show signs of a
‘constant preoccupation with domination and submission’ as well as with ‘detail and
established procedures.’ Such organizations ‘place great emphasis on product quality’ and
they also ‘focus on a carefully circumscribed target market’, tendencies that can obscure the
relevance of impending macroenvironmental change. Because ‘Compulsive Organizations’
usually dominate their chosen markets they are, ‘at least for a while’, able to ignore market
change, but if their strategies are too narrowly focused, their survival in a changing
environment becomes increasingly difficult.227
Summarizing the weight of the evidence presented above, it seems unreasonable to assume
that Gardner’s inaction was the result of ignorance or misunderstanding, and it is equally
implausible to imagine that a Board of Directors that included experienced professionals
would not have drawn some conclusions from the information available. If, however, their
collective astuteness had been negated by the autocratic manner with which Hugh Gardner
handled the firm, then the only reasonable explanation is that he alone was responsible for
this blunder. The resulting crisis gave rise to serious consequences, the most important of
which was the exposure of Gardner to new competition, an opportunity that Cummins quickly
grasped and upon which they steadily built.
A less immediate outcome, but one at least as critical for the future of Gardner, was the long-
term effect on the firm’s relationship with its employees. The managers had clearly
misrepresented the situation in early 1957, when they must have been aware of the true
position. Moreover, they had used the situation to inveigle the shop stewards, the full-time
officials on the AEU District Committee, as well as the union’s headquarters staff into
accepting dilution when this would in no way alleviate the firm’s difficulties. In the next
chapter, which concentrates on workplace industrial relations at Gardner, the worsening
relationship between the firm and its employees during a period often viewed as one of the
most turbulent eras in Britain’s post-war history are described and analysed.
227 Kets de Vries and Miller, Neurotic Organization, pp. 28 – 31.
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CHAPTER 4
WORKPLACE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
I Introduction
What’s important is the approach you take. I’ve seen some people go into
negotiations with the idea that they’re not going to change their position, and
that’s that. But eventually you’ve got to come together, so you have to put
yourself in a position where you can come together. Unless, of course, you want
to have a strike. You can always have a strike if you want a strike.228
The theme propounded in this chapter is that between 1960 and 1975, the managers of L.
Gardner and Sons espoused workplace industrial relations policies that increasingly made
the relationship between the firm and its employees dysfunctional. Its wider purpose is to
examine the nature of workplace industrial relations in Britain during the 1960s and 1970s
from the perspective of a middling-sized industrial firm. The research focused on a fifteen-
year period widely regarded as an era during which Britain’s industrial relations became
progressively impaired, and Britain’s decline as an industrial power became irreversible. The
analysis concentrates on the relationship between the Gardner management, the
employees’ elected representatives, and the local full-time trade union officials. Particular
attention was given to the changing perspectives of these three key elements as each in turn
vied for control in the workplace, and the aggregate effects of procedures, regulations, and
payment systems.
Between 1960 and 1973, the majority of trade union members at Gardner supported
relatively moderate shop stewards and demonstrated their aversion to discord by their
rejection, on more than one occasion, of the more assertive strategies of full-time union
officials. However, while these conditions afforded opportunities for reasonably astute
managers to foster stable workplace industrial relations, it is clear that the relationship
between the firm and its employees gradually worsened during the 1960s, deteriorated
steadily after 1968, and broke down completely in 1973. It will be argued that the firm’s
problems in this area stemmed not from mounting trade union power, workers’ intransigence,
or management’s lack of authority, but from unrealistically high expectations of submission to
management control coupled with a manifestly maladroit approach to negotiating
procedures. The following narrative describes the deterioration of workplace industrial
relations at Gardner, analyses the findings, and offers explanations for these developments.
II Thematic Issues
The evolving relationship between employers and employees is an area of interest that has
increasingly attracted the attention of academics, chroniclers, journalists, and general
228 Dick Stoner, executive vice president, Cummins Engine Company, quoted in, Cruikshank and
Sicilia, Cummins, p. 268.
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commentators since the late Victorian era.229 Viewed from a diversity of standpoints and
typically studied using an institutional approach, the resulting vast body of scholarly works
range from descriptive histories of trade unionism and of individual trade unions, to more
broadly structured narratives on the socioeconomic, sociopolitical, and sociocultural
influence of workers and their organizations.230 Its growing significance, especially since the
mid-twentieth century, has led to the establishment of degree courses at British universities
and abroad, and its maturity as a discrete field of study to the founding of several specialist
scholarly journals.231 Evidenced by a gradual but discernible philosophical transformation
among industrial relations managers – from regarding employees as anonymous factors of
production to a more unitarist perception that they are, individually and collectively, a
resource – the influence of these developments has led to a more progressive approach to
its practice and a more analytical approach to its history.232
The historical implications of industrial relations, especially during the period discussed in
229 For example Marshall, Principles of Economics, passim; Marshall, Industry and Trade,
passim.
230 On the profusion of works and perspectives see David Gilbert, ‘Strikes in post-war Britain’, in
Chris Wrigley, ed., A History of British Industrial Relations, 1939 – 1979, Industrial Relations
in a Declining Economy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), p. 129; prominent among these
are: Sidney and Beatrice Webb, The History of Trade Unionism, Various Editions (London:
Longmans Green, 1894 - 1920); Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy, Various
Editions (London: Longmans Green, 1897 - 1920); F. D. Klingender, The Condition of Clerical
Labour in Britain (London: Martin Lawrence, 1935); Jefferys, Engineers; K. G. J. C. Knowles,
Strikes: a study in industrial conflict (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952); John T. Dunlop, Industrial
Relations Systems (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1958); Ernest Henry
Phelps Brown, The Growth of British Industrial Relations: a study from the standpoint of
1906-14 (London: Macmillan, 1959); Henry Pelling, A History of British Trade Unionism,
Various Editions (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963 – 1992); H. A. Clegg, A. Fox, and A. F.
Thompson, A History of British Trade Unions since 1889 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1964 – 1994);
A. Flanders, Industrial Relations: What is Wrong with the System? (London: Faber, 1964);
Alan Fox, Industrial Sociology and Industrial Relations, Research Paper No. 3 (London:
HMSO, 1966); J. Clarke, C. Critcher, and R. Johnson, Working Class Culture: studies in
theory and history (London: Hutchinson, 1979); Ernest Henry Phelps Brown, The Origins of
Trade Union Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); R. Croucher, We Refuse to
Starve in Silence: a history of the National Unemployed Workers’ Movement, 1920-46
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1987); Howard F. Gospel and Gill Palmer, British Industrial
Relations, Second Edition (London: Routledge, 1993).
231 Including, for example, Industrial and Labour Relations Review; British Journal of Industrial
Relations; Work, Employment and Society; Industrial Relations Journal; Human Resource
Management Journal; Personnel Management; Employee Relations.
232 For example, ‘… economic theories state that if an employer is to succeed, or even survive in
the face of competition, he must treat his labour force as a factor of production, a cost to his
business, like his non-human raw materials’. However, ‘At the present time (the early 1990s)
often under the banner of new-style Human Resource Management, there is increasing talk
about the need to treat the workforce as a resource and an asset to be retained and
developed for the longer term …’ moreover, ‘Human Relations theorists argue that workers
demand and need interesting, stimulating work [without which] employees will be alienated
and uncooperative and managerial objectives difficult to achieve’. Gospel and Palmer,
Industrial Relations, p. 37, 93; ‘… the predominant concern of employee relations is no longer
about the role of collective bargaining, and the union as its agent, as about securing
employee assent and expressing managerial commitment to achieving that assent’., Ian
Beardwell, ‘‘How Do We Know How It Really Is?’ An Analysis of the New Industrial Relations’,
in Ian J. Beardwell, ed., Contemporary Industrial Relations: A Critical Analysis (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 7; for a detailed account of these developments see Boyce
and Ville, Development of Modern Business, pp. 116 – 144.
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this chapter, are well understood and routinely explored in the works of economic
historians.233 In the sub-field of business history, however, prominent scholars have elected
to disregard an aspect of industrial enterprise that, according to its leading exponent, was
crucially significant. As well as exposing weaknesses in his approach, Chandler’s somewhat
inappropriate justification for his failure to address industrial relations – that its analysis
would require ‘a second volume as extensive as this one’ – tacitly licenced others to be
similarly casual.234 Thus, although one of the key advantages of comparative methodology
has been described as its capacity to analyse the techniques used by different firms to
overcome the same problems, in his much-cited Strategy and Structure of British Enterprise,
Derek Channon allocated barely a thousand words to what he clearly regarded as one of
British industry’s most serious weaknesses.235 Moreover, having enumerated the perceived
problems, he limited his appraisal of them to the arbitrary observation that British
management ‘got the industrial relations it deserved’, but while this assertion implied strongly
that the same rule applied, but with different outcomes, to firms in other countries, he
produced no substantiating evidence.236 Nevertheless, Channon’s meagre contribution to the
industrial relations issue was larger that that of Leslie Hannah, another British scholar with
Harvard connections who, in his comparative study, Rise of the Corporate Economy,
completely disregarded the subject.237
Perhaps their tendency to focus on large-scale industrial corporations has led some
business historians to identify mass-production methods with the most appropriate system,
and to perceive the replacement of labour by automated manufacturing methods as one of
233 ‘Anyone with even the slightest interest in Britain’s economy since the Second World War can
hardly fail to recognize [labour relations] as a major, if not the single most important, factor in
industrial performance – or in the lack of it’. Bernard W. E. Alford, ‘New Industries for Old?,
British industry between the wars’, in Floud and McCloskey, Economic History of Britain, Vol.
2, p. 329; ‘Labour markets and industrial relations are probably better understood than other
elements in economic performance …’, Alford, Britain in the World, p. 270; for a concise
review of what he terms the ‘conventional wisdom’ see Peter Nolan, ‘Industrial Relations and
Performance Since 1945’, in Beardwell, Contemporary Industrial Relations, pp. 99 – 100;
also, for example, Mathias, First Industrial, pp. 332 – 343; Dewey, War and Progress, pp. 11
– 13, 37 – 42, 116 – 141, 253 – 275, 280 – 282, 306 – 308; Cairncross, British Economy,
Second Edition, pp. 9, 26, 108 – 109, 113, 114, 142, 145, 148, 151, 183, 193 – 196, 199,
220, 235, 256, 302; D. E. Baines, ‘The labour supply and the labour market 1860 – 1914’, in
Floud and McCloskey, Economic History of Britain, Vol. 2, pp. 144 – 174; Aldcroft and
Richardson, British Economy, pp. 14 – 15, 162 – 163, 174 – 178, 200 – 202.
234 Alfred D. Chandler Jnr., ‘Comparative business History’, in Coleman and Mathias, Enterprise,
p. 3; Chandler, Scale and Scope, p. 13; on Chandler’s ‘contribution’ to the industrial relations
discussion see, Howard F. Gospel, ‘Comparative Patterns of Labor-Management Relations:
Great Britain, the US, and Japan’, Business and Economic History, 2 (15), 1986: 119 – 131.
235 Channon, Structure of British Enterprise, pp. 41 – 42; this work is cited, for example, in
Hannah, Corporate Economy (both editions), passim; also in Bernard W. E. Alford, ‘The
Chandler Thesis – Some General Observations’, in Hannah, Management Strategy, p. 66;
Bernard W. E. Alford, ‘Strategy and Structure in the UK Tobacco Industry’, in Hannah,
Management Strategy, p. 84; Leslie Hannah, ‘Strategy and Structure in the Manufacturing
Sector’, in Hannah, Management Strategy, pp. 185 -186, 189, 199 – 202; Hannah, ‘Visible
and Invisible’, in Chandler and Daems, Hierarchies, p. 72.
236 Channon, Structure of British Enterprise, pp. 40 – 42, 226, 231.
237 Hannah, Corporate Economy (both editions).
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management’s fundamental goals. Clearly, in firms such as Ford where such principles were
applied to their attainable limits, the employee’s role in the workplace was largely governed
through mechanical ‘impersonal’ controls.238 However, while such strategies were available
in certain market sectors there can be no doubt that in many others, particularly for industrial
goods like large diesel engines, this approach was not viable, at least during the period
covered by this chapter. Thus, as Gospel and Palmer’s range of typologies plausibly
demonstrated, different types of firms adopted different broadly defined industrial relations
strategies. Especially in firms like Gardner, whose complex, high-value, low-volume products
necessitated the employment of a relatively large number of skilled artisans, the relationship
between employers and workers was particularly important.239
More rigorous analyses of the relationship between firms and employees appear in the
works of labour historians, social scientists, and other scholars whose studies, unlike those
of many business historians, include small and medium-sized industrial firms that, like
Gardner, were neither mass producers nor members of global oligopolies.240 Prominent
among these, Piore and Sabel’s study of manufacturers of high-quality products accentuated
the importance of industrial relations in firms that relied on skills, while Steven Tolliday and
Jonathan’s Zeitlin’s analysis of industrial relations in the automobile industries of Britain and
the USA during the 1960s and 1970s proposed that many of the stereotypical perceptions
regarding the workplace environment are misleading, a view supported by others. In both
countries, they argued, the interaction between managers and workers on the shopfloor
created a ‘… complex blend of power and constraint for both unions and management …’
and the outcomes of disagreements, when they arose, were greatly influenced by the
attitudes of individuals directly involved. In Britain, they asserted, while the power of trade
union officials in the workplace strengthened between 1965 and 1975, it was normally
exercised ‘… in a flexible and co-operative manner except in periods of acute conflict’.241
238 A theme repeatedly emphasized in Lewchuk, American Technology, also P. David, Technical
Choice, Innovation and Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
239 In small and middling-sized enterprises like Gardner, industrial relations strategies are
described as being ‘simple, direct, and personal’. Gospel and Palmer, Industrial Relations,
pp. 37, 53; also Fox, Industrial Sociology; John Purcell and Keith Sisson, ‘Strategies and
Practice in the Management of Industrial Relations’, in George Sayers Bain, ed., Industrial
Relations in Britain (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), pp. 112 – 113.
240 ‘Few labour historians found persuasive Chandler's blanket assertion that, except in the case
of the railroads, the work force had little impact on managerial decision making …’, John,
‘Elaborations’, p. 190; also Bowden, Foreman-Peck, and Richardson, ‘Post-war Productivity,
pp. 54 – 78; also Kenneth D. Brown, 'Unions and Management in Engineering: A Case Study,
1964-79', Business History, 47 (1), 2005, pp. 86 – 101; Marek Korczynski, 'The Restrictive
Practices of Capital: Employer Commercial Opportunism, Labour Militancy and Economic
Performance in the Engineering Construction Industry, 1960-80', Business History, 41
(3)1999, pp. 134 – 160; Nick Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinson, ‘Restrictive practices on the
shopfloor in Britain, 1945-60: myth and reality’, Business History, 36 (2), 1994, pp. 65 – 83;
Jim Tomlinson, ‘The Government and the Car Industry, 1947 – 1970’, Journal of Transport
History, 20 (1), 1999, pp. 17 – 29.
241 Piore and Sabel, Second Industrial, passim; for example, ‘Compared with Germany, days lost
to strikes per employee between 1966 and 1970 were 38 times higher in Britain and 99 times
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Most observers accept that conflict in the workplace was inevitable, and some have outlined
the various strategies available to employers for dealing with it. However, ‘acute’ conflict
suggests the adoption of fundamentally contrasting and uncompromising positions, often
centred on ill-defined and longstanding assertions concerning regulations and the rights of
workers on the factory floor where senior, junior, and middle managers necessarily and
constantly interacted with employees.242 Clearly, under such conditions, the ‘adversarial’
approach to industrial relations, commonly embraced by firms during the 1960s and 1970s,
offered little scope for employees to express their feelings, and their only means of
communicating their dissatisfaction with management was to adopt obstructive behaviour.243
The rising level of industrial disputes in sectors of the British manufacturing engineering
industry between 1960 and 1975 ostensibly confirms the widely held perception that, during
this period, the relationship between employers and employees became increasing
dysfunctional.244 Depending on the viewpoint of the writer, responsibility for the breakdown
has been attributed jointly and severally to government intervention (which steadily turned
into interference); ineffective negotiating procedures; outdated remunerations systems; over-
powerful trade union officials, and weak or incompetent management.245 In the context of the
higher in the United States’. Ronald Philip Dore, William Lazonick, and Mary O’Sullivan,
‘Varieties of Capitalism in the Twentieth Century, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 15 (4),
1999, p. 110; Steven Tolliday and Jonathan Zeitlin, ‘Shop-Floor Bargaining, Contract
Unionism and Job Control: An Anglo-American Comparison’, in Tolliday and Zeitlin, Workers,
pp. 99 – 120.
242 The settlements of the 1897 and the 1922 ‘lock-outs’ established certain ‘rights’ concerning
management and labour is discussed in, W. R. Garside, ‘Management and Men: Aspects of
British Industrial Relations in the Inter-War Period’, in Supple, Essays, p. 253; considered in
more detail in Jonathan Zeitlin, ‘The Labour Strategies of British Engineering Employers,
1890 – 1922’, in Howard F. Gospel and Craig R. Littler, eds., Managerial Strategies and
Industrial Relations, An Historical and Comparative Study (Aldershot: Gower, 1983), pp. 25 –
54, esp. pp. 34 – 35; also in Edmund and Ruth Frow, Engineering Struggles, Episodes in the
Story of the Shop Stewards’ Movement (Manchester: Working Class Movement Library,
1982), pp. 22 – 24, 81 – 82; and in Lewchuk, American Technology, pp. 86 – 88.
243 ‘Adversarial [employee relations]: the organization decides what it wants to do, and
employees are expected to fit in. Employees [can] only exercise power by refusing to
cooperate’. Michael Armstrong, Strategic Human Resource Management, A Guide to Action
(London: Kogan Page, 2000), p. 244.
244 Following ‘a seven year peace’ the overall level of strike activity in British industry between
1953 and 1959 ‘was firmly up’, and between 1960 and 1968 there was ‘a substantial growth
in the number of shop-floor stoppages’ which rose steeply in 1969, fell sharply in 1971, but
resumed a ‘familiar upward path’ thereafter. J. W. Durcan, W. E. J. McCarthy, and G. R.
Redman, Strikes in Post-War Britain, A Study of Stoppages of Work Due to Industrial
Disputes, 1946-73 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), pp. 26, 171.
245 This range of issues is discussed in Gospel and Palmer, Industrial Relations, p. 71; Stephen
Wilks, ‘Institutional insularity: government and the British motor industry since 1945’, in Martin
Chick, ed., Governments, Industries and Markets (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990), p. 161;
Tiratsoo and Tomlinson, ‘Restrictive practices’, p. 65; Lloyd-Jones and Lewis, Capitalism, pp.
171, 181, 187, 192; Korczynski, 'Restrictive Practices’, p. 134; Brown, 'Unions and
Management’, p. 86; Nolan, ‘Industrial Relations’, in Ian Beardwell, Contemporary Industrial
Relations, p. 107; Alan Booth, ‘The Manufacturing Failure Hypothesis and the Performance of
British Industry During the Long Boom’, Economic History Review, 56 (1), 2003, pp. 1 – 33;
Keith Laybourn, A History of British Trade Unionism c. 1770 - 1990 (Stroud: Alan Sutton,
1992), pp. 181, 375 – 376; Cairncross, ‘Economic Policy and Performance, 1964 - 1990’, in
Floud and McCloskey, Economic History of Britain, Second Edition, Vol. 3, pp. 76 – 77; H. A.
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British manufacturing engineering industry, and especially where they involve firms like
Gardner, these issues are summarized and explored below.
The Role of Governments
It is clear that micro- and macroenvironmental factors emerging during the decade following
the end of the Second World War directly influenced the relationship between employers and
employees in the British manufacturing engineering industries. While some historians believe
that the wartime co-operation between the state, enterprise, and workers endured for many
years after 1945, others hold different views. Believing the level of collaboration to be
somewhat overstated, one contemporary observer has proposed that, as trade unions
demanded the repeal of concessions yielded during the conflict, and companies sought to
restore the ‘managerial functions’ they had ceded to the state, discord quickly emerged.246
Although it seems probable that, over time, such differences would have been resolved
without government intervention, the advent of the Korean War in 1950 made this less likely.
Its global economic impact, especially worldwide shortages of raw materials, and the
domestic consequences, such as the re-expansion of Britain’s military capacity, brought with
it state controls and a partial return to pre-1945 conditions.247 Thereafter, although opinion
varies somewhat, a pattern of recurring economic crises drew successive governments into
direct action aimed at achieving stability.248
Such intervention had been firmly rejected by the first post-war Labour administration and
neither was it immediately espoused by the post-1951 Conservative government.249 Soon
Clegg, How to Run an Incomes Policy and Why We Made Such a Mess of the Last One
(London: Heinemann, 1971), pp. 61 – 67; H. A. Turner, Garfield Clack, and Geoffrey Roberts,
Labour Relations in the Motor Industry: A Study of Industrial Unrest and an International
Comparison (London: Allen and Unwin, 1967), pp. 211 – 212.
246 According to Laybourn, ‘… a wartime consensus between employers, the state and unions ...
survived at least until the late 1960s … ’; Laybourn, History of British Trade Unionism, p. 157;
however, a contemporary chronicler observed, ‘The temporary identity of interests between
the employers and the shop stewards during the war was shattered when the war ended …’,
Edmund and Ruth Frow, Engineering Struggles, pp. 145 – 201, 220 – 262; also Richard
Croucher, Engineers At War 1939 – 1945 (London: Merlin, 1982), passim; Cairncross,
‘Economic Policy’, p. 46; Jeremy, Business History of Britain, p. 58.
247 With the outbreak of war in Korea government controls ‘… returned with a vengeance …’
Zeitlin, ‘Reconciling’, p. 18; the ‘… process of transition to a peacetime economy was still in
progress when the Korean war broke out in 1950’., Dunnett, Decline, p. 31; An early effect of
the Korean crisis included ‘physical shortages of raw materials [that] multiplied, creating
bottlenecks and limiting production’. Cairncross, British Economy, Second Edition, p. 101.
248 For example, ‘… in December 1950 Britain was ‘home free’, and even the severe deficit on
balance of payments of 1951 - a product of the Korean War - could not reverse her upward
course’., David S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change in Western
Europe from 1750 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p.496;
however, ‘… the Korean War and the stockpiling crisis associated with it in 1951 caused the
third of what threatened to be regular economic crises in alternate years, [but] British
economic recovery was by then firmly set’. Pollard, Development, p. 197; also Pollard,
Wasting, p. 37; Cairncross, British Economy, Second Edition, p. 117.
249 ‘In spite of the exhortations of public officials in the Economic Section and the Economic
Information Division of the Treasury, Conservative ministers proved dilatory about developing
any wages policy at all. It was only when Macmillan became Chancellor in 1955, that a white
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however, a perceived steady increase in labour costs, as well as an upsurge in industrial
disputes, brought the theme of regulatory legislation to the attention of politicians.250 The
concept of controlling inflation by limiting prices and incomes, either through voluntary
restraints or legally binding agreements, steadily gained credence until, by the mid-1950s,
government ministers were urging union leaders to adopt a responsible stance in the face of
their members’ escalating wage demands.251 However, as rising inflation continued to cause
concern the first in a long series of formal measures intended to curb the growing cost of
labour was introduced.252 Thereafter, sporadic and occasionally intense trade union
opposition notwithstanding, there followed a series of relatively short-lived government
sponsored commissions, boards, and directives.253 Although most of these were at best
modestly successful, they had unforeseen and far-reaching consequences for workplace
industrial relations. Far from achieving their intended outcomes, they seem to have
engendered an enduring attitude among workers that government restrictions, whether they
were officially approved by the unions or not, could be circumvented through a
paper … was published on the subject’. Noel Whiteside, ‘Industrial Relations and social
welfare, 1945-79’, in Wrigley, British Industrial Relations, p. 116.
250 ‘Between 1953 and 1959 stoppages outside coal mining … rose by nearly 80 per cent …’
Gospel and Palmer, Industrial Relations, p. 221; also Durcan, McCarthy, and Redman,
Strikes in Post-War Britain, pp. 26 – 171; Gilbert, ‘Strikes’, in Wrigley, British Industrial
Relations, pp. 133 – 142; ‘As early as 1958, the basic framework had already been widely
aired by Conservative lawyers … which was to be the basis of much of the 1971 Industrial
Relations Act’. Chris Wrigley, ‘Trade Unions and the 1964 General Election’ Contemporary
British History, 21 (3), 2007, p. 329.
251 ‘It was not until 1956 that [the conservative government] issued The Economic Implications of
Full Employment, a pamphlet … arguing the need for stability in wages … In the same year
Macmillan entered into talks with employers and employed, hoping to persuade them to hold
prices and wages steady’. Cairncross, ‘Economic Policy and performance, 1945 – 1964’, in
Floud and McCloskey, Economic History of Britain, Second Edition, Vol. 3, p. 61; Sir
Alexander Cairncross, ‘The post-war years 1945 – 77’, in Floud and McCloskey, Economic
History of Britain, Vol. 2, p. 393; Cairncross, British Economy, Second Edition, pp. 135, 141,
145, 154, 157 – 158, 162, 194, 290, 171, 197 – 198; Cairncross, ‘Economic Policy’, pp. 62 –
63; Laybourn, A History of British Trade Unionism, pp. 173 – 175; Chris Wrigley, ‘Trade union
development, 1945 – 79’, in Wrigley, British Industrial Relations, p. 78; Durcan, McCarthy,
and Redman, Strikes in Post-War Britain, p. 373; Gospel and Palmer, Industrial Relations, pp.
211, 246 – 247.
252 The Council for Prices, Productivity and Incomes (COPPI) was appointed in August 1957,
Robert J. Davies, ‘Incomes and Anti-Inflation Policy’, in Bain, Industrial Relations, p. 419;
Cairncross, British Economy, Second Edition, pp. 113 – 114, 141; Whiteside, ‘Industrial
Relations’, in Wrigley, British Industrial Relations, pp. 116, 119; Patrick Maguire, ‘Labour and
the law: the politics of British Industrial Relations, 1945 – 79’, in Wrigley, British Industrial
Relations, pp. 49 – 51; Laybourn, A History of British Trade Unionism, pp. 173 – 175; Chris
Wrigley, ‘Trade union development, 1945 – 79’, in Wrigley, British Industrial Relations, p. 78.
253 The most important of these are listed in Table 9.3 in Gospel and Palmer, Industrial
Relations, p. 230; also in Appendix 1 in Cairncross, British Economy, Second Edition, pp. 308
– 312; Policy Studies Institute at the University of Westminster, appendix D, Government
Policies, Government Measures in the United Kingdom, 1945 – 1980,
http://www.psi.org.uk/publications/archivepdfs/Innovation%20and%20Indust/APPD.pdf, pp,
155 – 157; also Nina Fishman, TUC History Online,
http://www.unionhistory.info/timeline/1960_2000.php.
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demonstration of their willingness to undertake industrial action.254
Formal and Informal Arbitration Procedures
Hypothetically, disputes in the manufacturing engineering industries could be resolved
through a range of established formal procedures in force throughout most of the twentieth
century. Based on an agreement negotiated after the 1898 engineering lockout, the
‘Provisions for the Avoidance of Disputes’ was an 'understanding' originally reached between
the engineering unions and the Engineering Employers’ Federation (EEF) in April 1914 and
revised ‘…at the close of [the] prolonged and embittered conference’ following another
lockout in 1922. They were, however, fundamentally outdated and largely inappropriate for
post-Second World War workplace conditions. Strongly biased towards the employers’
interests, the ‘Provisions’ entailed lengthy, highly strictured, and formulaic proceedings that
often took many months to conclude, encouraging shop stewards to coerce management -
and occasionally vice versa - into direct dialogue at plant level.255 Such ‘semi-legitimate’
discussions are regarded by many to have been at the centre of the perceived anarchic
nature of post-war workplace industrial relations, and are therefore often presented as one
the main reasons for Britain’s industrial decline.256
254 ‘In the end, it became clear to organized workers that the power to organize an effective
strike was the only way to bargain with ... government’. Laybourn, History of British Trade
Unionism, p. 175; Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman and John McIlroy, eds., British Trade Unions
and Industrial Politics vol. 1, The post-war compromise, 1945-64 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999),
pp. 103; Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman and John McIlroy, eds., British Trade Unions and
Industrial Politics, vol. 2. The High Tide of Trade Unionism, 1964-79 (Aldershot: Ashgate,
1999), p.120; Durcan, McCarthy, and Redman, Strikes in Post-War Britain, pp. 26 – 171, 373
– 374.
255 See Jefferys, Engineers, pp. 152, 160, 165, 222, 227, 231, 236, 243; For Laybourn, the
Provisions ‘… were nineteenth century in origin. They belonged to an industrial structure
which had passed’. Laybourn, History of British Trade Unionism, pp. 340 – 341, 323 – 324;
also Sisson, ‘Employers’ Organizations’, p. 127; for a particularly critical analysis of the
evolution of the ‘Procedures’ see Edmund and Ruth Frow, Engineering Struggles, pp. 23,
270, 471 - 477; for more specific observations on the ‘Provisions’ from an AEU perspective
see B. C. Berridge, ‘Failure to Agree’, AEU Monthly Journal, April 1943, p.100; also ‘Your
Union and You: Chapters in AEU History, XII – Union Negotiations and Agreements’, AEU
Monthly Journal, July 1943, p. 178; regarding ‘coercion’ see Raymond Robinson interviewed
by Ruth Frow and Edmund Frow, tape recording, July 1976., ref. 231A, 2000.1037; Foreman-
Peck, Bowden and McKinlay, Motor Industry, pp. 166 – 167; also Jeffrey Haydn, Between
Craft and Class: Skilled Workers and Factory Politics in the United States and Britain, 1890-
1922 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 72, 94 – 95, 97, 102 – 103, 168,
172; The ‘Provisions for the Avoidance of Disputes’ is also described in Turner, Clack, and
Roberts, Labour Relations, p. 250; its operation analysed in A. I. Marsh and R. S. Jones,
‘Engineering Procedures and Central Conference at York in 1959: a Factual Analysis’, British
Journal of Industrial Relations, 2 (2), 1964, pp. 228 – 250; also Confederation of Shipbuilding
and Engineering Unions, Handbook of National Agreements (London: Charles Mitchell,
1964).
256 For example, the Donovan Commission, established in 1965, the Government White Paper
‘In Place of Strife’ in 1969, and the Industrial Relations Act in 1971, see Peter Maunder, ed.,
The British Economy in the 1970s (London: Heinemann, 1980), p. 127; ‘The (Donovan)
Commission argued that the decaying national and industry-wide system of collective
bargaining had allowed disorder and informality to flourish in the workplace’. Nolan, ‘Industrial
Relations’, in Beardwell, Contemporary Industrial Relations, p. 107; also M. Terry, ‘Shop
Steward Development and Managerial Strategies’, p. 73; Brown, 'Unions and Management’,
in Bain, Industrial Relations, p. 86.
87
Remunerations Systems
By the 1960s, the number of stoppages taking place without official union sanction or
occurring before formal negotiation procedure had been exhausted was increasing.257
Usually brief, limited to a single factory or section and involving a relatively small number of
employees, the link between such actions and the prevalence of piecework systems, also
known as ‘Payment by Results’ (PBR) is conspicuous.258 Typical of PBR schemes in the
engineering industries, by the late 1950s the Manchester Piecework Agreement, first drawn
up in 1918, had become extremely complex.259 (see Appendix 3) Its most potentially
disruptive aspect lay in the right of individual workers to renegotiate the rate for each task
when alterations in manufacturing methods led to changes in production processes. Their
prerogative, if not satisfied, to eschew piecework bonus and revert to ‘day-work’, essentially
effecting a ‘go-slow’, made transactions surrounding PBR especially sensitive and minor
disagreements were common. Because they naturally emerged in the workplace, the
mutually beneficial interest in maintaining the flow of production created time constraints that
made their resolution through formal Procedures impracticable. Although cultural differences
set much of the agenda and conflict was not always avoided, under normal circumstances
pragmatism usually dictated outcomes.260 There can be no doubt, however, that although
some managers believed that PBR encouraged effort, shop stewards knew well how to
manipulate the inherent vagaries of systems such as the Manchester Piecework Agreement
to suit their own agendas.261
The Role of Shop Stewards
By the mid-twentieth century, the influence of shop stewards in the manufacturing
engineering industries, directly traceable to the spread of PBR at the end of the nineteenth
257 Gospel and Palmer, Industrial Relations, p. 221; Howard F. Gospel, ‘The management of
labour’, in Wrigley, British Industrial Relations, p. 89.
258 ‘Unofficial and wildcat strikes … accounted for 95 per cent of industrial stoppages and were
becoming more common. About half the wildcat strikes concerned wages …’ Channon,
Structure of British Enterprise, p. 42; ‘Up to the late 1960s, strikes were not a major problem
but by the late 1960s the British car firms had identified the piece-work system as the
principal cause of productivity problems …’ Millward, ‘Industrial and Commercial’, in Floud
and McCloskey, Economic History of Britain, Second Edition, Vol. 3, pp. 143 – 144; also
Lewchuk, American Technology, pp. 1 – 5.
259 On PBR in the engineering industries see Jefferys, Engineers, pp. 188 – 189; on some of the
historical iniquitous aspects of PBR, from the point of view of a leftwing trade unionist, see
Edmund and Ruth Frow, Engineering Struggles, pp. 122, 127 – 128, 174, and passim.
260 ‘… the personalities of the parties involved, the dominant idea of the time (and), the parties’
perceptions of the historical background against which they operated ... probably influenced
behaviour and attitudes’. Durcan, McCarthy, and Redman, Strikes in Post-War Britain, pp.
412 – 413; also Foreman-Peck, Bowden and McKinlay, Motor Industry, p. 172; For a detailed
description of the complexity of PBR see Turner, Clack, and Roberts, Labour Relations, pp.
155 – 164; Wayne Lewchuk, ‘The Motor Vehicle Industry’, in Elbaum and Lazonick, Decline
of the British Economy, p. 140; for a trade unionist’s perception regarding some of the
intricacies of PBR see Edmund and Ruth Frow, Engineering Struggles, pp. 235 – 237;
Tolliday and Zeitlin, ‘Shop-Floor Bargaining’, pp. 99 – 120.
261 John K. Gardner interviewed by Ruth Frow, tape recording, July 1976, ref. tape no. 87,
2000.0882; Carl Lingard, Inverbeg, to Maurice Halton, Horwich, 27 September 2003; Carl
Lingard, Inverbeg, to Maurice Halton, Horwich, 24 October 2003.
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century, had become established.262 However, depending on the perspective of the
observer, opinions of their role in the workplace vary. To full-time officials shop stewards
were custodians of the trade union ethos, upholders of trade union policies and in the
vanguard of resistance to any attack on trade union rights. To their departmental colleagues,
however, from whose democratic votes and active support their power was derived, the shop
stewards’ primary function was to represent their individual and collective interests in the
workplace.263 Clearly, it was not always possible to satisfy the expectations of both groups.
When the exigencies of full-time officials ran counter to the interests of ordinary union
members, and especially when industry wide settlements reached through collective
bargaining restricted their perceived right to press for higher wages, the shop stewards’
strategies often conflicted with official trade union policy. Moreover, while full-time officials
were obliged by convention to adhere to the Provisions for the Avoidance of Disputes, the
shop stewards’ physical presence allowed them to actively and regularly challenge
management in the workplace. Unsurprisingly, because shop stewards had the power to
mediate as well as to confront, many workers tended to view them, rather than senior union
officials, as their true leaders.264
In general, while shop stewards have been held responsible for many of the more serious
shortcomings of British industrial enterprise, they have also been credited with having some
positive effects in the workplace. Among their perceived beneficial attributes, their status as
elected representatives combined with, in the case of skilled engineering employees, their
knowledge as fully trained and highly specialized craftsmen, are thought to have led to their
being regarded as potentially ideal intermediaries and quasi-supervisors whose technical
experience could be accessed and used to increase efficiency. On the other hand, their
alleged tendency to foster restrictive practices and obstruct the installation of modern
manufacturing equipment and methods are considered to have hindered British industry’s
response to international competition.265 Another, somewhat less convincing, indictment is
262 For a summary of the role of shop stewards as specified by the 1922 Working Conditions
agreement, ‘Your Union and You: Chapters in AEU History, XII – Union Negotiations and
Agreements’, AEU Monthly Journal, July 1943, p. 178.
263 At Gardner, and most other manufacturing engineering firms, shop stewards were elected
annually in departmental ballots. See Jefferys, Engineers, p. 261; Laybourn, History of British
Trade Unionism, pp. 172, 340 – 341, 412 – 413; also Ken Coates and Tony Topham, ‘Shop
Stewards and Workplace Trade Unionism’, chap. 5 in Trade Unions in Britain, Third Edition
(London: Fontana, 1988), p. 143; Larry James, Power in a Trade Union, The role of the
District Committee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 14 – 17.
264 For an account of a specific example of such paradoxical issues see, Larry James, ‘The
District Committee and the Executive Council: a case study in negotiated outcomes’, chap. 5
in Power in a Trade Union, p. 62; ‘Over the years … there was inevitable conflict between the
shop stewards and the union officials’. E. and R. Frow, Engineering Struggles, p. 270;
Church, Rise and Decline, p. 116; Gospel and Palmer, Industrial Relations, pp. 202 – 204,
208 – 214; Keith Laybourn, History of British Trade Unionism, p. 172; P. K. Edwards, ‘The
Pattern of Collective Industrial Action’, in Bain, Industrial Relations, p. 213.
265 For Dunnett the role of shop stewards was partly beneficial, partly detrimental in that they ‘…
played an important role ... in co-ordinating the activities of the workers …’, but some,
motivated by irrational and hostile impulses, assisted ‘bloody-minded’ small groups of
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that it was their ability to forestall serious disputes and encourage individual workers to
increase output that made of shop stewards responsible for delaying the introduction of
professional personnel management in British firms.266 In general, however, shop stewards
have been characterized – and occasionally caricatured – by their perceived ability to
provoke disputes and instigate unofficial strikes.267
The Role of Managers in the Workplace
Although opinion on the role of British managers is equally varied, in general they are
accused of performing badly in the perceived struggle for power in the workplace.268 Often
cited as evidence of management weakness, it has been proposed that a deceptive quasi-
conspiracy between junior and middle managers and shop stewards produced a de facto
‘informal’ system of industrial relations. On the other hand, it has been suggested that such
arrangements can be viewed as co-operation rather than collusion, and that allowing
departmental shop stewards to undertake certain basic administrative tasks was simply the
imaginative use of available resources.269 Moreover, it is clear that the realities of workplace
workers, employed in critical operations, to exploit their positions to the detriment of
colleagues who depended upon them. Furthermore ‘jealousies and antagonism’ arose as full-
time union officials came to realize that ‘shop stewards ... really represented the shop-floor’.
Dunnett, Decline, pp. 52, 110; assertions that shop stewards promoted restrictive practices
have been questioned by Tiratsoo and Tomlinson, ‘Restrictive practices’, pp. 65 – 83; also
Millward, ‘Industrial and Commercial’, in Floud and McCloskey, Economic History of Britain,
Second Edition, Vol. 3, pp. 150 – 154; Lewchuk, ‘Vehicle Industry’, pp. 148 – 149; Laybourn,
History of British Trade Unionism, pp. 172, 340 - 341, 412 – 413.
266 Shop stewards ‘… were critical for maintaining labour peace and eliciting effort …’ permitting
British industrialists ‘… to continue to avoid investment in personnel management, while
creating a coherent, if informal, system of employment relations’. William Lazonick,
‘Employment Relations in Manufacturing and International Competition’, in Floud and
McCloskey, Economic History of Britain, Second Edition, Vol. 2, pp. 114 – 115.
267 ‘… industrial relations … as far as the media are concerned … is about … strikes …’ Gospel
and Palmer, Industrial Relations, p. 1; also Edwards, ‘The Pattern’, in Bain, Industrial
Relations, p. 213; In the 1960s, the popular BBC television series ‘The Rag Trade’ amusingly
caricatured workplace industrial relations in Britain. Mr. Fenner (Peter Jones), the owner of a
small clothing company, had daily confrontations with his workforce, and particularly with the
Shop Steward, Paddy (Miriam Karlin).
268 ‘More fundamentally, these [industrial] disputes reflected weakness in management and
industrial organization. … The causes [of industrial disputes in the second half of the 1960s]
were, in many cases, weak management …’, Alford, Britain in the World, pp. 241, 270; ‘The
weakness of supervisory staff in Britain posed problems for the management of work and
Industrial Relations’. Howard F. Gospel, ‘The management of labour’, in Wrigley, British
Industrial Relations, p. 87; ‘Besides inadequate investment, poor management … have been
blamed for the low rate of British economic growth’. Pollard, Development, p. 299.
269 ‘Senior management were held culpable for neglect, and for being too ready to allow foremen
and supervisors to enter into covert and cozy deals with the rapidly expanding ranks of shop-
floor trade union representatives’. Nolan, ‘Industrial Relations’, in Beardwell, Contemporary
Industrial Relations, p. 107; ‘Britain has two systems of Industrial Relations. The one is the
formal system embodied in the official institutions. The other is the informal system created
by the actual behaviour of trade unions, employers’ associations, of managers, shop
stewards and workers’. quoted in, Pelling, History of British Trade Unionism, p. 254; also
Jeremy, Business History of Britain, p. 456; According to Terry, allowing shop stewards to
perform managerial tasks relating to labour efficiency such as worker effort, overtime
schedules and work organization, were seen by many senior and middle managers as ‘an
effective system of handling problems and grievances’. Terry, ‘Shop Steward Development’,
in Bain, Industrial Relations, p. 73.
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industrial relations were expressed on a daily basis in the machine shop or on the assembly
line where managers and employees, both collectively and individually, interacted, and
where the potentially harmful consequences of unresolved problems called for rapidly
applicable solutions and ‘on the spot’ concurrence between parties. Thus, the issue of
management weakness and incompetence appears to hinge on whether such conditions are
regarded as a ‘disarticulated system of industrial relations’ or merely the normal functioning
of a process well understood and accepted by managers, shop stewards and workers.
III Macroenvironmental Background
By the mid-1960s, government attempts to formulate a lasting solution to Britain’s seemingly
perennial cyclical microeconomic problems had failed. The National Economic Development
Council, created in 1961, seems to have lacked the powers or support necessary to
influence business, and although the Department of Economic Affairs that replaced it in 1964
enjoyed wider sponsorship as well as co-operation from the trade unions, neither of these
bodies achieved the relatively modest goals they were set. Significantly, however, although
both were intentionally and expressly interventionist, their effect on firms like Gardner seems
to have been both minor and indirect. Their successor, the Industrial Reorganization
Corporation, established in 1966, was somewhat more influential. As its designation
suggests, the IRC’s purpose was to reorganize (and rationalize) British industry in order to
make it more internationally competitive. Its major defects were that it was to be operated
and controlled by ‘leading businessmen’ – ostensibly seconded from the group responsible
for the existing problems – and its fallacious preconception that large-scale firms were the
embodiment of manufacturing efficiency.270
Between 1966 and 1970, sectors of the British manufacturing engineering industries,
especially motor vehicles, were transformed by the IRC. However, much of the intervention it
carried out was in the furtherance of ideological or party political considerations, the nature
of which can be understood by the proliferation of ministerial departments, boards and
committees, many of which were essentially interest groups linked to specific industry
sectors. While some of the resulting takeovers and mergers ended in complete failure, the
270 Pollard, Development, p. 346; Jim Tomlinson, ‘British Economic Policy Since 1945’, in Floud
and McCloskey, Economic History of Britain, Second Edition, Vol. 3, p. 275; The IRC
‘espoused the idea that British firms were too small in comparison with their foreign
competitors and were not likely to be re-grouped into larger, more efficient units through the
operation of market forces’., Cairncross, British Economy, Second Edition, pp. 15, 105, 150,
172; ‘It [the IRC] had pump priming funds of £150 million and its group of independent
businessmen were expected to act as merger brokers. Size was seen as key to industrial
efficiency and unlikely to emerge voluntarily in a satisfactory form’. Millward, ‘Industrial and
Commercial’, in Floud and McCloskey, Economic History of Britain, Second Edition, Vol. 3, p.
162; ’… the Industrial Reorganization Corporation [was established] to bring about industrial
“rationalization” or reorganization by encouraging mergers which were thought to be justified
on the grounds of economies of scale, better management, and improved international
competitive strength’. Michael C. Fleming, ‘Industrial Policy’, in Maunder, Economy in the
1970s, p. 143; ‘… the driving principle of government intervention in industry was that it would
promote greater productivity and competitiveness. But it was a principle based on a belief
that “big” is beautiful. … [an] approach [that] was a mixture of half-truth and mistaken
analysis’. Alford, Britain in the World, pp. 256, 261, 263.
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ultimate outcome of many others was disappointing. It also seems clear that a considerable
number were undertaken in order to reduce competition rather than in the interests of
efficiency and productivity. Moreover, intervention on the scale undertaken during the 1960s
and 1970s appears to have had little beneficial impact on the perceived declining
competitiveness of Britain’s manufacturing engineering industries, and some evidence
suggests that its overall effect may well have been negative.271
By dissolving the institutions set-up under the previous regime, the Conservative
administration that was elected to power in 1970 signalled its intention to allow industry to
function in an environment more consistent with free market conditions. However, when
major upheavals in the international macroeconomic environment rendered two of Britain’s
largest manufacturers exposed the explicit rejection of the policy of sustaining failing firms
proved to be a somewhat embarrassing pronouncement. The government’s response
amounted to a complete reversal of its position – a change that became know as ‘Heath’s U-
Turn’ – and a return to active intervention. As the industrialised economies of the world fell
into recession, the British government introduced expansionary measures aimed at restoring
the conventional post-war commitment to full employment.272
Consequently, in early 1973 the British economy began to emerge from the slump at a time
when most other industrialised nations were experiencing similar surges in growth. The
resulting rapid increases in the prices of primary materials created inflationary conditions that
were greatly exacerbated by an abrupt and unprecedented sharp increase in the price of
crude oil towards the end of the year. For the rest of the decade, unemployment and inflation
remained at higher levels than had hitherto been considered acceptable, stimulating the
concept that government faced a choice between one and the other.273
271 ‘The Leyland merger proved to be a milestone in the collapse of the British [owned] motor
industry’. Alford, Britain in the World, p. 262; ‘There is evidence that government pressure
and the compensation of large subsidies caused some firms to pursue strategies that did not,
in their independent judgement, make long-term commercial sense’. ;idem, p. 264; On the
various committees, boards etc. see Millward, ‘Industrial and Commercial’, in Floud and
McCloskey, Economic History of Britain, Second Edition, Vol. 3, pp. 162 – 164; Between
1966 and 1970 ‘In spite of elaborate provisions for ‘fair trading’ and against monopolies, [the
government] was at times itself enforcing or encouraging the monopolistic organization of
industry …’see also Pollard, Development, p. 261.
272 The conservative government which came to power in 1970 attempted to ‘… disengage from
intervention in industry …’, Cairncross, British Economy, Second Edition, p. 183; ‘… a
different posture [was adopted when] the general policy avowal of hardened realism ... rapidly
turned to pragmatism’. Coopey and Woodward, ‘Overview’, in Coopey and Woodward, Britain
in the 1970s, pp. 17 – 18; Fleming, ‘Industrial Policy’, in Maunder, Economy in the 1970s, p.
143.
273 Cairncross, ‘Economic Policy and Performance, 1964 - 1990’, in Floud and McCloskey,
Economic History of Britain, Second Edition, Vol. 3, p. 79; Feinstein, ‘Success and Failure’, in
Floud and McCloskey, Economic History of Britain, Second Edition, Vol. 3, p. 112
Cairncross, British Economy, Second Edition, pp. 38 – 39, 183; Max-Stephan Schulze and
Nicholas Woodward, ‘The Emergence of Rapid Inflation’, in Coopey and Woodward, Britain in
the 1970s, p. 112; Alford, Britain in the World, p. 297; Dilwyn Porter, ‘Government and the
Economy’ in Coopey and Woodward, Britain in the 1970s, p. 42; Nina Fishman, TUC History
Online, http://www.unionhistory.info/timeline/1960_2000_4.php.
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IV Microenvironmental Background
There are virtually no references in extant chronicles and media sources to the contributions
made to the development of L. Gardner and Sons by its employees. According to David
Whitehead’s ‘official’ history, the firm’s paternalistic inclinations included the provision of
sports facilities, a library, and a social club, most of which appear to have ceased to exist
well before the mid-twentieth century.274 Official trade union records covering the first half of
the twentieth century are also sparse, but a depiction of the relationship between the firm’s
management and its workforce can be formed from the recollections of a long-serving
employee. Arthur Walmsley, a skilled craftsman and a trade union activist, worked at
Gardner from 1924 to 1927, and from 1933 until his retirement in the late 1950s. In an
interview recorded in 1976, he recalled that, during his first period of employment at
Gardner, trade union activities were pervasive and well organized. However, following the
general strike of 1926, which the Gardner workforce supported, union membership declined
until, by 1933, a general lack of interest had set in.275
As the size of the Gardner workforce increased following the introduction of the firm’s
successful automotive range of diesel engines, union membership began to rise. By 1936,
most of the skilled workers had joined the AEU, and several sections of the factory had
begun to elect shop stewards. Subsequently a formal approach was made to the local
employers’ federation who agreed to recognize Gardner as an ‘organized’ shop. Thereafter,
a dialogue was established between the Works Committee, a body elected by and of the
shop stewards, and the management, normally represented by Harold Hunter, the works
manager. Although direct contact between union officials and Gardner family directors were
infrequent, Thomas Harry or Eric usually took part in discussions concerning potentially
major changes. Other than a strike by apprentices involving various engineering firms in the
Manchester area, details of which are vague, there were few disputes at Gardner during the
immediate pre-war years, and the relationship between the firm and its employees seems to
have been reasonably amicable.276
Records relating to workplace industrial relations at Gardner during the Second World War
are also extremely sparse. However, there can be little doubt that, in line with the trend
throughout the British manufacturing engineering industries, virtually the whole of the
Gardner labour force were members of a trade union. It also seems reasonable to assume
that the number and influence of shop stewards also increased after 1939, and that they may
have taken part in some form of consultative process.277 Nevertheless, it is important to
274 Whitehead, Gardners, p. 15.
275 Arthur Walmsley, Interviewed by Edward and Ruth Frow, tape recording, 1976, Working
Class Movement Library, Archive Ref. 259A 2000.1061.
276 Ibid.
277 ‘The (1939 – 1945) war led to a much larger role for trade unions, whose membership rose
[leading to] a rise in the number and influence of shop stewards’. Dewey, War and Progress,
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understand that Gardner was not, either then or at any time, a closed shop.278
In the immediate post-war years the majority of trade union members at Gardner, who
worked in the machine shops and assembly sections, were members of the AEU. In the
aluminium and iron foundries, where employment was significantly lower, most were
members of the Amalgamated Union of Foundry Workers (AUFW). Both unions were
affiliated to the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions (CSEU), and although
nationally coordinated directives were fully supported, at Gardner they appear to have
preferred to conduct their affairs independently. In general, however, all union members took
part in annually held democratic elections. Departmental shop steward, chosen by secret
ballot, formed a shop stewards’ committee which in turn elected the smaller Works
Committee led by the Chairman and the Convenor; traditionally the two most influential union
officials in the works.279 Probably reflecting the moderate disposition of most of the Gardner
employees, at the Manchester district headquarters of the AEU, Gardner was thought of as a
firm where the management ‘got all there own way’.280
Evidence revealed by the research strongly suggests that, after 1955, the Gardner
management, eschewing the more paternalistic approach of earlier regimes, adopted an
increasingly detached posture towards the employees.281 Frequent complaints concerning
the general working environment in the plant, even when couched in terms of their negative
effect on productivity, received little sympathy.282 More emphatic protests regarding the
pp. 307 - 308; also Edmund and Ruth Frow, Engineering Struggles, pp 145 – 201; Foreman-
Peck, Bowden, and McKinlay, Motor Industry, pp. 84 – 85.
278 Even at the height of trade union membership at Gardner, this was acknowledged by both
unions and management. Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 13 August 1975.
279 On the organization of union representatives at plant level see; Coates and Topham, Trade
Unions in Britain, chap. 5, passim; Turner, Clack, and Roberts, Labour Relations, pp. 206 –
207; Dewey, War and Progress, p. 40; for an outline of Gardner specific organization see
Arthur Walmsley interviewed by Ruth Frow and Edmund Frow, tape recording, Salford, July
1976, ref. 259A, 2000.1061; for a concise history of the CSEU see
http://www.warwick.ac.uk/services/library/mrc/ead/259CSEU.htm.
280 Raymond Robinson interviewed by Ruth Frow and Edmund Frow, tape recording, July 1976.,
ref. 231A, 2000.1037.
281 Arthur Walmsley, a shop steward at Gardner for many years, recalled having good relations
with Harold Hunter, the works manager, and, although the Gardner family members rarely
had direct contact with trade union officials, they were prepared to intervene when
negotiations reached impasse. In particular, he remembered several amicable discussions
with Thomas and Eric Gardner, the then chairman and deputy chairman, during negotiations
for a ‘prosperity bonus’ which was eventually granted to workers who were not on piecework.
In contrast, in 1957, when the Shop Stewards’ Committee’s suggested that the introduction of
an award for ‘long and meritorious service’ would be conducive to employee retention it was
rejected by the management who thought that such a scheme would be too expensive. Arthur
Walmsley, Interviewed by Edmund and Ruth Frow, tape recording, 1976, Working Class
Movement Library, Archive Reference 259A, 2000.1061; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 26 June
1957.
282 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 24 August 1955; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 7 September 1955; Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 7 March 1956; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 30 May 1956; Shop Stewards’
Minutes, 18 September 1957; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 24 June 1959; Shop Stewards’
Minutes, 14 October 1959; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 11 November 1959; Shop Stewards’
Minutes, 22 October 1961; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 17 January 1962; Shop Stewards’
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training and employment conditions of apprentices, who seem to have been generally
regarded as a supplementary low paid workforce, were also for the most part disregarded.283
Only after the introduction of the Factories Act in 1961, with its strict rules on safety in the
workplace and the employment of young persons, were these matters addressed. Even
then, the 'Safety First' committee that was established following a bland declaration
acknowledging safety to be of primary importance, proved little more than a talking shop.
Although periodic meetings were held to discuss specific safety issues, members of the
managerial staff frequently ignored the committee’s recommendations, leaving employees in
parts of the Barton Hall works at risk.284
V Findings
By the early 1960s, the consequences of the 1958 engine crisis were beginning to have a
negative effect on workplace industrial relations at Gardner. The already substandard
working conditions in parts of the Patricroft plant had become exacerbated by a combination
of staff shortages caused when short-time working had led many employees to seek full-time
work elsewhere, and a sharply increasing workload.285 Unsurprisingly, in view of the
management’s previous conduct, several requests for dilution were treated with calculated
indifference, an inevitable consequence of which was an increase in the amount of overtime
working. While many hourly paid workers no doubt welcomed an opportunity to increase
their incomes, others, who were evidently more reluctant to give up their leisure time, began
to interpret persuasion as coercion. Some of these complained, first to their shop stewards
and then directly to full-time union officials, that excessive overtime had become virtually
compulsory; a situation regarded by all serious trade unionists as unacceptable.286 Given the
apparent compliant disposition of the Gardner shop stewards at that time, other than
Minutes, 23 May 1962 ; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 5 February 1963; Shop Stewards’ Minutes,
29 May 1963.
283 Allegations of this type of exploitation are recorded in Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 2 February
1955; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 15 June 1955; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 29 June 1955; Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 7 September 1955; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 24 January 1968; Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 27 August 1969.
284 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 3 January 1962; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 28 March 1962; Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 25 April 1962; on the 1961 Factories Act and its implications see for
example The Honourable Lord Cullen, lecture on The Development of Safety Legislation,
Royal Academy of Safety Legislation and Royal Society of Edinburgh, 1996; also Factories
Act 1961: 9 and 10 Eliz. 2, chapter 24 (London: HMSO, 1961).
285 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 23 July 1958; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 28 October 1958; Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 7 January 1959; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 4 February 1959; Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 4 March 1959; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 18 March 1959; Shop Stewards’
Minutes, 1 April 1959; T. F. Farrell, Patricroft, to E. Frow, Manchester, 30 September 1964.
286 ‘Overtime continued to be a major evil …’, E. and R. Frow, Engineering Struggles, p. 226;
Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 23 July 1958; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 28 October 1958; Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 7 January 1959; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 4 February 1959; Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 4 March 1959; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 18 March 1959; Shop Stewards’
Minutes, 1 April 1959; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 4th January 1961; Shop Stewards’ Minutes,
22 April 1962; W. Henderson, Patricroft, to A. Bottomley, Manchester, 25 April 1961.
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obstructing requests for dilution, the full-time union officials made no efforts to intervene.287
Thereafter, however, an already palpable rift between members of the AEU District
Committee and the Gardner management steadily widened.
By 1963, the character of the shop stewards’ committee at Gardner appears to have
changed with the election of T. F. Farrell, a Works Convenor under whose leadership a strict
limit on the amount of overtime working was placed and matters concerning the training of
apprentices and health and safety were vigorously addressed. Moreover, in mid-1964, after
the management had persistently rejected a claim for a general increase in wages, the Woks
Committee acted even more forcefully. As previously discussed, the Manchester Piecework
Agreement, under which the majority of Gardner employees were paid, included the
entitlement of individual workers, under certain circumstances, to renegotiate rates and
declare day-work if not satisfied. By using this right collectively they could institute an
effective ‘go-slow’ which, under such circumstances, could not be classified as industrial
action and was not therefore subject to the Provisions for the Avoidance of Disputes
regulations. The effectiveness of this strategy, especially when it was combined with an
overtime ban, is evidenced by the result of its first recorded post-war use at Gardner. Within
a month, it brought the management back to the negotiating table where a satisfactory offer
was worked out. As a result, Farrell was re-elected Works Convenor in January 1965, and
again in January 1966.288
Given the ostensibly confrontational temperament of the Gardner senior management, it was
inevitable that a response would, sooner or later, materialize. Thus, in July 1966, it focused
its disapproval on Farrell who, in the purported interests of production efficiency, was
instructed to transfer from the department where he had been shop steward for a number of
years. Although within the firm’s rights to manage their business, this unusual and highly
provocative action was viewed by the AEU District Secretary with suspicion.289 It also clearly
unsettled Farrell who, despite assurances that he was free to carry on his trade union
activities as normal, promptly resigned. Unable to resolve the situation at plant level, the
287 For example, when called upon by the AEU district organizer to account for complaints of
excessive and compulsory overtime the then Works Convenor responded as follows: ‘Every
person commencing at L. Gardner is informed that overtime is worked on Tuesday and
Thursday evenings and Saturday morning, and that overtime is not compulsory, but
everybody is expected to work these hours of overtime, which comply with the Overtime
Agreement; and they can not have people pleasing themselves when they work this overtime.
The reason given for this is, it can very seriously hold up line production and cause
bottlenecks further along the line’. W. Henderson, Patricroft, to E. Frow, Manchester, 21 May
1962; T. F. Farrell, Patricroft, to E. Frow, Manchester, 30 September 1964.
288 Raymond Robinson interviewed by Ruth Frow and Edmund Frow, tape recording, July 1976.,
ref. 231A, 2000.1037; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 22 April 1962; T. F. Farrell, Patricroft, to E.
Frow, Manchester, 29 June 1964; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 29 May 1963; Shop Stewards’
Minutes, 13 November 1963; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 5 February 1964; Shop Stewards’
Minutes, 22 April 1964; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 24 June 1964; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 22
July 1964; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 19 August 1964.
289 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 6 July 1966; for various historical examples of ‘victimization’ used in
the Manchester area against shop stewards and convenors during this period see Edmund
and Ruth Frow, Engineering Struggles, pp. 314 – 364.
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shop stewards turned the matter over to the AEU District Committee, which, in accordance
with the Provisions for the Avoidance of Disputes, summoned a formal Works Conference.290
During subsequent meetings, the Gardner management remained obdurate and, without
Farrell’s active involvement, no further action was deemed possible.291
Although it would be implausible to suggest that the Gardner management could somehow
influence the outcome of shopfloor elections, it seems uncanny that the departure of Farrell
resulted in the advent of a Works Committee with an entirely different, and far less assertive,
demeanour. In January 1967, Derek Waddington, whose far more accommodating approach
to workplace industrial relations promised a period of harmony and stability, replaced Farrell
as Works Convenor. Within a few months of his election, he announced to the District
Committee that ‘a change in relations has taken place between Management and the Shop
Stewards Committee’. Included in a list of positive developments he reported that the post of
Labour Manager had been made obsolete and a Personnel Manager, who had already been
appointed in his place, was beginning to have a positive effect on employee relations. There
had, he wrote, been several improvements in working conditions in the plant as well as
increased bonus earnings in a number of departments. He also anticipated that many new
jobs would be created when a new machine shop for the production of large engine
components came into operation at the end of the year. The only pessimistic aspect of
Waddington’s letter referred to an ongoing shortage of skilled personnel that should, he
suggested, be eased through ‘controlled dilution’. In this, he declared, he intended to ‘co-
operate fully’ with the management as long as developments at Gardner continued to be
positive. Thus, and with the help of the District Committee, he hoped to improve ‘the bad
name Gardners have held for so long’. Viewing the tenor of this communication with concern
and the steadfastness of the majority of the employees at Gardner with misgivings, the full-
time officials on the District Committee unenthusiastically accepted the new situation.292
The 1968 Foundry Dispute
No similar detente in workplace industrial relations took place in Gardner’s two foundries,
where a long history of complaints regarding faulty equipment and the general inadequacy of
the ventilation system persisted. The nature of foundry work, with its attendant exposure to
extreme heat, dust, sand and smoke, made it at best dirty and uncomfortable, as well as
both physically and mentally demanding. Moreover, the particularly unpleasant conditions in
the iron foundry, which had seen very little in the way of modernization since it was built in
290 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 20 July 1966; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 10 August 1966.
291 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 21 September 1966; Report of AEU District 11 Official, AEU
Monthly Journal, February 1967, pp. 2, 34, p. 68.
292 D. Waddington, Patricroft, to E. Frow, Manchester, 18 August 1967; Raymond Robinson
interviewed by Ruth Frow and Edmund Frow, tape recording, July 1976., ref. 231A,
2000.1037; according to one colleague, Wadding was a ‘really nice bloke’ who ‘went [along]
with the Thompstone era [which defined] good trade unionist[s] as a trade unionist[s] that did
as they were told. Any sort of resistance or militancy was taboo …’ Carl Lingard, Inverbeg, to
Maurice Halton, Horwich, 24 October 2003.
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1912, coupled with constant refusals by management to address grievances had led to a
succession of intense and occasionally acrimonious disputes.293
Towards the end of 1967, the AUFW and AEU merged to form the Amalgamated Union of
Engineering and Foundry Workers (AUEFW), potentially affording opportunities for a
harmonious and co-operative relationship between the Gardner foundry shop stewards and
those representing the much larger engineering section. However, although the merger led
to close collaboration at the national level, in district offices and in the workplace each
section retained its own officials, rules, and structures. Nevertheless, at Gardner,
Waddington and the former AEU stewards attempted to integrate the foundry stewards into a
single Works Committee, efforts that were, in the face of the foundrymen’s dogged resolve to
maintain their independence, essentially unsuccessful. Seemingly oblivious to the
increasingly divisive effect of such actions, Waddington persisted, claiming at one stage
during a relatively minor dispute in the foundries, that the Gardner management ‘will only
recognize the Works Convener [himself] who has been elected by the Joint Shop Stewards
Committee’. Thereafter, as subsequent events appear to demonstrate, the rift between the
two sections of the AUEFW at Gardner deepened and spread, ostensibly, to the rest of the
workforce.294
On 23 August 1968, a moulder in the iron foundry was suspended for two-days for persistent
faulty workmanship. Although the validity and the appropriateness of the sanction were not
questioned, either at the time or later, the conduct of the employee’s supervisor caused
indignation among the foundry personnel and union officials. While his open outburst of
anger and ‘humiliating manner’ were considered unnecessarily offensive, his refusal to allow
the moulder’s shop steward to be present when the suspension was administered was
293 See, for example, Vanguard, May 1947. ref. GB1008, Working Class Movement Library, L
Gardner and Sons Collection, p.1; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 25 January 1956; Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 11 November 1959; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 20 January 1960; As late
as February 1968 the Gardner managers were strongly resisting calls for the installation of
effective ventilation systems, Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 21 February 1968; in August 1968,
the AUFW foundry section district organizer reported a case of ‘the misuse and bullying of
apprentices by a [foundry] departmental foreman’. Report of S. Haynes, district 7 organizer,
AUFW Journal, August 1968.
294 ‘It appears to me that the Foundry Workers section of the Union are taking matters into their
own hands and disregarding the rules and officials of the Engineering Section’., D.
Waddington, Patricroft, to E. Frow, Manchester, 21 June 1968; ‘The foundry Shop Steward is
a member of the Works Committee, he can sit in on any engineering dispute and have a
direct say in our affairs. But Mr. Frow no engineering Shop Steward can sit on a Foundry
Committee or have a say in their present affairs, is this fair and democratic. Every Steward at
our meeting insists that this is wrong and must be rectified immediately on firmer lines of co-
operation’. D. Waddington, Patricroft, to E. Frow, Manchester, 30 August 1968; Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 2 March 1968; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 15 May 1968; Shop Stewards’
Minutes, 12 June 1968; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 24 July 1968; Report by F. Haynes, District
11 Secretary, The Foundry Worker, August 1968; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 26 June 1968; D.
Waddington, Patricroft to E. Frow, Manchester, 13 July 1968; on the amalgamation of the
AEU and the AUFW and the after-effects thereof see The Foundry Worker, 31 October 1967,
35, p. 12; also S. Hays, The Engineering Industries (London: Heinemann, 1972), p. 48;
Edmund and Ruth Frow, Engineering Struggles, pp. 268 – 269.
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perceived to be in clear breach of procedure.295 The outcome was an impromptu shop-floor
meeting followed by a show of hands and a resolution for an immediate walkout by all the
iron foundry workers, who were soon joined on the picket line by their aluminium foundry
colleagues. The management’s equally precipitous response was to inform each of the two
hundred and fifty strikers by letter that if they did not return to work they would be dismissed,
and accordingly, on 3 September, all were sent their cards and severance pay.296 Eight days
later the AUEFW, blaming management intransigence for the continuing dispute, announced
that the stoppage had been given official status. Confidence that the strike would soon
spread to other parts of the plant, however, proved ill founded.297
The management remained obdurate and, with some support from the District Committee,
the foundry shop stewards continued to adopt a confrontational stance. In the meantime,
Waddington and other members of the Works Committee attempted to resolve the dispute
through negotiation, but their efforts were frustrated by their exclusion from informal
discussions between management representatives, full-time union officials, and the foundry
workers. Attitudes then became polarized, with the moderate engineering section protesting
that their members’ views were not being represented and the foundry section claiming that
the matter was their sole responsibility. Clearly backing the latter’s position, the District
Secretary then called on Waddington to ‘black’ castings on the grounds that the
management had begun to replace the strikers with non-union labour. Waddington, however,
procrastinated, alleging that the uncompromising attitude of the foundry stewards was
causing a serious rift between the foundry workers and the rest of the employees who, for
this reason, were reluctant to offer support. Again, the District Secretary, while announcing
his intention to address a mass meeting of union members, urged him to stop machine
operators working on ‘black’ castings. This time Waddington responded by organising a
secret ballot among the machine shop workers who would have been directly affected by
such a boycott. Perhaps unsurprisingly under the circumstances, they voted by a large
majority against it and, with subsequent attempts to muster support for the foundrymen being
equally unsuccessful, the strike remained confined to the foundries.298
295 ‘… a worker or group of workers shall be entitled to raise any question directly concerning
them … through the appropriate shop steward …’ ‘Your Union and You: Chapters in AEU
History, XII – Union Negotiations and Agreements’, AEU Monthly Journal, July 1943, p. 178.
296 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 12 June 1968; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 4 September 1968; W.
Simpson, Manchester, to J. Conway, London, 11 September 1968; ‘Official Dispute at L.
Gardner’, AUEFW Branch Circular, September 1986; on ‘bloody-minded’ shop stewards, see
Dunnett, Decline, pp. 52, 110; on ‘bloody-mindedness’ on the part of management or workers
see Wilks, ‘Institutional insularity’, in Chick, Governments, p. 164.
297 ‘… it is very likely that other work people employed (at Gardner) will be involved before long’.
W. Simpson, Manchester, to J. Conway, London, 11 September 1968.
298 E. Frow, Manchester, to D. Waddington, Patricroft, 12 September 1968; E. Frow,
Manchester, to D. Waddington, Patricroft, 13 September 1968; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 18
September 1968; E. Frow, Manchester, to D. Waddington, Patricroft, 23 September 1968; E.
Frow, Manchester, to D. Waddington, Patricroft, 26 September 1968; Circular letter from
AUEFW, London, 10 October 1968; D. Waddington and T. Lightfoot, Patricroft, to J. Conway,
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The ten week dispute, which remarkably seems to have alleviated some of the stress in the
foundries and led to an improvement in workplace industrial relations there, ended on 4
November 1968, apparently with no significant concessions being conceded by either side.
After a management precondition for the signing of new contracts of employment was
discarded, the strikers returned to work with no break in service, and without incurring lost
credits relating to redundancy pay or pensions. The recalcitrant moulder, the period of his
suspension having, obviously by then, expired, returned to work on the same conditions.299
Thereafter, Waddington and his supporters made several unsuccessful efforts to bring about
a more convivial relationship between the Works Committee and the management.300
Suggestions that workplace industrial relations would be improved through better and more
open communications concerning the health of the firm were basically ignored.301 On the
rare occasions that the Gardner management chose to address the employees as a group, it
did so via characteristically impersonal communiqués. One such statement, written in
response to a suggestion that a productivity bonus might improve output, was couched in
terms that emphasized the management’s opinion that the workers’ contribution to the health
of the firm was insignificant. (see Appendix 4)
Nevertheless, and often in the face of severe criticism from the District Committee as well as
from a growing number of less compromising shop stewards, Waddington continued his
endeavours to avoid conflict.302 His key strategy for averting industrial action, which had
proved successful during the 1968 foundry dispute, was to circumvent the more militant
factions by appealing directly to the ordinary union members in the workplace. In this way,
he managed, with some justification, to disregard or overturn several directives from
members of the District Committee.303 If, however, the Gardner management appreciated his
London, 17 October 1968; R. W. Wright, London, to D. Waddington, Patricroft, 28 October
1968; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 30 October 1968; The Foundry Worker, 11 November 1968,
p. 401; Report of A. Jones, Divisional Organizer, Division 11, AUEFW Journal, December
1968, p. 552; Carl Lingard, Inverbeg, to Maurice Halton, Horwich, 24 October 2003.
299 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 30 October 1968; Report of A. Jones, Divisional Organizer, Division
11, AUEFW Journal, December 1968, p. 552.
300 For example, when, because of increasing closures and redundancies, an embargo on all
overtime was imposed by the Manchester area Shop Stewards’ Combine Committee in
January 1972, the Works Committee successfully claimed exemption for Gardners because
they were actively recruiting personnel. Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 6 January 1972; Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 15 January 1972; Report by J. W. Tocher, District 11 Secretary, AUEFW
Journal, February 1972, p. 2; on Shop Stewards’ Combine Committees, see Edmund and
Ruth Frow, Engineering Struggles, pp. 202 – 219, 259, 272, 310, 409.
301 ‘… the man inn the street’ it was suggested by one shop steward, ‘knew more about what
was going on at Gardners than the employees’. Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 23 September
1970.
302 For example, an attempt to democratically depose Waddington early in 1972 only narrowly
failed. Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 12 April 1972; Minutes of a special Manchester District
Committee meeting, 14 June 1972; Raymond Robinson interviewed by Ruth Frow and
Edmund Frow, tape recording, July 1976., ref. 231A, 20000.1037.
303 In February 1970 Waddington bypassed the shop stewards’ committee and organized a
ballot among skilled operators who voted to accept a dilutee in the department. A subsequent
appeal for assistance to the District Secretary resulted in a written directive being sent to
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contribution to the firm’s relatively trouble-free workplace industrial relations, it did not
respond encouragingly.
The Strike of 1972
In September 1972 a machine operator, who was also a shop steward, was ordered by his
supervisor to transfer to a different machine. Upon learning that he was to be replaced by an
apprentice, and after consulting the District Secretary, he refused to move. When, as a
result, he was summarily dismissed, all sixty union members in the department concerned
walked out in support. Waddington immediately attempted to intercede, but with a key
section of the plant standing idle, the District Committee clearly felt strong enough to insist
on a return to the status quo anti before any talks took place. He nevertheless approached
the management, which, declining to comply with the union’s demand, offered instead to
discuss two compromise positions, both of which were rejected out of hand. Waddington was
then directed to encourage other union members to become involved in the dispute, and to
ensure as well that no work whatsoever was being carried on in the effected department.
Soon, however, it became clear that these instructions were not being carried out, prompting
the District Secretary to bypass the Works Committee and call the Gardner employees to a
mass meeting. Although his motion for an immediate withdrawal of labour was rejected, his
supplementary proposal to reconsider the situation should the management attempt to
replace any of the striking machinists with non-union labour was approved.304
What the Gardner managers did next affectively nullified the efforts of Waddington and the
moderate faction, delivered the leadership of the workforce to the militants, and spread the
stoppage from a single department to the whole of the plant. Clearly miscalculating the mood
of their employees, they claimed that an improvised ballot of staff in the works canteen had
approved a proposal to employ non-union machinists in the strike-affected department. Upon
learning of this development, the full-time district officials again assembled a mass meeting
Waddington instructing him not to process the necessary dilution forms. His reply was both
curt and prompt; the forms, he stated, ‘were already signed after approval of the men,
previous to me receiving your instruction’. In March 1972, in response to the management’s
rejection of a pay claim, the district organizer assumed personal control and placed the
matter before the employees at two mass-meetings, the second of which voted to petition the
Gardner management to resume negotiations within seven days. They responded through a
firm of solicitors, who threatened to initiate legal proceedings under Sections 96 and 101 of
the Industrial Relations Act. This was ignored creating a deadlock. With the support of some
of the more moderate shop stewards, Waddington again organized a ballot of Gardner
workers, the result of which suggested that most of them were satisfied with the company’s
offer. When the District Committee asked to have these findings confirmed at a mass
meeting, Waddington refused, announcing that, based on an improved offer from the
management, he would lift the ban on piecework and overtime forthwith. Further
communications and instructions from the District Committee were more or less ignored, and
production at Patricroft returned to normal. Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 15 March 1972; Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 29 March 1972; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 12 April 1972; Minutes of the
Manchester District Committee Meeting, AUEW, 25 April 1972; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 26
April 1972; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 12 May 1972; AUEFW Journal, May 1972, p. 224; D.
Waddington, Patricroft to E. Frow, Manchester, 24 February 1970.
304 Minutes of a special meeting of the Manchester District Committee, 19 September 1972;
Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 20 September 1972; Minutes of an inquiry into the conduct of D.
Waddington and various Shop Stewards, 5 October 1972.
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and called on all union members to observe their previous resolution. The result, predictably,
was that at midday on 23 October 1972 they complied and within a few days all hourly paid
Gardner employees had either joined the strike or been laid off as a result of it. ‘The whole
works has been shut down because of the dispute’ William Gordon Thompstone, the works
director, told the local press, ‘and about 2,500 of the 2,800 workforce are affected’.305
An appeal for support to the Manchester Shop Stewards’ Combined Committee virtually
ensured that the strike would hold firm. In the face of an embargo on all work connected with
Gardner, and a resolution to hold demonstrations and summon mass pickets, the
management decided to negotiate. In what amounted to a complete capitulation, they
undertook to reinstate the shop steward, not to victimize him, and to pay him for holidays lost
during the strike. They also formally guaranteed that they would not in future attempt to
replace skilled workers with apprentices. On these terms, while resolving to strengthen their
organization at Patricroft in the near future, the union agreed to recommend a return to
work.306
In the meantime, attention had focused on Waddington and several other shop stewards
who, in the opinion of the District Secretary, had not demonstrated appropriate support for
members involved in the early stages of the dispute. Summoned to a meeting at the AUEW’s
Manchester office, they were asked to account for their alleged misconduct.307 After
imposing nominal fines for ignoring a previous summons, the committee proceeded to
consider more serious matters. It was subsequently found that Waddington and others had
failed to carry out the decisions of the Manchester District Committee and misled union
members regarding rules and procedures. Abrogating Waddington's shop stewards
credentials forthwith, the committee reprimanded the others and warned them as to their
future conduct.308
Although the 1972 dispute represented a comprehensive reversal for the Gardner
management’s attempt to impose strict discipline in the workplace, it did not, as might be
305 Report of the District Organizer, AUEW, 10 October 1972; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 24
October 1972; Minutes of a Special District Committee Meeting, 26 October 1972; ‘Gardners
men go on strike’, Eccles and Patricroft Journal, 26 October 1972, p. 1; Minutes of a Special
District Committee Meeting, 31 October 1972.
306 Minutes of a Special Shop Stewards Meeting, 26 October 1972; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 8
November 1972; Report of J. W. Tocher, District 11 Organizer, AUEW Journal, December
1972, 39, 12, p. 566.
307 The Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW) was formed in 1970 as a result of
a merger between the Amalgamated Union of Engineering and Foundry Workers (AUEFW),
the Draughtsmen and Allied Technicians Association (DATA) and the Constructional
Engineering Union (CEU).
308 Minutes of an inquiry into why Brothers Waddington and Lightfoot and all other AUEFW
(Engineering Section) Shop Stewards, with the exception of Brothers Bushell, Ankers and
Robinson, should not be disciplined in accordance with Rule 13 for failing to attend the
District Committee when summoned in accordance with that Rule on Tuesday 26 September
1972, 5 October 1972; Minutes of an inquiry into the conduct of D. Waddington and various
Shop Stewards, 5 October 1972; Carl Lingard, Inverbeg, to Maurice Halton, Horwich, 24
October 2003.
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expected, lead to a more astute approach to employee relations.309 Nor, surprisingly, did the
sanctions imposed on Waddington and other former shop stewards deter them from
involving themselves in union affairs; issues that, within a few weeks, had combined with the
equally strong determination of the more militant trade unionists and their leaders to produce
the devastating events of the first six months of 1973.
The Strike of 1973
The 1973 dispute began with a demand for a general rise in wages, which, in an attempt to
circumvent the limitations imposed by the prevailing freeze on incomes and prices, was
couched in terms of an increase in the existing production bonus.310 When negotiations with
the management failed to produce an acceptable offer, the Works Committee called a mass
meeting of the workforce and asked for a declaration of day-work under the terms of the
Manchester Piecework Agreement.311 However, with the active support of some of the
moderate shop stewards, several departments continued to work normally, thus rendering
the embargo partially ineffective.312 Seemingly encouraged by this lack of unity, the Gardner
management then offered to draft an improved bonus scheme on condition that all
employees returned to normal working.313 The union responded negatively, tempering their
rejection, however, with an offer to include the Engineering Employers Association in a
three-way conference. The management’s riposte was to withdraw from all discussions,
stating that it would not negotiate ‘under duress’.314
Almost inevitably, this situation soon led to an escalation of the dispute and, two weeks later,
all efforts to draw the management back into negotiations having failed, the union added an
overtime ban to the piecework embargo.315 Again displaying a predilection for rash and
illogical action, on 15 March 1973, the Gardner management responded by posting the
following curt and unambiguous notice throughout the plant:
309 Minutes of a Special District Committee Meeting, 17 October 1972; Minutes of a Special
District Committee meeting, 23 January 1973.
310 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 24 January 1973; In November 1972, the government announced a
statutory three-months freeze on wages and prices which would last until April 1973, when
increases limited to £1 plus four per cent a week, up to an annual maximum of £250 would be
permitted, see Cairncross, ‘Economic policy’, pp. 79 – 80; Schulze and Woodward, ‘Rapid
Inflation’, in Coopey and Woodward, Britain in the 1970s, p. 112; Chris Wrigley, ‘Trade
Unions, Strikes and the Government’, in Coopey and Woodward, Britain in the 1970s, p. 285;
Cairncross, British Economy, Second Edition, p. 198.
311 Monthly Report of the District 11 Secretary, AUEW Journal, 30 January 1973; Carl Lingard,
Inverbeg, to Maurice Halton, Horwich, 24 October 2003.
312 Minutes of a Special District Committee meeting, 23 January 1973; Shop Stewards’ Minutes,
6 February 1973.
313 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 6 February 1973.
314 Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 21 February 1973.
315 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 7 March 1973.
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As from tomorrow, Friday, 16 March, all employees banning piecework or taking
irregular industrial action, or acting in sympathy therewith will be laid off until
further notice. Employees working normally will be laid off for two working days
each week until further notice. Anyone required to work a full week will be
notified individually. The none-working days next week will be Monday, 19
March, and Tuesday, 20 March.316
To all intents and purposes, for those workers in the parts of the Patricroft plant that were
working more-or-less normally, this stratagem amounted to a lockout. Its affect on the
workforce, especially those whose reward for defying union instructions was to have their
employment reduced to three days a week, was predictable. Consequently, a motion to take
all-out strike action placed before a mass meeting of employees on 19 March 1973 was
carried by a large majority, and when an exasperated AUEW official described the events
that had brought about the closure of Gardner as ‘the worst case of bad management I have
seen for a long time’, few would have disagreed.317
As the deadlock continued, the mood of the strikers became confrontational. Pickets, who
blocked the street outside the despatch department, later entered the works and occupied
various departments in an organized ‘sit-in’. When management called in the police, they
took no action, stating that the public highway was not being blocked and that the
demonstration was peaceful. By early May, on prearranged evenings, hundreds of workers
from engineering firms in the Manchester area were joining the Gardner pickets, jostling and
jeering as ‘black-legs’, protected by a cordon of police officers, entered and left the plant.
Further escalations were threatened when union officials demanded the support of ‘the
whole of the trade union movement’, calling for ‘ten thousand men’ to buttress the
blockade.318
As both sides remained obdurate and the dispute wore on it began to impact on other firms,
especially Gardner’s automotive industry customers, who relied on Patricroft to supply
engines for many of the vehicles they built. Consequently, firms like Foden of Sandbach and
the bus builder Bristol Commercial Vehicle (BCV), both experiencing difficulties, began to
urge customers to accept alternatives. The potentially damaging long-term effects of these
and, doubtless, other similar developments on the HCV sector attracted the attention of MPs
and government departments, but their appeals made little impression. Preliminary talks held
at the Manchester headquarters of the Employers’ Association produced no basis for a
return to work and no date was set for a second meeting.319
316 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 15 March 1973.
317 Minutes of the AUEW Manchester District Committee meeting, 20 March 1973; ‘Gardners
men go on strike’, The Salford. Journal, 22 March 1973, p. 2.
318 ‘Sit-in at factory’, Eccles and Patricroft Journal, 5 April 1973, p. 4; ‘Gardners cars blocked’,
Eccles and Patricroft Journal, 3 May 1973, p. 4; Barbara C. Holman, Murcia, Spain, to
Maurice Halton, Horwich, 13 March 2004.
319 Tony Benn MP, London, to Alan Stiddard, Bristol, 3 May 1973; Minutes of a Special
Summons Meeting of Shop Stewards, 10 May 1973; ‘Engineers are still sitting in’, Eccles and
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Meanwhile, issues relating to the conduct of various former members of the Gardner Works
Committee came before the District Committee. At an enquiry held on 17 May 1973 at the
Manchester office of the AUEW, Derek Waddington’s appeal against the withdrawal of his
shop stewards credentials was rejected. At the same time a new allegation, that of pursuing
antiunion activities during an official dispute, had been made against him. When several
witnesses affirmed that he had crossed the picket line and engaged in discussions with
management representatives during the current strike, the committee ruled that he was ‘...
not a fit and proper member to hold shop stewards credentials ..’. Fined ‘the maximum under
the Rule’, he was issued with a severe reprimand and warned that similar conduct in the
future could well result in his expulsion from the union. At another special District Committee
meeting held a few days later, similar allegations were examined against T. Lightfoot, who
had been Chairman of the Works Committee at the time Waddington was Convenor. Finding
that he had broken union rules on a number of occasions, the committee withdrew his shop
stewards credentials.320
It seems likely that, with the leaders of the moderate faction thus neutralized, the Gardner
management resolved to end the dispute on the best terms available under the
circumstances. The first sign of an slackening of its heretofore-intractable position came in
late May. In an interview given by John Kynaston Gardner, the Joint Managing Director, to
the Eccles and Patricroft Journal, it was disclosed that the company was prepared to make
an improved offer subject to approval by the Pay Board.321 Three weeks later, following a
series of meetings, a settlement based on this proposal was reached and, on 18 June 1973,
after the Barton Hall works had been virtually closed for fourteen weeks, Gardner resumed
normal working.322
Unsurprisingly, the dispute had immediate and harmful effects, among the most damaging of
which was the permanent loss of between 500 and 600 highly skilled craftsmen and a fifty
per cent fall in engine production.323 In a recurrence of the conditions that followed the strike
of 1972, a combination of staff shortages and a backlog in deliveries generated requests for
excessive overtime in several departments, leading some employees to complain to their
shop stewards that they were being pressured into working more hours than they wished.324
Considering that these and other relatively minor issues should be resolved before they
Patricroft Journal, 12 April 1973, p. 4; ‘Work situation may get worse at BCV’, Bristol Evening
Post, 8 May 1973, p. 43.
320 Minutes of a Special District Committee Meeting, 17 May 1973; Minutes of a Special District
Committee Meeting, 22 May 1973.
321 ‘No date fixed for second strike meeting’, Eccles and Patricroft Journal, 31 May 1973, p. 4.
322 Minutes of the Manchester District Committee of the AUEW, Divisional and Assistant
Divisional Organizers’ Report, 12 June 1973; ‘Everyone back at Gardners’, Eccles and
Patricroft Journal, 21 June 1973, p. 5.
323 Staff Reporter, ‘Staff Crisis at strike-hit plant’, Manchester Evening News, 18 June 1973;
Edge, Legendary Engineering , pp. 205 – 206.
324 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 5 August 1973; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 22 August 1973.
105
escalated, the new Works Committee requested a conference with one or more of the
Gardner family directors. They, however, demurred, myopically stating that they ‘could see
no useful purpose in such a meeting taking place’ and workplace industrial relations
remained somewhat tense 325
The End of the Family Firm
The medium-term consequences were also profound. As well as signalling the end of
Gardner as a family firm, the failure of the management’s efforts to establish a high level of
coercive discipline in the workplace ushered in an increase in trade union membership until,
by the end of 1974, it encompassed virtually the whole of the workforce. Thereafter, every
department in the works was represented by a shop steward, whose committees were larger
and far more assertive than ever before. Minutes of their meetings, often openly critical of
the management, were reproduced and posted on notice boards throughout the factory.
Surprisingly, however, there is little evidence to suggest that this new situation proved
detrimental to the organization and efficiency of production. Indeed, it seems apparent that
during the remaining few months of Gardner family control, when problems with the firm’s
customers and suppliers regularly caused disruptions, the shop stewards adopted an
increasingly accommodating and flexible approach.326
Nevertheless, 1974 was characterized by the absence of overtime, traditionally systemic at
Gardner, and by short time working in several departments. By January 1975, however,
although difficulties persisted, order intake was described as 'good' and there were
expectations, unfounded in reality, that the general situation would soon improve. Continuing
problems with suppliers were exacerbated when some of Gardner’s customers, themselves
experiencing difficulties, started to postpone engine deliveries. Consequently, there was a
general shortage of work in the plant, with the workload in the foundries being described as
'extremely thin'. Coupled with these uncertainties, by the end of April 1975 unconfirmed
rumours were circulating that major changes at Gardner were imminent.327
Interregnum
The extent of the changes, when they came, surprised many in that they profoundly
325 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 19 September 1973; ‘After the 1973 dispute, the Gardners were
seen less and less on the shopfloor…’, Carl Lingard, Inverbeg, to Maurice Halton, Horwich,
11 March 2004.
326 For example, In March 1974 Seddon Atkinson went on strike over wage controls imposed by
government anti-inflation legislation. Press Cutting, Oldham Evening Chronicle, ref. V35-P70,
Oldham Local History Library archive; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 26 June 1974; Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 24 July 1974; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 3 September 1974; Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 16 October 1974.
327 For an illustration of the long-standing issue of ‘excessive’ overtime at Gardner see Report of
the Division 11 Organizer AEU Monthly Journal, September 1954, p. 284; Shop Stewards’
Minutes, 3 September 1974; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 13 November 1974; Shop Stewards’
Minutes, 30 October 1974; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 11 December 1974; Joint Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 8 January 1975; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 2 April 1975; Shop Stewards’
Minutes, 12 April 1975; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 16 April 1975; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 30
April 1975; L. Tolly, The Times business section, 31 December 1976; also Foden An Outline
History, passim.
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transformed the make-up of the regime that had controlled Gardner for the previous twenty
years. On 1 July 1975, Joseph Hugh Stott Gardner, at the age of 71, stepped down as
Chairman of the Board. On the same day, Eric Anthony Todd, aged 72, also resigned,
followed in September by the Works Director, William Gordon Thompstone, aged 66, and the
Company Secretary, Frank Gardner Wilkinson, aged 67. While two family members – John
Kynaston Gardner, as Managing Director, and his son, John Paul Gardner, as Technical
Director – remained, George Norman Clayton Flint, the first ever member of the board with
executive powers who was not a Gardner family member, replaced Hugh as Chairman. Born
in Wisbech, Cambridgeshire in 1914, Flint studied law at Clare College, Cambridge gaining a
BA in 1936, an LLB in 1937, and an MA in 1940. Another significant change was the
elevation of Geoff Howarth, the personnel manager, to the board of directors.328
These fundamental alterations to the firm’s administration brought with them an equally
radical shift in the management’s approach to workplace industrial relations. Acknowledging
a need to reach better understandings in the future, one of Clayton Flint’s first actions was to
meet with the Joint Shop Stewards Committee to discuss the firm’s relationship with its
employees.329 Overall, however, the news he delivered was sombre. A downturn in business
had forced the management to suspend recruitment, and they would need to introduce short
time working in most areas of the plant.330 In addition, from 1 January 1976, all employees
reaching retirement age, and at Gardner there were many, would be compelled to resign.331
While these announcements, especially the latter, appear to have been viewed as
reasonable responses to prevailing circumstances, a delay in the implementation of a
recently negotiated wage increase was considered unacceptable, and the 'immediate
position of the company' notwithstanding, the shop stewards promptly registered a formal
failure to agree.332
Nevertheless, and in stark contrast with the previous regime, reticence and secrecy were
replaced by a constant flow of information from the boardroom, via the shop stewards, to the
workplace. Having first identified the problems the firm was facing, and allowing sufficient
time for their severity to be absorbed, Flint began to outline the measures he was taking to
remedy them. Advertising was being increased, and the sales department had been
instructed to seek new customers and accept orders in 'any form'. A new range of engines
328 L. Gardner and Sons Limited, Report and Accounts for the year ended 31 December 1975 to
be presented at The Seventy-sixth Annual General Meeting, of the Company on 13 May
1976, pp. 4 – 5; Cambridge Alumni Relations Office (CARO), 1 Quayside, Bridge Street,
Cambridge.
329 Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 2 July 1975.
330 ‘1300 go on four-day week’, Eccles and Patricroft Journal, 26 November 1975, p. 1; Joint
Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 8 October 1975.
331 ‘Employees retire’, Eccles and Patricroft Journal, 7 January 1976, p. 17; Joint Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 10 September 1975.
332 Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 13 August 1975; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 19 November
1975.
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was already in the early stages of design and would soon be introduced. Efforts to increase
the workload included a reduction in the number of components supplied by outside sub-
contactors, and the employment of Gardner staff in much-needed machine tool
refurbishment programmes. There were also urgent plans to improve working conditions in
the foundries where, with the help of government grants, modern equipment would soon be
installed.333
By the end of 1975, Gardner’s trading position had recovered sufficiently to allow the new
management to re-establish full-time working. By mid-February 1976, the situation had
improved further, and the firm began a recruitment drive to restore the number of employees
to pre-1973 levels.334 Cautiously welcoming these positive developments, the Works
Committee warned against any resumption of systematic overtime working, and called for
investment in modern, more efficient equipment, and for management to ‘analyse and plan in
order to avoid short working hours’ in the future.335
During the next eighteen months, under Clayton Flint’s stewardship, Gardner’s trading
position improved considerably. The new approach to sales and marketing resulted in an
increase in engine output to an unprecedented 150 units per week, the erection of a new
machine shop equipped with modern machine tools, and to a significant expansion in the
number of employees; positive developments that transformed the firm’s relationship with its
workforce.336 In particular, it is clear that Flint’s personal popularity transcended the deep-
seated scepticism of hardened trade unionists, so much so that, within a few months of his
appointment, normally cynical shop stewards were referring to him as 'our enlightened
Chairman' and to his administration as 'our new enlightened board of directors'.337
There can be no doubt that Clayton Flint’s evident ability to captivate others and his
readiness to communicate were of considerable value in his dealings with the Gardner
333 Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 3 December 1975.
334 ‘Gardner at Start of Boom?’, Eccles and Patricroft Journal, 31 March 1976, p. 1; ‘Boost on
Jobs Front’, Eccles and Patricroft Journal, 16 June 1976, p. 1; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes,
30 December 1975.
335 Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 14 January 1976; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 28 January
1976; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 11 February 1976; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 25
February 1976; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 24 March 1976; Joint Shop Stewards’
Minutes, 2 May 1976; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 11 June 1976; Joint Shop Stewards’
Minutes, 25 June 1976.
336 Announced in mid-1976, the machine shop was in full production by December. By then the
workforce had increased by 300, bringing the number of shopfloor personnel to 1,975. Joint
Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 9 July 1976; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 23 July 1976; Joint
Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 17 September 1976; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 22 October
1976; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 3 December 1976; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 17
December 1976.
337 Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 14 January 1976; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 28 January
1976; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 11 February 1976; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 25
February 1976; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 10 March 1976. Paul Gardner, Salford, to
Maurice Halton, Horwich, 13 August 2003.
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workforce and their union representatives.338 It is clear, however, that workplace harmony
was not purchased with compliance. While the union’s efforts to make the Patricroft plant a
‘closed shop’ were persistently resisted, and several ‘failures to agree’ over this issue were
registered, at no time was industrial action threatened.339 On three occasions between July
1975 and the end of 1977, the Shop Stewards Committee submitted claims for substantial
wage increases, none of which were met either timeously or in full. Although they were able
to refer to government restrictions and, on one occasion, the threat of sanctions by the
Department of Employment, the Gardner management under Flint took care never to
withdraw from negotiations.340 Nor, during Flint’s relatively brief period at Gardner, were
there any declarations of day-work, overtime bans, or other organized stoppages of work.
Moreover, when a group of employees downed-tools, they were rebuked by the Shop
Stewards’ Committee who described their action, the only incident of its kind recorded during
this period, as ‘deplorable’.341
As Gardner engines increasingly became the preferred power unit for a growing number of
vehicle builders and operators, order intake gathered momentum. Recruitment and staff
turnover, however, remained challenging. In some sections of the plant enrolment barely
kept pace with resignations, and shortages in some trades exacerbated the firm’s
considerable skilled labour problems, leading inevitably to a recurrence of the long-standing
issue of excessive overtime. Nevertheless, with the record profits generated in 1976 set to
rise even further in 1977, Flint delivered a positive and optimistic address to the annual
meeting of Gardner shareholders. ‘We are’, he coyly suggested, ‘doing quite well’. He also
mentioned, parenthetically, that conversations had taken place with the National Economic
Development Office in conjunction with Rolls-Royce Motor Holdings.342
338 As clearly illustrated in G. N. C. Flint, Salford, to John W. Tocher, Manchester, 9 February
1976; and in John W. Tocher, Manchester, to G. N. C. Flint, Salford 26 February 1976.
339 Although, in February 1977, negotiations between representatives of the Employers
Association and the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions resulted in a draft
agreement on this issue, it was never implemented. see Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 23 April
1976; Works Committee Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 7 May 1976; J. Bamber, Manchester, to J.
W. Tocher, Manchester, 14 May 1976; J. Bamber, Manchester, to J. W. Tocher, Manchester,
24 November 1976; J. Bamber, Manchester, to J. W. Tocher, Manchester, 2 February 1977.
340 For example, a claim for a general increase in wages, submitted and accepted in July 1975,
was not fully implemented for several months. A more substantial award in July 1976, which
the management responded to favourably, was modified and delayed by the criteria of the
Social Contract. A third considerable increase, approved in July 1977, was reversed when
the threat of sanctions by the Department of Employment jeopardized the health of the firm.
Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 10 March 1976; Paul Gardner, Salford to Maurice Halton,
Horwich, 13 August 2003; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 23 July 1976; Joint Shop Stewards’
Minutes, 28 January 1977; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 25 February 1977; Joint Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 25 March 1977; Report of the District 11 Organizer, AEU Monthly Journal,
September 1977, pp. 42 - 43.
341 Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 15 July 1975.
342 Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 28 January 1977; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 31 March
1977; Michael Rimmer, ‘Gardner hits the jackpot’, Manchester Evening News, April 28 1977.
109
The Hawker Siddeley Takeover
By June 1977, Rolls-Royce had acquired a 16.72 per cent shareholding in Gardner, a
situation that sections of the press began to construe as the early stages of a bid to gain full
control. Clayton Flint firmly dismissed such speculations, emphasizing that the Gardner
board was confident in the firm’s ability to take full advantage of its current success.
However, his reflection that he was ‘properly ready to listen to any proposals’ indicated
clearly that appropriate offers would not be discarded without due consideration.343
Accordingly, in early July, cash-rich following the nationalization of its aerospace divisions,
Hawker Siddeley revealed itself as a potential suitor and soon became the preferred bidder.
A few days later, following formal discussions, it was announced that Hawker Siddeley’s
offer, which valued the firm at £14.7 million, would be recommended for acceptance by the
Gardner board of directors.344
There was, of course, never any question that the firm’s employees would be consulted at
any stage or on any aspect of these proceedings. However, assurances were given that no
redundancies would result from the acquisition, and that Gardner would continue to operate
as an independent unit. Moreover, the advantages of the Hawker Siddeley Group, including
its ‘… financial strength, production experience and world wide export organization …’
would, it was asserted, complement Gardner’s ‘… reputation for engines of the highest
quality with outstanding fuel economy, reliability and longevity’. On 31 December 1977, when
Gardner officially became a wholly owned subsidiary of Hawker Siddeley Group, George
Norman Clayton Flint, the last Chairman of the Gardner Board, resigned.345
VI Analysis
The evidence presented above suggests that by 1960, the paternalistic ‘cash nexus’
convention that had, ostensibly, characterized the relationship between Gardner and its
employees since the end of the Second World War had subtly changed. Progressively
adopting a coercive-cum-remunerative approach, the management increasingly relied on the
financial incentives offered by a PBR system coupled with a high level of subordination in the
workplace to enforce the wage-effort bargain.346 However, while monetary rewards produced
a limited degree of loyalty, the management’s authoritarianism and unsympathetic attitudes
to workers’ legitimate concerns regarding safety and comfort in the workplace inevitably
invoked a correspondingly negative response.
343 ‘Rolls-Royce takeover?’, Eccles and Patricroft Journal, 23 June 1977, p. 1; Barbara Conway,
‘Hawker in talks with Gardner’, Daily Telegraph, 12 July 1977; Terry Dodsworth, ‘Hawker may
bid for Gardner’, Financial Times, 12 July 1977; 'Takeover race looms for diesel group’, Daily
Express, 12 July 1977; Nicholas Bannister, ‘Hawker may bid for diesel group’, The Guardian,
12 July 1977; ‘Take-Over At Gardners?’, Eccles and Patricroft Journal, 21 July 1977, p. 1.
344 ‘Take-Over At Gardners?’, Eccles and Patricroft Journal, 21 July 1977, p. 1; ‘Hawker
upstages Rolls-Royce Motors’, The Times, 23 December 1977.
345 Edge, Legendary Engineering, p. 184.
346 On the existence this type of regime see Howard F. Gospel and Gill Palmer, British Industrial
Relations, Second Edition (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 42 – 43; Amitai Etzioni, A
Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: Free Press, 1961), pp. 3 – 39.
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Nevertheless, disapproval was slow to develop into widespread and active dissension and,
for most of the 1960s, the largely compliant Gardner workforce represented by moderate
shop stewards afforded comparatively stable workplace industrial relations. Thus, between
1960 and 1966, other than three brief and minor stoppages, no serious disputes occurred,
and at least one potentially grave incident involving the harassment of a trade union official
passed almost without incident. Moreover, with the election of a particularly moderate Works
Convenor in January 1967, the shop stewards’ committee assumed an even more
conciliatory disposition. As well as rejecting the confrontational policies of more militant shop
stewards, forestalling industrial action, and circumventing the hard-line approach advocated
by full-time union officials, they endeavoured to create a constructive dialogue with
management.
The management, however, while persistently demanding strict adherence to rules in
matters of workplace discipline, remained aloof, both from the firm’s employees and from
their democratically elected representatives. On two occasions, in September 1972 and
again a few months later in 1973, seemingly unaware of the potentially provocative
consequences of their actions, managers acted against convention and in breach of
procedures. In the face of increasingly intense intervention by full-time union officials and
mounting resentment among the workforce, the moderate shop stewards’ conciliatory
approach proved ineffective.
Thus, in 1972, a relatively minor incident deteriorated into a major conflict that subsequently
involved the whole plant and ended only when the management guaranteed future
adherence to the terms of long established agreements. It is clear, however, that this
setback did not lead to a more adroit and less precipitous approach to workplace industrial
affairs. A few months later, a less than fully supported ban on piecework and overtime in
connection with a pay claim escalated into an all-out strike when the management effectively
locked out the whole of the workforce. Increasingly acrimonious and confrontational, this
prolonged dispute, which ended on terms more-or-less dictated by the unions, presaged the
end of Gardner as a family firm.
In mid-1975, non-Gardner family directors replaced four senior members of the board,
including the chairman. Almost immediately thereafter, a direct rapport with trade union
representatives and, through them, with the rest of the workforce was established. Periodic
announcements regarding the state of the business, although they were not always
optimistic, and regular meetings between managers and shop stewards clearly had a
positive effect on workplace industrial relations. Although efforts to increase wages and
improve employment conditions continued, and several formal failures to agree were
recorded, no strikes or partial stoppages of work took place during the next two years.
If the takeover of Gardner by Hawker Siddeley at the end of 1977 obfuscates its motives,
there can be no doubt that the new management’s industrial relations strategy created the
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conditions in which other aspects of the business could flourish. Moreover, the speed with
which the transformation was accomplished demonstrates that harmonious industrial
relations at Gardner were not difficult to establish by managers who were willing to structure
an environment conducive to their development.
The next chapter recounts the last seven years of Gardner as a viable industrial firm. The
events described took place during a period of virtually unprecedented change in the
structure of the British economy when many long established manufacturing engineering
enterprises simply vanished from the environment. It will be shown, however, that in the case
of Gardner, no such outcome was determined by circumstances other than those created
internally.
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CHAPTER 5
MANUFACTURING ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGY
I Introduction
Now you might think that Toyota Motor Company is just a company wearing a
smart suit, and you want to buy such a suit for your company. However, if you
only buy the kanban system, you soon discover that this suit will not fit your
obese, fat body and chaos soon results.347
The theme propounded in this chapter is that after 1978, the new Hawker Siddeley
appointed management of L. Gardner and Sons fundamentally altered the way the firm
manufactured diesel engines, and thereby lost the ability to meet the needs and wants of its
customers and to respond to market change. Its wider purpose is to examine the computer
controlled, technologically advanced, manufacturing systems and alternative approaches to
the production of complex mechanisms that were espoused by firms in the British
manufacturing engineering industry during the late 1970s and the early 1980s from the
perspective of a subsidiary of a multinational engineering group. The research focused on
what was essentially the final seven years of Gardner’s existence, concentrating on the
efficacy and appropriateness of investments made in new plant and machinery, and changes
made in the firm’s traditional methods in relation to the production task. The analysis centres
on the motivation, both explicit and implicit, behind the introduction of these changes, and
their observable effects on Gardner’s commercial viability in the face of increasing
competition in the challenging post-1979 macroenvironmental conditions. Particular
consideration was given to a series of strategic adjustments made by the new management
in response to an observable and continuous deterioration in Gardner’s trading position after
1980, and their ostensible contribution to Hawker Siddeley’s decision to dispose of the firm in
1986.
As previously discussed, Gardner’s approach to manufacturing was based on a combination
of flexibility and automation and the use of conventional and modern equipment, including a
small number of individual NC and CNC machine tools that had been installed before 1978.
Although some proprietary components were purchased from specialist suppliers, Gardner
had always been wary of outsourcing individual parts, and what little of that tradition had
been allowed to lapse had been clawed back by Clayton Flint. Using this system, Gardner
had profitably produced and sold around 130 complete diesel engines of various types and
sizes every week during 1977. By the end of 1985, notwithstanding a considerable
investment in new plant and machinery, the firm was struggling to manufacture sufficient
engines to meet sales of barely a third of this number, its annual trading surpluses had
become deficits, and its long-established reputation for high-quality, reliability and economy
had been lost. While macroenvironmental changes may account for many of the difficulties
347 Shigeo Shingo (1909 -1990), quoted in Black, Factory with a Future, p. 157.
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experienced by Gardner during this period, the evidence revealed by the research strongly
indicates that the fundamental reasons for the firm’s problems lay less in declining markets
than in its ability to efficiently and profitably manufacture diesel engines. The following
narrative describes how the new Gardner management’s attempt to improve what it
perceived as the firm’s outdated approach to the production engineering task inevitably
resulted in complete failure.
II Thematic Issues
The evolution of manufacturing engineering technology during the first half of the twentieth
century, especially where the development of machine tools influenced the production of
internal combustion engines, has already been considered above. It was shown that high-
production systems like in-line transfer machines were extremely inflexible and therefore of
little interest to Gardner, whose product mix, although specialized, necessitated a relatively
high level of adaptability. Thus, Gardner continued to utilize a combination of standard, semi-
automatic, automatic and special-purpose machine tools, manned by a blend of skilled,
semiskilled and unskilled operators.
By the end of the 1950s, however, an entirely new kind of automation system, offering
previously unimagined levels of flexibility and efficiency, was being applied to machine tools.
The main advantages of Numerical Control (NC) were derived from its programmable
electronic system, which controlled the cutting tool in relation to the component via a
programme expressed as a series of numbers.348 The system could also execute
coordinated machine movements, initiate changes to speeds and feeds, and carry out many
other functions usually performed by a skilled operator. Because NC machines used
standard cutting tools, and the programmes for different components could be stored as a
series of coded instructions on magnetic or punched paper tapes, they were relatively easy
to reset. Ostensibly, for these reasons, NC was extolled by machine tool builders and in the
engineering industry press as the solution to many of the problems inherent in the
manufacture of small batches of complex components and mechanisms. Overstated notions
that the advent of NC represented ‘… the most important single advance in the whole history
of the machine tool industry, and one that is much more revolutionary, for instance, than the
introduction of the automatic transfer machine’ were not uncommon.349
348 David Gibbs, An Introduction to CNC Machining (Eastbourne: Cassell, 1984), p. 1; Black,
Factory with a Future, p. 37; also Bo Carlsson, ‘The development and use of machine tools in
historical perspective’, Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, 5 (1), 1984, pp. 91
– 114; Jeffrey H. Keefe ‘Numerically Controlled Machine Tools and Worker Skills’, Industrial
and Labor Relations Review, 44 (3), April 1991, pp. 503-519; editorial, ‘Gaining control over
machine tools’, American Machinist, 8 January 1988,
http://www.americanmachinist.com/304/Issue/Article/False/9149/Issue.
349 ‘It (the NC machine) is a highly versatile machine which is designed to carry out, entirely
automatically, work that would otherwise demand the constant attendance and attention of a
highly skilled operator’. ‘The Extending Application of Numerical Control’ (editorial),
Machinery, August 10 1960, p. 303; ‘The advent of numerical control … has brought
automation within the reach of smaller companies, where the work is non-repetitive. On
numerically controlled machines it may be profitable to produce only one piece of a
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Towards the end of the 1960s, the introduction of Computer Numerical Control (CNC)
generated a new wave of enthusiastic, often irresponsible, outpourings.350 However, there
can be no doubt that CNC delivered the flexibility that NC had only promised and by the mid-
1970s, it had begun to alter, if not exactly transform, the ways in which firms approached the
manufacture of complex mechanisms.351 One of its significant advantages over NC derived
from the memory integrated into the small computer that formed the core of its control
system in which programmes could be stored and optimized at the machine. While for some
this facility returned a degree of human intervention to the machining process, for others it
created possibilities for communication between machines and computers, theoretically
affording management an unprecedented level of control.352
III Macroenvironmental Background
According to a number of historians, the process of the ‘deindustrialization’ of Britain’s
economy began during the early 1970s.353 At the time, the government viewed it as an
complicated design at a given time’. ‘Economies Obtained with Numerical Control of Jobbing
Shop Operations’ (editorial), Machinery, December 7 1960, pp. 1294 – 1295; A. W. Astrop,
‘Batch Production with Numerically Controlled Machines, Some Aspects of Short Brothers
and Harland, Ltd., Queens Island, Belfast, for the Production of Aircraft Components in Small
Quantities’, Machinery, May 10 1961, pp. 1044 – 1048; ‘… the increasing availability of
numerically controlled machines offers revolutionary possibilities for the production of a very
wide range of work-pieces in small and medium quantities’. ‘The need for a rational re-
equipment policy’ (editorial), Machinery, December 24 1962; ‘Tape-controlled (NC) machines
… have been found to give the short-run jobbing shop advantages that were possible before
only where parts were being mass-produced’. ‘Advantages of numerical control for small
batch production’ (editorial), Machinery, June 26 1963, p. 1442; ‘Now with vertical turret
lathes and a drilling machine – all numerically controlled – a single flywheel can be
progressed from order to delivery in a maximum of 48 hours’. Alexander Cechanowicz,
‘Economic flywheel production on numerically controlled machines’, Machinery, August 7
1963, p. 292; ‘Numerical Control’ (Editorial), Machinery, 19 October 1960, pp. 874 – 875; also
‘The need for more rapid adoption of numerically controlled machines’ (editorial), Machinery,
April 29 1964, p. 967; ‘The economics of numerical control’ (editorial), Machinery, February
26 1964, p. 455; ‘Numerically controlled machine tools’ (editorial), Machinery, July 15 1964,
p. 223; ‘Conference on numerically controlled machine tools’ (editorial), Machinery, March 10
1965, p. 547; ‘The need for wider application of numerically controlled machine tools’
(editorial), Machinery, April 28 1965, p. 899.
350 For example, it was proposed that CNC was ‘economical for mass-production [as well as]
batch and in many cases single-item production’. Gibbs, Introduction, p. 1; S. C. Black, V.
Chiles, A. J. Lissaman and S. J. Martin, Principles of Engineering Manufacture, Third Edition
(London: Arnold, 1996), pp. 190 - 191 also David F. Noble, Forces of Production: A Social
History of Industrial Automation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), p. 84.
351 ‘A new wave of technological change began to transform process technology from the mid
1970s … [as CNC] … enhanced flexibility and reduced the minimum efficient scale [and thus]
reduced the optimum level (of production)’, Foreman-Peck, Bowden, and McKinlay, Motor
Industry, pp. 122 – 124; also J. Muellbauer, ‘Productivity and competitiveness in British
manufacturing’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 3 (3), 1977 quoted in Lloyd-Jones and
Lewis, Capitalism, p. 201; ‘Gaining control’, American Machinist.
352 For example, one manufacturer of CNC systems proposed that its product was suited ‘to job
shops in the name of shopfloor editing and operator control’ while at the same time promoting
it ‘to mangers of large firms in the interest of ... greater management control’. Noble, Forces
of Production, pp. 326, 328 – 329; also Piore and Sabel, Second Industrial, pp. 217 – 218.
353 For example, ‘… from the 1970s, a falling level of employment in manufacturing sparked off a
fear of “deindustrialization”‘. Millward, ‘Industrial and Commercial’, in Floud and McCloskey,
Economic History of Britain, Second Edition, Vol. 3, p. 124; Lloyd-Jones and Lewis,
Capitalism, pp. 183 - 184, 187; Cairncross, ‘Economic Policy and Performance, 1964 - 1990’,
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indication of mounting economic weakness and accordingly, in November 1975, it signalled
its renewed commitment to intense intervention. The proposed solution was to be increased
government involvement in practically all aspects of industry and commerce, and to this end,
a 'new style' of planning was introduced. Its key strategy was based on the creation of
‘modern’, internationally competitive ‘national champions’ which would be selected by
government institutions and supported by government funding. Soon, however, instead of
nurturing future industrial winners the government became ideologically constrained to bail
out current failures and, as inflation gradually became the focus of attention, the objective of
intervention turned to ameliorating the effects of high and rising unemployment.354
The severity of the macroenvironmental difficulties faced by virtually the whole of the British
manufacturing industry between 1978 and 1986 surpassed those of any other peacetime
period of the twentieth century.355 By the end of 1982, employment in this sector of the
economy, which had been falling gradually since the mid-1960s, had decreased sharply and
by 1983 exports of British manufactured goods had fallen below the level of imports.356
The fundamental causes of these two closely related developments are perhaps the most
discussed aspects of a period of British economic history that is otherwise replete with
hypotheses relating to phenomena, ideologies, and personalities.357 Where most economic
historians agree, however, is that the conditions for their emergence lay in the anti-
inflationary economic policies of the post-1979 government.358 Typical of their analyses is
in Floud and McCloskey, Economic History of Britain, Second Edition, Vol. 3, p. 90; Alford,
Britain in the World, p. 252.
354 Porter, ‘Government and the Economy’, in Coopey and Woodward, Britain in the 1970s, p.
43; Tomlinson, ‘British Economic Policy Since 1945’, p. 276; Feinstein, ‘Success and Failure’,
in Floud and McCloskey, Economic History of Britain, Second Edition, Vol. 3, p. 113; Coopey
and Woodward, ‘Overview’, in Coopey and Woodward, Britain in the 1970s, p. 17.
355 ‘The beginning of the Thatcher epoch was little short of a disaster for the British
manufacturing sector …’ Lloyd-Jones and Lewis, Capitalism, p. 201; by 1981 ‘… [the British]
manufacturing industry had shed 10 per cent of its labour force in a year and large numbers
of firms were being forced out of business …’ Cairncross, British Economy, Second Edition,
p. 244; in 1982, 12,000 companies went into liquidation, manufacturing output fell by 14.5 per
cent and investment in manufacturing fell by 36 per cent. Gamble, Decline, pp. 191 – 195;
’Clearly, looking at the period 1979-87 as a whole … from the output and employment side,
the results appear to range from poor to disastrous’. Maynard, Thatcher, p. 89.
356 Maynard, Thatcher, pp. 89 – 90; Stephen Bazen and Tony Thirlwall, Deindustrialization
(Studies in the UK Economy) (Oxford: Heinemann, 1991), pp. 55; Cairncross, ‘Economic
Policy and Performance, 1945 - 1964’, in Floud and McCloskey, Economic History of Britain,
Second Edition, Vol. 3, p. 33; Cairncross, ‘Economic Policy and Performance, 1964 - 1990’,
in Floud and McCloskey, Economic History of Britain, Second Edition, Vol. 3, p. 90; Alford,
Britain in the World, p. 316.
357 ‘Not even Winston Churchill (whom she [Margaret Thatcher] greatly admired) had given birth
to a personal “ism”’ Trevor May, An Economic and Social History of Britain 1760 – 1990,
Second Edition (London: Longman, 1995), pp. 455, 461; Alford, Britain in the World, pp. 312,
317, 322.
358 ‘... the present [1982] government has done more damage more rapidly that any previous
administration’. Pollard, Wasting, p. 165; moreover, although by March 1983 inflation ‘... was
down to 5 per cent, the achievement was partly the result of huge unemployment’, Jeremy,
Business History of Britain, p. 53; ‘The sharp rise in unemployment during 1979-83 was thus
to a large extent the cost of the reduction of inflation’., Stephen Broadberry, ‘Employment and
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the unambiguous and seemingly logical assessment offered by Cairncross, that the
contraction was an inevitable result of a rapid increase in the value of the British pound
brought about by abnormally high interest rates, combined the difficulties in raising credit
then being encountered by manufacturing firms.359
There are, however, scholars who have proposed alternative reasons. According to Steven
Toms and Mark Wright, for example, many firms in the engineering industry were equipped
with outdated machinery and systems ‘reflecting decades of under-investment’. Maynard
believed that the link between economic policy and the decimation of the manufacturing
sector was superficial, and that it was the inevitable result of overmanning in previous years,
an opinion that echoes that of the then Prime Minister. However, as discussed more fully
below, overmanning can be a somewhat skewed and subjective measure of efficiency, and it
is doubtful whether firms like Gardner indulged in it gratuitously. Moreover, as the research
for this thesis clearly revealed, in the early 1980s Gardner’s plant was by no means
obsolete.360
Although, by 1983, the deep recession of the previous four years had eased, it had left the
manufacturing engineering industries of Britain in general, and that of the Northwest in
particular, decimated. In Bolton, for example, Dobson and Barlow, manufacturers of textile
machinery, founded in the late-eighteenth century and one of the world’s oldest engineering
firms, closed down in 1982, and the machine tool manufacturer Thomas Ryder and Son,
founded in 1865, disappeared in the same year: however Hick Hargreaves and Company,
founded in the 1830s, endured. Similarly, in Oldham firms like Ferranti and Platt were also
on the verge of closure during the 1980s, while Seddon Atkinson, an erstwhile Gardner
customer, albeit in a much reduced condition, survived.361
Unemployment’, in Floud and McCloskey, Economic History of Britain, Second Edition, Vol. 3,
p. 217; ‘British companies suffered a sudden loss in competitiveness of 20 per cent. The
consequence was a major contraction of manufacturing industry’. Gamble, Decline, pp. 191 –
195.
359 Cairncross, ‘Economic policy and performance, 1964 – 1990’, in Floud and McCloskey,
Economic History of Britain, Second Edition, Vol. 3, p. 87; Cairncross, British Economy,
Second Edition, p. 244; also Feinstein, ‘Success and Failure’, in Floud and McCloskey,
Economic History of Britain, Second Edition, Vol. 3, p. 114; also Pollard, Wasting, p. 165.
360 ‘… if “monetarism” was the spark that fired the explosion of unemployment, the gunpowder
had certainly been well and truly laid much earlier. There would be little disagreement that
much of the UK manufacturing industry in the 1970s was excessively overmanned and
afflicted by low labour and capital productivity’. Maynard, Thatcher, p. 128; see also Thatcher,
Downing Street Years, p. 119; Steven Toms and Mike Wright, 'Divergence and Convergence
within Anglo-American Corporate Governance Systems: Evidence from the US and UK,
1950-2000', Business History, 47 (2), 2005, p. 279.
361 Bazen and Thirlwall, Deindustrialization, p. 52; Owen Ashmore, Industrial Archaeology of
Lancashire (Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1969), p. 248; Brief History of Dobson and
Barlow published by the firm in 1927, Bolton Library Local History Archive ref. ZDB; Bolton
Evening News, Bolton Library Local History Archive, Local Press Cuttings 1967 to 1998, Ref.
621/ctg; Thomas Ryder and Son, Machines to Make Machines 1865 to 1965, a centenary
booklet (Derby: Bemrose and Sons, 1968), Bolton Library Local History Archive ref. 621/RYD;
P. W. Pilling, Hick Hargreaves and Co., The History of an Engineering Firm c. 1833 – 1939, a
Study with Special Reference to Technological Change and Markets, Unpublished Doctoral
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Clearly, therefore, it was possible for firms to surmount the extremely challenging conditions
of the early 1980s. Of the four automotive diesel engine builders that existed in Britain in
1978, Cummins and Perkins continued intact, while the Rolls-Royce plant was absorbed into
the latter’s facilities. Although it seems likely that Perkins made use of some aspects of what
remained of the Patricroft factory after 1986, it is clear that its function as a complete engine
production facility was never again considered worthwhile.
IV Microenvironmental Background
Diesel engines of the type and size produced by Gardner comprised several hundred
individual components, virtually all of which, before 1978, were manufactured at the
Patricroft works.362 At Gardner, the production management’s task, both unambiguous and
exacting, was to ensure that a steady and balanced flow of components arrived at the
assembly department in quantities sufficient to permit complete engines to be built and
shipped in accordance with the firm’s contractual obligations.363 The components were
produced using a type of flexible manufacturing technique commonly employed by firms
whose sales volumes were below that of passenger car companies. Machine tools of various
types were arranged in ‘flow-lines’ or ‘cells’ according to the required sequence of operations
and although components varied in size, they were generally similar in shape and complexity
so that each flow-line or cell could be quickly reset to accommodate variations in demand.364
At the assembly stage, a highly skilled and experienced engine fitter took full responsibility
for each unit.365
Thesis, University of Liverpool, 1985, p. 27; EIS Group plc, Annual Report and Accounts,
1990; The Ferranti Collection, Manchester Museum of Science and Industry Archive Ref.
1996.10; Ultra Electronic Holdings plc, Annual Report and Accounts, Greenford, Middlesex,
1999; Oldham Local History Library Archive, Press Cuttings ref. V52 - P15 (OEC).
362 Herbert Frank Purday, Diesel Engine Design (London: Constable, 1919 - 1948), passim; L. R.
C. Lilly, Diesel Engine Reference Book (London: Butterworth, 1986), passim; on British firms’
preference to manufacture ‘in-house’ see: Lewchuk, ‘The Motor Vehicle Industry’, p. 138;
Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 9 July 1976; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 23 July 1976;
Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 17 September 1976; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 22
October 1976; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 3 December 1976; Joint Shop Stewards’
Minutes, 17 December 1976; Nicholas Faith, ‘Mr. Hugh and his dream engine’, The Sunday
Times, 9 November 1969, p. 30.
363 ‘Manufacturing people are responsible for the smooth running of the factory to produce the
right products in the right quantities at the right time for the right cost’. Kotler, Marketing
Management, p. 733; ‘The connection between the commercial and the technical function is
crucial to any business’. ‘General management’s production responsibilities’ (editorial),
Machinery and Production Engineering, 27 July 1977; Michael J. Rose, Senior Design
Engineer (ret.), BAe systems, Bolton, interviewed by Maurice J. Halton, 23 September 2009.
364 Often referred to as ‘group technology’, see for example Black, Factory with a Future, pp. 32
– 33; also Peter L. Primrose, Investment in Manufacturing Technology (London: Chapman
and Hall, 1991), p. 94.
365 There are many references to ‘flow-lines’ and work ‘flowing’ through the plant. See for
example W. Henderson, Patricroft to E. Frow, Manchester, 21 May 1962; D. Waddington,
Patricroft, to Mr. E. Frow, Manchester, 18 August 1967; D. Waddington, Patricroft, to Mr. E.
Frow, Manchester, 24 February 1970; Minutes of the Shop Stewards Committee meeting
dated 17 April 1968. Shop Stewards Minute Books; and in Minutes of the Shop Stewards
Committee meeting dated 27 August 1969. Shop Stewards Minute Books; also Scranton,
Endless Novelty; Edge, Legendary Engineering, p. 145; Nicholas Faith, ‘Mr. Hugh and his
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The introduction of CNC in the late 1960s subsequently gave rise to the concept of the
Flexible Manufacturing System (FMS). Described by one expert as ‘a combination of the
transfer line with an NC machine’, an FMS was a group of CNC machine tools controlled by
a central computer and linked together by conveyors, robots, or guided vehicles. Compared
to transfer lines, which were extremely productive but generally capable of producing only
one component, the rationale behind FMS was the economical production, singly and
sequentially, of a variety of dissimilar components with minimal interruption and virtually no
human intervention.366 However, while an FMS was considerably more flexible than a
transfer line, it was much less flexible than a similar number of individual CNC machine
tools. Moreover, an FMS was very expensive to acquire and its implementation was far from
straightforward.367
Nevertheless, by the late 1970s, FMS technology was attracting a great deal of interest,
much of which was generated by unrealistically high levels of expectations. To many firms
like Gardner, the perceived opportunity to produce small batches of components for various
sizes of diesel engines at costs comparable to, but without the inflexibility of, mass-
production methods, in addition to the prospect of absolute management control over a
greatly reduced labour force, comprised an almost irresistible attraction.368 However, the
high cost of FMS together with its perceived potential to enhance production placed exacting
demands on management, and many were installed without adequate preparation and for
the wrong reasons.369
dream engine’, Sunday Times, 9 November 1969, p. 30; also Womack, Jones, and Roos,
The Machine, p. 24; Jones, Forcing, pp. 16 – 17.
366 ‘An FMS is set apart from any other kind of manufacturing system, such as a transfer line
used in high volume automotive applications, because of its ability to accept parts or
components in varying quantities, in random order’. William W. Luggen, Flexible
Manufacturing Cells and Systems (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1991), pp. 7, 9; also
Gibbs, Introduction, p. 185; Black, Factory with a Future, p. 37.
367 ‘FMS is not a cure-all for productivity and profitability problems. It cannot make
order out of chaos …’ Luggen, Flexible Manufacturing, p. 27; ‘FMS [are] difficult to
link to other manufacturing systems. The FMS becomes an island of automation
(the inventory piles up all around it like water around an island) …’ Black, Factory
with a Future, p. 46; also Primrose, Investment, p. 163; for a comprehensive
appraisal of FMS evolution and its complexities see Roger E. Bohn, (2005) From Art
to Science in Manufacturing: The Evolution of Technological Knowledge. UC San
Diego: Retrieved from: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/6z6703z5.
368 ‘With FMS it is possible to machine two or three different engine blocks … in low volume at
relatively low cost’. Hartley, FMS, p. 35; FMS was ‘… an attempt to achieve higher rates of
machine utilization in factories making small batches of components. [as well as] Fordist-style
automaticity without the requirement of mass-production scales of standardized products’.
Jones, Forcing the Factory, pp. 19, 101; FMS had the perceived potential ‘… to achieve
shorter production runs, more frequent setting of machines and higher product quality [as well
as] reductions in labour costs and other scale economies’. Bryn Jones, ‘Flexible Automation
and Factory Politics: The United Kingdom in Comparative Perspective’, in Hirst and Zeitlin,
Reversing, 1989)’, p. 96.
369 ‘… FMS will not solve the problems of a mismanaged or poorly organized plant’. Luggen,
Flexible Manufacturing, p. 27; ‘Such a [FMS] system must be scheduled and can be as
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V Findings
It was more than six months before Hawker Siddeley appointed a successor to Clayton Flint.
There is much evidence to suggest that, during this period, because Gardner operated
without the strong leadership that the Chairman of the Board had traditionally provided, a
minor organizational crisis took place, when the crucially important coordinated production of
engine components became increasingly imbalanced. By the end of February, for example,
the foundries were three months ahead and by the end of June, various sections of the
machine shops were reporting component shortages. At the same time, an apparent
moratorium on recruitment left several vacancies unfilled and, while some labour shortages
were resolved by temporarily transferring staff between departments, this appears to have
occasionally resulted in confusion over piecework rates and underpayment of bonuses.
Unsurprisingly, this often led to dissatisfaction, protests and friction, as well as, on at least
one occasion, industrial action.370
Eventually, in late July 1978, Hawker Siddeley announced their decision to appoint A. B. H.
Davies, at that time the production director at Mirrlees Blackstone of Stockport, to the
position of Managing Director at Gardner. Although Mirrlees was also a Hawker Siddeley
subsidiary and a manufacturer of diesel engines, there were several important differences
between the two firms, the most significant of which were that the engines it produced were
much larger than those made by Gardner, and they were designed for an entirely different
market segment. Perhaps more importantly, at least in the context of this chapter, the firm’s
Stockport factory made extensive use of computers for production planning and work
scheduling, as well as for the performance of several other organizational tasks. Moreover,
in comparison with what many perceived to be Gardner’s 'old and outdated plant’, the
Mirrlees factory was equipped with numerous modern Computer Numerically Controlled
machine tools. For this reason, the appointment of Davies appeared to some to signify
Hawker Siddeley’s modernizing intentions.371
For the rest of 1978 and throughout most of 1979, it is clear that fundamental changes to
Gardner’s traditional approach to the production of diesel engines were taking place.
Whereas, in previous decades, there had been a strong bias towards manufacturing as
much of the final product as possible at Patricroft, this philosophy changed radically after
Davies’ appointment. Production of small batches of complete engines for market segments
complex as the job shop it replaced. … it is [therefore] necessary to schedule parts and
machines within the FMS, just as it is in the job shop’. Black, Factory with a Future, p. 37, 46.
370 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 24 February 1978; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 14 June 1978;
Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 21 July 1978; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 28 July 1978.
371 On the many CNC machine tools installed at Mirrlees se Arthur Barker, ‘NC gives GT a lot
more bite!’, Machinery and Production Engineering’, 8 April 1981, pp. 25 – 27; Joint Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 9 February 1978; J. Parkinson, Patricroft to J. W. Tocher, Salford, 19
June 1978; In September 1978, members of the Gardner Joint Shop Stewards’ Committee
visited Mirrlees and were very impressed by the number of CNC machine tools in use there,
observing that 'This type of machine-tool will most certainly have to be introduced on a larger
scale at Gardner in the very near future’. Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 22 September 1978.
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outside the automotive sector were, in some cases, being subcontracted to outside firms,
and components for automotive engines were also increasingly being acquired in this way.
Unsurprisingly, given their radical nature, these changes did not always take place without
complications. Component deliveries were often behind schedule and quality standards were
frequently below requirements, irregularities that led to sporadic shortages at the assembly
stage and consequential delays in engine shipments.372
Nevertheless, by January 1980, the management had outlined plans that promised a more
coherent future. New manufacturing technology, computer systems, and enhanced
organizational procedures would be introduced during the 'next couple of years’. In the
meantime, obsolete machine tools would either be scrapped or transferred to
subcontractors, and the space thus created used for the installation of new and more
efficient plant.373 The first major investment would be in an advanced computer controlled
manufacturing system for the production of crankcases, one of the three major components
of the Gardner diesel engine. The ‘AMS’, as it came to be called, was ordered in early 1980
from KTM of Brighton, a member of the Vickers Group. Comprising a number of British and
German CNC machine tools and ancillary equipment, all linked together by a conveyor
system and controlled by a central computer, it was in many ways a typical FMS, but in
others, it was similar to a Detroit style transfer line. (see Appendix 5) Its precise cost is
unclear varying, depending on the source and the context, between six- and seventeen-
million pounds. However, its size and sophistication can be construed from the length of time
it was expected to take to deliver, install, and commission, which was, at the time the order
was placed, almost two years. Portentously, although Hawker Siddeley would initially fund
this considerable investment, it was expected that it would eventually be financed out of
Gardner’s profits.374
By June 1980, increasingly adverse trading conditions in the British manufacturing
engineering industry induced the Gardner management to place the workforce on a four-day
week. By the end of July, when it was learned that Foden of Sandbach, an important and
long established customer, had been forced into receivership, this was reduced still further to
three days. There followed a review of the firm’s short- and medium-term prospects which
determined that engine sales, already at their lowest level for several years, would continue
to fall until at least the last quarter of 1981, with only a modest improvement predicted
thereafter. Furthermore, it concluded that although much of the decline in orders could be
ascribed to the general downturn, market share was being lost to competitors whose engines
372 Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 6 April 1979; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 25 June 1979;
Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 12 October 1979.
373 Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 11 July 1979.
374 Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 27 July 1979; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 10 April 1980; Joint
Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 12 October 1979; Robert Ramwell, Manchester, to Maurice Halton,
Horwich, 16 June 2004; Peter Chadwick, Bolton, to Maurice Halton, Horwich, 16 March,
2004; also ‘New Crankcase Machining Facility Brief Description’, undated document, The
Gardner Collection, Working Class Movement Library, Salford.
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were both cheaper and more powerful. In order to ameliorate the worst affects of these
conditions, it was considered necessary to reduce the 2,400 workforce by 700 by the end of
the year.375
Unsurprisingly, the employees and their union representatives actively opposed what
appears to have been a precipitous and unilateral action, and for most of October and
November 1980, an all-out strike closed the Patricroft factory. It ended when, following the
intervention of the Hawker Siddeley group, the management and the employees agreed to a
reduction in staffing levels through a system of voluntary redundancy and early retirement.376
Gardner entered 1981 with a full workload but, as the year progressed, receipts of new
orders slowed significantly and customers began to postpone delivery of, and even cancel,
outstanding orders. As the situation continued to deteriorate, several sections of the plant
were placed on short time working in an attempt to reduce costs. Efforts were also made to
offset the firm’s ostensible over-reliance on the HGV market, probably the worst affected
sector, including increased endeavours to secure more business for bus, marine and static
engines; all of which had been neglected under the new management. Nevertheless, as
business projections for the second half of the year became ever more negative, pessimism
among managers and workers appears to have attained near tangible levels, especially by
the end of the year when it had become clear that trading losses were being generated.377
In the meantime, the management revealed the findings of their analysis of Gardner’s
unsatisfactory performance in the market for proprietary automotive diesel engines. Two
main problems were identified. The first, and clearly the most serious, was their conclusion
that since the Hawker Siddeley takeover, the firm’s once unblemished reputation for quality
of build and reliability in the field, features upon which Gardner had established itself from
the start, had been lost. The second and somewhat less tangible perceived problem was
based on an opinion that Gardner’s ‘antiquated plant … does not impress potential
customers whose businesses reflect the introduction of modern manufacturing technology’.
Although it was considered necessary to reduce, wherever possible, the projected level of
investment in new plant and machinery, there nevertheless appears to have been subdued
375 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 19 June 1980; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 26 June 1980; Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 8 July 1980.
376 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 5 September 1980; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 12 September 1980;
Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 1 October 1980; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 2 October 1980; Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 3 October 1980; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 17 October 1980; Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 25 November 1980; Report of the District 11 Organizer, AEU Journal, 48
(1), January 1981, p. 24.
377 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 5 March 1981; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 11 March 1981; Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 7 April 1981; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 6 June 1981; Shop Stewards’
Minutes, 24 March 1981; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 22 April 1981; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 4
June 1981; Gardner management statement dated 20 July 1981.
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confidence in the firm’s ability to survive its current difficulties.378
For most of 1982, the situation at Gardner deteriorated until the management’s increasingly
pessimistic outlook, intensified by a series of progressively negative business forecasts,
began to assume quasi-apocalyptic proportions. In July, the workforce was informed that a
further 100 redundancies were being considered which, by August, had risen to 400. As
seriously imbalanced component production schedules continued to cause interruptions and
delays in the assembly department, even the relatively modest and much reduced
production target of forty engines a week proved increasingly difficult to achieve. Such was
the seriousness of this situation that at one stage the management began mooting a
proposal to close the works for the three weeks before Christmas in order to re-establish
stability. By mid-November, however, a sudden and evidently unforeseen increase in order
intake brought the cancellation of this somewhat impetuous plan, as well as the withdrawal
of 120 of the redundancies planned for 1983.379
The upsurge in confidence, however, proved ephemeral as a series of developments in the
British HCV cluster brought a return to pessimism as well as the implementation of a series
of increasingly unconventional and poorly structured stratagems. During 1983, Seddon-
Atkinson was acquired by the state-owned Pegaso group of Spain, who greatly reduced the
firm’s Oldham manufacturing facilities and withdrew from the HGV market. Shortly thereafter,
another established Gardner customer disappeared when Leyland closed the Bristol
Commercial Vehicles factory in Brislington. At around the same time Perkins re-entered the
HGV market with the acquisition of the Rolls-Royce Diesel International plant at
Shrewsbury.380
In the meantime, according to the management, Gardner was ‘in a very fragile state’ and
many changes were needed. ‘Survival’ now entered the vocabulary of their communications,
and they began to describe their overall objective as to ‘provide employment for around
1,000 people’. They proposed to address their primary concern – the restoration of
Gardner’s reputation for quality and reliability – by simplifying engines designs in order to
make them easier to manufacture, and by purchasing many more components from
subcontractors. The latter aspect of this plan included the radical procedure of encouraging
378 ‘We have earned a reputation for quality and reliability … this reputation has been tarnished
by a number of problems which have occurred in the last year or so’. Minutes of the Joint
Consultative Committee, Works Meeting, 8 July 1981.
379 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 1 February 1982; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 27 May 1982;
Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 10 June 1982; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 14 June 1982;
Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 29 June 1982; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 7 July 1982;
Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 11 August 1982; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 3 September
1982; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 27 October 1982; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 28
October 1982; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 18 November 1982; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 8
March 1983.
380 Press Cutting, Oldham Evening Chronicle, V56-P50, Oldham Local History Library; Press
Cutting, Oldham Evening Chronicle, V55-P58, Oldham Local History Library; Leyland, Official
History, p. 45; Parisson et al, Perkins.
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departmental managers to set-up small subcontracting businesses equipped with machine
tools acquired from Gardner and staffed by ex-Gardner employees. The respective
departments were then closed down and the work previously undertaken by them transferred
to the new firms. Superficially simple, the actual outcome of this scheme can be perceived in
its effect on production, manifested by the complete failure to increase engine output from
fifty to sixty units a week.381
As 1984 began, the management were obliged to acknowledge that the firm’s position had
deteriorated further. ‘Substantial’ losses had been generated during the previous twelve
months and although the British market for proprietary automotive diesel engines had
‘remained relatively stable’, Gardner’s share had again fallen in relation to its main
competitors. Somewhat naïvely concluding that the firm was not selling enough of its
products to cover its costs, the management announced that it hoped ‘… to preserve the
Gardner business as an entity …’ and to this end, they revealed their intention to make
another 125 employees redundant. By March, however, in another sudden and unexpected
reversal of fortune, a large order for diesel engines was received from a British bus
manufacturer who had succeeded in securing a substantial contract from a Hong Kong
transport concern. The anticipation that this contract would ensure a reasonable workload for
the factory until the middle of 1985 once again restored the management’s ostensibly
capricious optimism, and they promptly cancelled the previously announced
redundancies.382
It was during 1984 that the AMS began to emerge as an area of concern. As previously
discussed, it was initially configured and tooled to machine crankcases, but because of the
severely reduced order intake, it was at that time being significantly underutilized. For this
reason, an attempt was made to increase its workload by adding cylinder blocks, cylinder
heads and various other components to its programme. The main problems in this area were
essentially practical. Somewhat unconventionally, Gardner engines were designed with
three, rather than two, main components. The crankcase was made from aluminium, an
easily worked metal, while the cylinder head and cylinder block were made from cast iron, a
material which, while it has different characteristics to aluminium, is by no means difficult to
machine. Nevertheless, the addition of these components entailed important changes to the
layout and functioning of the AMS: several individual machines had to be reprogrammed,
retooled, and relocated; staff were retrained and redeployed, and the electronic systems
required modifications needing many hours of attention by a specialized maintenance team.
Undoubtedly, such complex alterations were achieved neither easily nor quickly, and they
381 Gardner management notice to employees, 11 February 1983; Minutes of an Informal
Conference between Gardner Management and Trade Union officials, 5 May 1983; Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 21 July 1983; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 18 October 1983.
382 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 4 January 1984; Gardner Management Statement, 6 January 1984;
Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 1 February 1984; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 24 February 1984; Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 9 March 1984; Gardner management Works Notice dated 12 March 1984.
124
severely tested the flexibility and effectiveness of the AMS which, by the end of the year,
was clearly becoming extremely unstable.383
By January 1985, the large Hong Kong bus engine contract had been completed, order
intake had again plummeted, and short-time working had been introduced in many sections
of the factory. Nevertheless, the management pressed ahead with plans to increase the
amount of work being subcontracted to outside firms, especially those willing to employ
redundant Gardner workers. The increasingly chaotic production schedule was being
exacerbated by several ongoing technical problems, particularly on the AMS as the new
components were added to its workload. Reports that two new engines introduced in 1984
were giving less than satisfactory performance in the field, almost certainly leading to high
warranty costs, coupled with the news that losses had again been generated during the
previous year, emphasized the firm’s increasingly unsound position. With Gardner clearly on
the verge of collapse, the management’s announcement that they intended to introduce
further redundancies could have surprised few. However, as the fervent exchange of
recriminations and reproaches that took place shortly thereafter confirm, it evoked an angry
response from the employees’ representatives.384
Such discord notwithstanding, the Gardner management persevered with their increasingly
ineffectual strategy, explaining in April 1985 that they intended to produce ‘a narrower range
of [engine] components’ at Patricroft, while subcontracting the rest to outside firms. Illogically
anticipating that this would ‘Improve the quality of all Gardner products’ they also implausibly
expressed their belief that it would ‘Ensure that … engines … are produced at substantially
lower unit costs than current unit costs’. Perhaps more revealing, however, was the oblique
but clear reference to the AMS made in their assertion that this strategy would ensure that
more use would be made of ‘… those facilities in which a heavy investment has been made’.
Referring to the disorder that their methods had led to as ‘teething problems’, they expected
that there would still be ‘… many changes in manufacturing methods, systems and
manufacturing control, [and in] systems of quality control’. While those employees that were
selectively retained would be urged to make every effort to adapt, others would be
383 ‘… the AMS is only used for 56% of a single shift per week and is, therefore, directly affecting
the profitability of the Company’. Communication from C. N. McKellen, Gardner Production
Engineering Manager, August 1984; Most diesel engine producers made the complete
engine block in a single, cast iron, structure. See Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 10
December 1979; Communication from C. N. McKellen, Gardner Production Engineering
Manager, August 1984; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 9 July 1984; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 23
November 1984; Peter Chadwick, Bolton to Maurice Halton, Horwich, 16 March 2004.
384 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 9 January 1985; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 18 January 1985;
Minutes of Conference dated 21 February 1985; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 22 February 1985;
Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 28 February 1985; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 5 March 1985;
Gardner management statement dated 5 March 1985; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 8 March
1985; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 14 March 1985; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 15 March 1985;
Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 21 March 1985; D. Oswald, Patricroft, to R. Robinson, Patricroft, 28
March 1985; R. Robinson, Patricroft, to The Gardner Board of Directors, Patricroft, 28 March
1985; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 9 April 1985; also Edge, Legendary Engineering, p. 204.
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encouraged to accept jobs with subcontractors.385
During the next few months, notwithstanding a much-reduced level of order intake,
Gardner’s increasing difficulties in meeting delivery schedules began to oblige long-standing
customers to turn to the firm’s main competitors. Against a background of almost constant
change, personnel were transferred to the AMS section, the volume of components
subcontracted to outside firms was increased significantly, more sections were closed down,
and several more machines were transferred to subcontractors. If and when the AMS was
able to produce the additional components is not known, but it is clear that the
subcontracting aspect of the management’s strategy was generally disastrous. Many bought-
out components, having failed to pass goods inward inspection, were returned to suppliers
for rectification or scrapping, while others, having passed inspection, were nevertheless
causing engines to fail on test, necessitating disassembly and re-build. Some subcontractors
declared themselves bankrupt, leaving Gardner encumbered with stocks of substandard
components. Under such conditions it was inevitable that the firm’s reputation would worsen
and that its commercial viability would thereby be threatened. Thus, by August, it was
revealed that, according to the management’s estimates, Gardner’s share of the UK market
for proprietary diesel engines had fallen to less that two per cent.386
Eventually and, under such circumstance, inevitably, the situation at Gardner attracted the
attention of the Hawker Siddeley Group board of directors who, in October 1985, informed
the Works Committee that they were no longer willing to ‘support a loss-making firm like
Gardner’, and a decision would be made before Christmas regarding its future.387 It is
doubtful if anyone concerned failed to appreciate the unmistakable implications of this terse
and unadorned communication. Clearly, whatever the details of this decision would be, it
would bring Hawker Siddeley’s hapless association with Gardner to an end. Unlike the
meeting of a few months earlier, the minutes of a discussion between the Gardner
management and the employees’ representatives held shortly thereafter reveal a general
atmosphere of resigned despondency. With Gardner on the threshold of failure, only the
senior managers found it appropriate to indulge themselves in vain retrospection. If,
complained the Managing Director A. B. H. Davies, ‘… we [presumably Hawker Siddeley]
had … invested [fourteen million pounds] in a Building Society …’ instead of spending it on
385 Memorandum of Agreement between L. Gardner and Sons and the CSEU, 16 April 1985, ref.
SBL/CE; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 16 April 1985; Carl Lingard, Inverbeg, to Maurice Halton,
Horwich, 20 September 2003.
386 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 14 March 1985; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 25 April 1985; Gardner
management statement dated 7 June 1985; F. Mann, Patricroft to R. Robinson, Patricroft,
Internal Memorandum, ‘Technology Changes - Components Transfer to AMS’, 13 June 1985,
ref. FM/CE; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 13 June 1985; Gardner Management communication in
response to wages and conditions claim dated 27 June 1985; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 23
July 1985; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 24 July 1985; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 19 August
1985; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 19 September 1985; Minutes of an external conference dated
7 October 1985.
387 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 22 October 1985; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 22 October 1985.
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Gardner then ‘we’ would have made a profit instead of a loss.388
Although no official announcement was made, over the next few weeks it became clear that
Hawker Siddeley was attempting to sell Gardner as a going concern and to this end, the
firm’s fixed costs were being cut back to the bare minimum. Announcements that the
workforce would be reduced to 480, or half of its current number, was followed by the
closure of several more sections of the already much downgraded manufacturing facilities.389
By mid-January 1986, rumours were circulating that a prospective buyer had been found,
and that negotiations had reached a critical stage.390 Shortly thereafter, the Salford local
press reported that a group of executives representing Perkins Engines of Peterborough had
recently visited the Patricroft works, suggesting that a takeover by that firm was imminent.391
While refusing to reveal the name of the potential buyer, the management confirmed that
negotiations were indeed taking place and, in order to advance the possibility of a successful
outcome, the size of the workforce would be reduced by a further 300 by June.392 Having
disposed of these matters with virtually no resistance from the employees, Hawker Siddeley
revealed that Gardner would become a subsidiary of Perkins on the last day of April 1986.393
Little is known of the few years between the Perkins takeover and the final extinction of L.
Gardner and Sons. Certainly, no trade union records exist that cover this time, and nor are
Perkins in any way disposed to disclose more than elementary information. Nevertheless, it
is clear that few, if any, Gardner diesel engines emerged from Patricroft after 1986. It can
therefore justifiably be asserted that the departure of Hawker Siddeley signalled the end of
the once reputable, profitable and successful family firm founded 120 earlier by a young
mechanic from Liverpool.
VI Analysis
The most surprising aspect of Hawker Siddeley’s acquisition of Gardner is their observable
lack of preparation. Between the departure of Clayton Flint and the arrival of A. B. H. Davies,
no one appears to have been placed in overall charge of the Patricroft factory and, as a
result, interdepartmental coordination seems to have broken down and production became
seriously imbalanced. Moreover, there appears to have been little improvement even after
388 Minutes of a Meeting between the Gardner Management and Trade Union Officials dated 30
October 1985; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 31 October 1985; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 7
November 1985.
389 Minutes of a Meeting between the Gardner Management and Trade Union Officials dated 30
October 1985; Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 31 October 1985; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 7
November 1985; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 15 November 1985; J. M. Griffiths (Gardner
Production Executive), Patricroft to R. Robinson, Patricroft, 6 December 1985.
390 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 17 December 1985; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 14 January 1986.
391 ‘Gardners: New Buyers Emerge?’, Eccles and Irlam Journal, 23 January 1986, p. 1.
392 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 18 February 1986; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 20 February 1986;
Management Notice to Gardner Employees, 24 February 1986.
393 Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 27 February 1986; Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 19 March 1986; Shop
Stewards’ Minutes, 16 April 1986.
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the appointment of Davies, whose main concern was clearly the acquisition of new
technologically advanced machinery and computer systems. Thus, as the new management
concentrated on medium- and long-term considerations, the day-to-day running of Gardner
became increasingly disorganized.
Seemingly oblivious to these conditions, the new management’s explicit agenda was largely
centred on change, particularly to Gardner’s fundamental approach to the production of
diesel engines. The first aspect of their strategy, which involved a reversal of the established
policy of manufacturing as much as possible internally, began tacitly immediately following
the Hawker Siddeley takeover. As the workforce shrank due to natural wastage, the level of
work subcontracted to outside firms gradually increased, rising exponentially thereafter in
direct proportion with a series of redundancy programmes. The second aspect was overt, in
that the new management soon made in known that they intended to replace the firm’s 'old
and outdated plant’ with ‘modern manufacturing technology’.394
However, while both of these approaches are fundamentally sound, they require careful
preparation and controlled implementation. Firms that subcontract a significant volume of
their components necessarily develop different types of quality control and expedition
systems than those needed by firms that prefer to retain such work ‘in-house’. Furthermore,
in order to maintain a balanced supply of components, the application of more productive
plant requires careful consideration in order to avoid the creation of ‘islands of automation’,
which, while solving one production bottleneck, simply create others ‘down the line’.395
Ultimately, however, because the Gardner management neglected to realize either of these
essential measures, they failed to safeguard the firm’s most important attributes: its
reputation for high-quality, reliable, and fuel-efficient diesel engines.
The effective utilization of FMS depended heavily on sound basic management functions
such as production planning and organization in the workplace, qualities that were evidently
absent at Gardner after the Hawker Siddeley takeover. In the end, the AMS failed because it
could reliably produce neither the engine component it was designed for, nor any of the
others that its suppliers undoubtedly claimed it could. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the
fact that it had been acquired by the ineffective management that they themselves had
imposed upon the firm, Hawker Siddeley insisted that Gardner repay the loan that had been
advanced for its purchase.
The system of outsourcing or subcontracting component production to outside firms had
394 Joint Shop Stewards’ Minutes, 9 February 1978; Minutes of the Joint Consultative Committee
- Works Meeting dated 8 July 1981; Lewchuk, ‘The Motor Vehicle Industry’, in Elbaum and
Lazonick, Decline of the British Economy, p. 138; on some of the perceived drawbacks of
outsourcing see Lloyd-Jones and Lewis, Alfred Herbert, pp. 78 – 79.
395 ‘If the initial motivation [to purchase FMS] had not been to improve product delivery, it is
probable that the FMS which was selected would not be able to produce all of the key
components which were affecting product delivery. Therefore, although the FMS might
improve the delivery of individual components, it would not improve product delivery’.
Primrose, Investment, pp. 52 – 53; also Black, Factory with a Future, p. 46.
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been in use in Britain for many years as an established means of reducing direct costs or of
accessing expertise that would not otherwise be available. Its advantages were well-known
to Japanese automotive firms whose innovative ‘kanban’ or ‘Just in Time’ systems had, by
the 1970s, been refined and disseminated to their subcontractors with whom they formed
especially close relationships.396 However, while Gardner had routinely purchased a small
number of discrete units from specialist suppliers, they rarely subcontracted individual
engine components and during Clayton Flint’s period in office very little of this type of
outsourcing had taken place. In 1978, therefore, no ‘kanban’ type co-operative relationships
existed with outside firms, at least to the extent that would allow outsourcing to be rapidly
increased without the likelihood of negative repercussions.
It is difficult to establish a reasonable explanation, given the alternative opportunities that
ostensibly existed within the Hawker Siddeley Group, either for the seemingly arbitrary
selection of subcontractors for the production of individual components, or for the
outsourcing of some complete engines. At that time Hawker Siddeley controlled both
Mirrlees and R. A. Lister, both of which were experienced in diesel technology and may well,
therefore, have had well-developed outsourcing systems. Nevertheless, the Gardner
management does not appear to have sought their co-operation or advice. Moreover,
component outsourcing seems to have developed as a reaction to events, rather than as
part of a coherent long-term strategy, and it is clear that by the end of 1979 some negative
effects of this policy were beginning to damage the firm’s relationship with its customers.
As the effects of the 1980 recession began to impinge on Gardner’s trade, the
management’s claim that the fall in sales was due to the Gardner product being too
expensive and underpowered may have been to some extent justified. However, although by
the middle of 1981 it had become clear that the firm was losing its reputation as a supplier of
superior and reliable engines, at no stage do the management appear to have linked this
development with a need to improve quality control and resolve logistical failings. Instead of
addressing these elementary problems, they proceeded to redesign the range of engines in
order to make them easier to manufacture and to increase further the volume of outsourced
components. Both of these actions fundamentally altered those aspects of the Gardner
product upon which its success had been built, and thus resulted in further losses of market
share and a corresponding deterioration in the firm’s financial performance.
As the crisis at Gardner deepened, efforts to reduce fixed costs became increasingly
unconventional. By the end of 1984, subcontractors were being selected not for their
reliability or their capacity to produce quality components, but for their willingness to employ
396 ‘Japanese firms during the 1970s and 1980s in civilian sectors such as automobiles …have
enhanced their flexibility and improved the quality of their products by turning out components
in small batches “just in time” to meet the demands of rapidly changing production programs.
[and] constructed complex mechanisms for orchestrating collaboration with suppliers and
subcontractors in product development, process improvement, and logistical co-ordination’.
Zeitlin, ‘Flexibility and Mass Production at War’, p. 76; also Daito, ‘Automation and the
organization’, pp. 139 – 178.
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redundant Gardner staff and takeover Gardner machine tools: presumably including some
that the new management had considered to be ‘out of date’. The tragic irony of this situation
is accentuated by the likelihood that it was the failure of the AMS to deliver improvements in
production that induced increased outsourcing, and because it was purchased with what in
reality was a loan from Hawker Siddeley, its high costs and the burdensome level of
repayments exacerbated Gardner’s financial problems. Constrained by these circumstances
to progressively cut overheads, the management introduced a series of redundancy
programmes, which undoubtedly reduced the firm’s ability to manufacture in-house and
necessitated more outsourcing leading to a further loss of control over quality and delivery,
thus generating a spiral of desperation, the eventual outcome of which was inevitable.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
I The First Eighty-Seven Years
The central objective of this thesis was to explore, through the close examination of a single
firm, a variety of issues concerning the British manufacturing engineering industry during the
mid to late twentieth century. The first task, however, was to resolve assumptions of innate,
deep-rooted weaknesses allegedly derived from flawed judgements and misguided attitudes
acquired between Gardner’s late nineteenth-century beginnings and the mid-1950s. In
chapter 2, a concise narrative history of the first eighty-seven years of the firm’s existence,
derived from evidence gathered mainly from primary sources, and a review of secondary
literature, revealed several disparities between Gardner and what is often regarded in the
historiography in economic and business history as a quasi-typical British industrial
enterprise.
The findings of this investigation show that, in the context of twenty-first century free-market
capitalist society, L. Gardner and Sons cannot be considered to have failed at any stage
before 1955. There can be no doubt that Lawrence Gardner’s purpose was to provide an
income and a measure of security for his wife and children, and this he accomplished
admirably. Perhaps the second generation of family managers were more technologically
focused, although it would be difficult to demonstrate that they placed such matters before
the attainment of wealth and status. However, why this should be regarded as a weakness is
hard to understand: unless, of course, it is viewed from the Chandlerian perspective that
making profits was acceptable as long as they were ‘long-term’ and did not take precedence
over ‘increased assets’ and ‘tenure for [non-family] managers and ... workers’ instead.397
Although during his lifetime Lawrence Gardner’s nascent enterprise remained essentially a
jobbing concern, it provided a living for his large and expanding family as well as for a
steadily increasing number of employees, so that by his death in 1890 it had developed into
a substantial business. As the eldest son, and therefore the heir apparent, Thomas Harry
Gardner would naturally have inherited the business when his father died, but it would be
difficult to imagine a person better qualified, either academically or vocationally, to assume
control at that time. Under his stewardship, L. Gardner and Sons became a specialist
manufacturer of internal combustion engines and, despite encountering severe disruptions
brought about by unprecedented macroenvironmental upheavals, its survival and its growth
argue against assertions of failure.
During the administration of the second generation, the Gardner family directors seem to
have systematically acquired a reputation for innovation and high-quality products, as well as
an explicit disdain for American-style mass-production, which they clearly regarded as the
397 See Chandler, Scale and Scope, p. 390.
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antithesis of excellence. Elusive as such perceptions may be, it is clear that, more than
twenty years after the last complete engine left Patricroft, used Gardner diesels are in high
demand, and there can be little doubt that they will continue to be so for some considerable
time to come.398 Such standing and respectability could not have been won easily in the
fiercely competitive and unsentimental environment of the 1930s, when many well-regarded
British enterprises foundered. Perhaps the firm’s most harmful characteristic was a
perceptibly strong aversion to ‘outsiders’ together with a somewhat unconventional ‘line of
succession’ policy that favoured the oldest surviving brother: a system that, after Thomas
Harry’s death in 1937, resulted in a series of relatively elderly chief executives whose
periods in office were consequently very short. Nevertheless, in 1955 the second generation
of Gardner family directors was able to pass on to its successors a firm with a sound
reputation and an established clientele, both in Britain and in many other parts of the world.
II The Third Generation of Family Control
The second task was to establish where and if Gardner failed as a family firm after 1955.
Guided by a preliminary, but detailed, survey of primary source materials, three discrete
case studies were undertaken, each of which investigated a particular crisis during separate,
consecutive periods in the firm’s post-war history. Chapters 3 and 4 examined markets
between 1955 and 1960 and, respectively, workplace industrial relations between 1960 and
1976: chapter 5 examined manufacturing engineering technology between 1977 and 1986.
Although, according to some evaluations, Gardner retained some aspects of family control
throughout the whole period covered by these three case studies, it is clear that the
ownership of the firm changed fundamentally in 1976. For the purpose of this analysis,
therefore, 1976 is viewed as the year that Gardner ceased to be a family firm.
In contrast to Thomas Harry Gardner’s fortuitous inheritance of control in 1890, the
appointment of Hugh in 1955 was probably based on a perceived Hobson’s choice. Although
Lawrence Gardner’s sons appear to have enthusiastically assumed a sense of attachment,
duty and responsibility in relation to the family business, the third generation seem to have
behaved somewhat differently. It is clear that, at least in his youth and early adulthood, Hugh
Gardner enjoyed certain middle-class privileges that were not conducive to diligence and
learning. In fact, none of the founder’s grandchildren appears to have been as keen on
gaining the sound academic foundation that could have been the basis of further
development. Indeed, some of them had little or no interest in working in the family business,
and those that did appear to have been content simply to wait for the opportunities that
would inevitably emerge as their relatives succumbed to old age. In the meantime, at least
for one or two Gardners, the life of a ‘gentleman’, of irresponsibility, thrills and pleasure-
seeking as well as that of a ‘player’, offered an attractive alternative.
Fundamentally, it seems more than likely that the Gardner family shareholders’ acceptance
398 See, for example, http://www.gardner-enthusiast.com/.
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of Hugh as CEO was based mainly on kinship, coupled with a belief that the favourable
market conditions of the mid-1950s would continue long enough to safeguard the firm’s long-
term security. If not, it seems reasonable to assume that the presence of specialized
professionals in two of the most important areas of management would provide sufficient
support to overcome any major problems that may emerge. However, ensuring the
availability of expert advice is no guarantee of its being taken, especially under
circumstances in which the protagonist believes that he has, or at least should have, full
control of any given situation. Moreover, while the shareholders would almost certainly have
expected that Hugh, as a family ‘insider’, would safeguard their interests, it is clear that he
placed far more importance on his personal status.399
Markets
Although no evidence was found to suggest that he personally supervised the everyday
running of the plant, it seems likely that once Hugh Gardner had established his authority no
decisions relating to operational matters progressed without receiving his explicit sanction.
There are, however, indications that Hugh’s fascination with technical matters resulted in the
firm becoming what Kotler terms a ‘product-oriented organization’ in which managers
concentrate on the quality of the product rather than on the needs of the customers and thus
develop ‘marketing myopia’.400 Perhaps it was this disposition, as well as a not entirely
unfounded conviction that Gardner engines were ‘the best’, that led the management to
believe that the it’s market position was invulnerable and for that reason it discounted the
significance of a threat made observable by forewarnings of impending and inevitable
change.
Whether the failure to act when action was called for was a result of Hugh Gardner’s
autocratic control or the considered outcome of a collective managerial decision, it was an
inexcusable error for which the chairman must be held responsible. While the loss of
revenue would have been significant in itself, the effects of Gardner’s ‘myopia’ undermined
its position as market leader, creating at the same time an unexpected and valuable
opportunity for a much larger, and impressively resourced, American competitor. Moreover,
although a remedy was quickly found, the speed and efficiency of its implementation
highlights the flexibility of the plant and the proficiency of the employees and thus
emphasizes the illogicality of management’s inertia.
Unfortunately, the events of the late 1950s are not the only evidence to suggest that the
399 For example, ‘… problems caused by deep-seated personality characteristics cannot
generally be combated by superimposing “rational” techniques on the organization. … a
paranoid executive will not become less so just because he is given a better information
system.’ Kets de Vries and Miller, Neurotic Organization, p. 175.
400 ’Hugh Gardner … and his brother, Mr. John, have made it their life work to perfect the engine
…’ and ‘… Mr. Hugh’s office [was] littered with valves, pistons and two engineers’ drawing
boards in a workmanlike chaos …’ Faith, ‘Mr. Hugh’; ‘Many … managers are caught up in a
love affair with their product and fail to appreciate that the market may be less ‘turned on’ and
may even be moving in a different direction’. Kotler, Marketing Management, pp. 17 – 19.
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Gardner management was afflicted with ‘market myopia’. In 1955, the firm offered a
relatively wide range of engines to a reasonably diverse variety of customers in a fairly broad
spectrum of markets. At that time, sales to automotive customers accounted for around sixty-
one per cent of the firm’s business, a proportion that increased steadily thereafter until, by
1975, it had reached ninety per cent. During the same period, total annual non-automotive
engine production fell from 1,781 units to 399 units, while the number of independent HCV
chassis builders shrank from eight to four, the others having been absorbed by the Leyland
Motor Corporation. In addition to these changes, Britain’s membership of the European
Union in 1973 soon led to imports from the large HCV suppliers of France, Germany, Italy
and the Netherlands, on top of the already fierce competition from erstwhile EFTA builders
like Scania and Volvo. There were, on the other hand, clear opportunities in non-automotive
diesel engine markets where much of Perkins’ rapid growth had been achieved, and for
which Foden, one of Gardner’s principal customers, produced a two-stroke, twelve-cylinder
210 horsepower engine.401 Moreover, although such short-sightedness began during
Gardner’s era as a family firm, as part of the Hawker Siddeley group it became even more
pronounced so that, by 1986, the automotive industry seems to have been considered as the
only market worth competing in.
Workplace Industrial Relations
Government interference, archaic arbitration procedures, overcomplicated payment systems,
confrontational shop stewards, and weak management are among the most commonly cited
causes of dysfunctional industrial relations in the 1960s and 1970s. In the case of Gardner,
however, only the latter stands out, but here the weakness stemmed not from a lack of
power, but from a pusillanimous aversion to interact with ordinary employees. Whereas, in
the pre-war era and in the immediate post-war years, the most senior Gardner family
directors had taken an active role in workplace industrial relations, there are no records of
either Hugh or John Gardner continuing this tradition after 1955. Responsibility for such
matters were entrusted to William Gordon Thompstone, a non-family works director who,
although he was not an engineer, was well educated and experienced in the legal aspects of
trade union and employment affairs. Nevertheless, the influence of Hugh Gardner’s
customary approach is unmistakable. In particular, his habit of taking disputes to the verge of
conflict in the hope of forcing the opposition to make concessions is inferred by the number
of times the management abandoned negotiations and their frequent refusals to return
without preconditions.
While government intervention may have had an indirect influence, no evidence was found
to suggest that incomes legislation adversely affected industrial relations at Gardner. Nor
was there any reluctance, at least among the shop stewards, either to adhere to agreements
reached through the Provisions for the Avoidance of Disputes, or to make use of the
401 ‘Engines At The National Boat Show’, The Engineer, 28 January 1955, p.140; ‘Engineering,
Marine and Welding Exhibition’, The Engineer, 23 September 1955, p. 433.
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somewhat less-formal local system when this was more appropriate. Although the firm’s
piecework system was ostensibly rather complicated, it appears to have been well
understood by managers and workers and it was not therefore a specific cause of disputes.
Moreover, although the rules of the Manchester Piecework Agreement were often exploited
as a means of persuasion, the management did not propose to abandon PBR as long as
Gardner remained a family firm.
Although the influence of the Gardner shop stewards appears to have been fairly significant,
most were inclined to use their power to mediate, while the few that agitated for conflict
received only limited support, at least until the events leading up to the strikes of 1972 and
1973. By then, the moderate shop stewards had made a series of exceptional efforts to
arbitrate, many of which were against the express instructions of the full-time district officials.
However, the Gardner management’s failure to support the moderates’ position effectively
nullified their actions and delivered them into the hands of the militants. With their downfall,
most moderate trade union activity at Gardner seems to have ended and with it, the
management’s position collapsed. Thus, when the factory reopened following the prolonged
1973 dispute, the settlement was based on terms more-or-less dictated by the District
Committee and a group of new, hard-line, shop stewards. Although thereafter at least some
apparently sincere attempts to reconcile differences were made, the relationship between
union officials and the management remained detached, a situation that continued until
1975, when most of the Board was replaced and Hugh Gardner had stepped down.
The thirty-month hiatus that followed the appointment of Clayton Flint, especially when
contrasted with the sporadic dissonance that characterized Hugh Gardner’s period in office,
needs little analysis. Without doubt an exceptionally capable manager and a shrewd and
resourceful negotiator, like Thompstone, Flint was a law graduate who had chosen to work in
industry. Unlike Thompstone, however, he was evidently unwilling and almost certainly far
too expensive to act as Hugh Gardner’s facilitator. If, in retrospect, Clayton Flint made the
establishment of peaceful industrial relations at Gardner seem easy, it is probably because
of the effectiveness and pragmatism of his approach compared to the redundant
authoritarian policies of his predecessors.
With the benefit of hindsight, of course, it is clear that Flint’s brief was to prepare Gardner for
sale to the highest bidder. Nevertheless, there is no evidence to suggest that his handling of
workplace industrial relations was based on compromise or duplicity and all the
improvements he was able to bring about were perfectly genuine. However, in view of the
uncertainties prevailing in the mid-1970s, it is not surprising that investors sought to
safeguard their financial interests and in this, other than their inherited control of an
engineering business, the Gardner shareholders were typical. Thus, in 1976, they decided
that their investment in the family firm would be better placed elsewhere: and besides, in all
fairness to them, they could not have foreseen that an established and prosperous
engineering group like Hawker Siddeley would mishandle matters so disastrously.
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Although, as the evidence presented in the first two empirical chapters revealed, Hugh
Gardner made two damaging errors, he coped reasonably well with most of the
macroenvironmental shifts that occurred between 1955 and 1975, and for most of this period
the business made profits. To speculate on possible alternatives would involve a
meaningless exercise in counterfactual conjecture and supposition, but it is sorely tempting
to imagine the potential long-term outcome of a merger with, say, Foden; although perhaps
the legendary aversion to ‘outsiders’ also applied to family members of other family firms.
Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the sale of Gardner to Hawker Siddeley in 1975,
from which the shareholders profited greatly, underscores the firm’s viability at that time and
precludes any allegations that, under Hugh and as a family firm, Gardner was in any way a
failure.
III Hawker Siddeley, the Final Decade
The third case study, narrated in chapter 5, covers the final few years of Gardner’s
existence, during which fundamental changes were made to those aspects of the firm that
had, in the preceding century, been steadily and painstakingly developed. While the delay in
the appointment of the new chief executive may be regarded as evidence of Hawker
Siddeley’s inattentiveness, it would be difficult to exaggerate the incompetence with which
the new managers approached the organization of the Patricroft plant once they eventually
took control. Clearly ensnared by the fallacious perception that ‘new is better’, their only
discernibly prepared strategy was a determination to acquire sophisticated high-technology
equipment without, however, having any clear conception as to how this would further the
firm’s production, let alone its market, goals. The introduction of increased outsourcing, the
other element of their approach, was clearly unplanned and therefore unsystematically
implemented. Moreover, although the increasingly disruptive consequences of both of these
stratagems soon began to adversely influence the firm’s performance in a number of areas,
the management seems to have remained irrationally committed to them.
Manufacturing Engineering Technology
As previously discussed, Gardner’s policy of manufacturing as much of its product as
possible at the Patricroft plant meant that no ‘kanban’ style co-operative relationships existed
with outside firms. Even as a temporary measure, outsourcing created a range of contingent
problems which soon resulted in a chain of events that seriously impaired Gardner’s
relationship with its customers: to pursue it as part of a broad production strategy would have
involved the formation of a group of suppliers whose ‘mentality’ and working practices
complemented Gardner’s needs.402 Clearly, however, the selection of subcontractors
became increasingly based on other, less cogent, criteria, some of which entailed the taking-
on of Gardner staff and the taking-over of Gardner machine tools. It was thus an ad hoc,
402 See Nils Kinch, ‘The Road from Dreams of Mass Production to Flexible Specialization:
American Influences on the Development of the Swedish Automobile Industry, 1920-39’, in
Shiomi and Wada, Fordism Transformed, p. 121.
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partial and fragmented plan, as well as a de facto abdication of management’s ultimate
responsibility for the quality of the product and for customer services.
Although the AMS was not a true FMS, in that it was designed, or at least configured, to
produce only one of the three main engine components, it embodied many of its fundamental
characteristics. In 1980, this technology was relatively new and although there had been
much optimistic speculation regarding its potential, most of this had been generated by
machine tool producers and their publicists, and there had been very little hands-on
experience of its practical efficacy.403 Even if the AMS had been capable of efficiently
producing crankcases, which it apparently was not, this would not have improved the output
of complete engines, and the notion that tangible benefits could be derived from impressing
potential customers through modernistic display was clearly fallacious. Thus, the Gardner
management’s lack of judgement led it into purchasing expensive and untried technology,
which was incapable of enhancing production, partly on the basis that it would, of itself,
advance the firm’s standing with its customers.
Compounding these two fundamentally flawed aspects of business strategy, instead of
widening the firm’s scope, a policy that must surely have suggested itself to them, Hawker
Siddeley illogically chose to focus even more narrowly on a market sector that had already
changed significantly and was promising to become extremely competitive. It is also
apparent that just as the firm became product orientated under Hugh Gardner, during the
Hawker Siddeley era it developed a production oriented concept without, however, achieving
any of the goals that such organizations, albeit misguidedly, attain.404 In the end, the
downfall of Gardner occurred not as a middling-sized, flexible, family managed, family-
owned firm, but as a part of a large multination corporation, ostensibly administered by
university trained ‘professionals’.
IV Implications for Further Research
In the mid-1960s, L. Gardner and Sons was one of Britain’s eleven-hundred middling-sized
manufacturing establishments. At over three billion pounds, the combined annual turnover of
these firms comprised slightly less than a third of the value of total manufacturing output, and
together they employed more than twenty-six per cent of the population working in
manufacturing. Although an ‘establishment’ is not necessarily the same thing as a firm, it is
probable that many, if not most, of these were, like Gardner, single-site companies. Clearly,
therefore, and imprecise definitions of ‘industrial’ and ‘manufacturing’ enterprises
notwithstanding, this section of British business was, at that time, extremely important to the
economy. In the somewhat unfamiliar macroenvironmental conditions of the early twenty-first
403 ‘In the UK there are two complete FMS about which sufficient is known to justify their
inclusion in a European survey’. Brian Kellock, ‘FMS: flexibility is the byword’, Machinery and
Production Engineering, 13 May 1981, pp. 52 – 53.
404 ‘The production concept holds that consumers will favour those products that are widely
available and low in cost. … this type of management is open to the charge of impersonality
and consumer insensitivity’. Kotler, Marketing Management, p. 17.
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century, as firms like General Motors and Mitsubishi languish and fail, it is clear that
middling-sized firms may well assume a more important position in advanced economies in
the not-too-distant future. Clearly, therefore, in order to understand the choices facing
industry at this time, it is necessary to clarify the choices made in the past, and for this
reason, but not only for this reason, further research is necessary and the histories of such
firms should be written.405
It is possible that some historians have tended to overlook firms like L. Gardner and Sons
either because they did not become as large as some American corporations, or because
they are perceived to have acquired characteristics in their creation that made their eventual
failure inevitable. On the one hand, it seems highly unlikely that middling-sized firms neither
existed nor succeeded in America, while on the other hand the fact that Gardner thrived for
well over a century casts doubt on the inherent vulnerability hypothesis. Clearly, as Chapter
2 of this thesis has strongly suggested, postulations of innate deficiencies stem from
assumptions of decline, which are themselves largely derived from assertions relating to the
somewhat nebulous hypothesis of the (first) Great Depression of the late nineteenth century.
Similarly, the commonly expressed perception that the late-nineteenth-century British
engineering industry was hampered by a shortage of trained and qualified people derives
from the concept of causality. Again, the evidence revealed in this thesis indicates that
Thomas Harry Gardner was not exceptional, and that, at least in the Manchester area, there
were outstanding opportunities for the education and training of young engineers. The
proposition that because institutions like Owens College were not ‘proper’ universities and
could not, therefore, produce proficient engineers is not sustained in this thesis. Moreover,
as previously mentioned, sufficient contextual and contemporary data exists that seems to
suggest that Owens was a ‘seedbed’ of proficient engineers who, like Thomas Harry
Gardner, became successful in their subject and worked both in industry and in education; a
prospect that, if properly investigated, may shed light on the failing engineering industry
allegory.
Advocates of the decline theory have sought, and in doing so found, a variety of
explanations for its advent, some of which are so unreasonable as to be almost humorous.
Nevertheless, the familiar catalogue of shortcomings that have become fixated in aspects of
the historiography in economic and business history are regularly and repeatedly presented
and extended to encompass periods much later than the two or three decades that most
economic historians view as the years of decline. Thus, a range of imprecise and implied
perceptions that surround the ‘family firm’ shape the histories of British industrial enterprise,
405 Report of the Census of Production, 1963, Table 8 in Morgan, Economics, p. 212; Zoltan J.
Acs, Bo Carlsson and Charlie Karlsson, eds., Entrepreneurship, Small and Medium-Sized
Enterprises and the Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Bob Rijkers,
Caterina Ruggeri Laderchi and Francis Teal ‘Who Benefits from Promoting Small and
Medium Scale Enterprises? Some Empirical Evidence from Ethiopia’ Policy Research
Working Paper, The World Bank, Africa Region, Poverty Reduction and Economic
Management Department, May 2008; also Piore and Sabel, Second Industrial, passim.
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assumptions that can only be addressed through comprehensive investigations of the history
of individual firms. It is indeed unfortunate that some scholars elected to characterize such
‘business biographies’ as ‘a tradition which, at its best, is a triumph of narrative skill, honest
to the facts of the individual case, but at its worst is narrow, insular and antiquarian'.
Presumably, it is possible to accept the former qualities, while narrowness, insularity, and
antiquarianism are fairly good descriptions of the type of imprecise and value-loaded
terminology regularly found in the many comparative studies that are clearly based on
‘insights derived from [a] selective and partial view of the historical process’.406
Ends
406 Hannah, Management Strategy, p. vii; Du Boff and Herman, ‘Chandler’s New Business’, in
Supple, The Rise, p. 322 – 323.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1, Gardner Machine Tool Acquisitions, 1905 – 1918
Purchased No. Make and Description Origin
19/09/1905 1 Churchill No. 9 Prentice Drilling Machine British
01/02/1906 1 Reed 6 inch x 5 inch Centre Lathe British
10/02/1906 1 Betts 7 feet Vertical Boring Mill extended to 91.5 inches swing American
30/08/1906 1 Bullard 30 inch Boring Mill American
13/09/1906 1 Biermatzki Gear Cutter German
12/11/1906 1 Lucas No. 1 Horizontal Boring Machine British
12/11/1906 1 Morse 30 inch x 4 inch Grinder N.K.
15/03/1907 1 Redman 30 inch Treble Gearing and Boring Lathe British
25/03/1907 1 Cincinnati No. 4 Plain Milling Machine American
25/03/1907 1 Cochrane - Bly 4 inch Sawing Machine N.K.
25/03/1907 1 Warner and Swasey No. 2 Turret Screw Machine American
25/03/1907 1 Warner and Swasey Hollow Spindle Hexagon Turret Lathe American
26/03/1907 4 Cincinnati Plain Milling Machine American
26/03/1907 1 Potter and Johnston 7 inch x 14 inch Chucking Lathe British
04/04/1907 1 Asquith 3 feet x 6 feet Radial Drilling Machine with additional flat base plate. British
04/04/1907 1 Becker No. 5B Vertical Milling Machine with Rotary Table American
04/04/1907 2 Herbert Drilling Machines with Tapping Attachments British
05/04/1907 2 Ludwig Loewe 3/32A Turret Lathes German
05/04/1907 3 Ludwig Loewe 3/32A Turret Lathes German
05/04/1907 1 6.5 inch Centre Feather Lathe N.K.
05/04/1907 1 Parkinson No. 7 Sensitive Drilling Machine with Hand and Treadle Feed British
09/04/1907 1 Herbert 9 inch centres x 9 feet 6 inch bed sliding and screw cutting lathe British
10/04/1907 1 Barnes 3 Spindle Drilling Machine American
09/07/1907 1 Herbert 10.5 inch centres x 11 feet 6 inch bed sliding and screw cutting lathe British
11/07/1907 1 Pittsburgh Machine Co. Second Hand 7 inch a 6 feet American Sliding,Surfacing and Screw-cutting Lathe 'Gem'. American
16/05/1908 1 Asquith 3 feet x 6 feet Radial Drilling Machine British
30/07/1908 1 Herbert No. 1 Patent Hexagon Turret Lathe for work up to 1.5 inch x 21 inch British
02/10/1908 4 Churchill Horizontal Drilling Machines British
04/11/1908 1 Ward 7 inch Centre Lathe British
20/04/1909 1 Binns Horizontal Boring Machine British
07/06/1909 1 Robinson Planing and Thicknessing Machine British
17/11/1909 1 Herbert 6 inch Centres Gap Bed Lathe British
21/03/1910 1 Meyer and Schmidt No. 2B Universal Milling Machine American
27/07/1910 1 Herbert No. 1 Patent Hexagon Turret Lathe British
30/07/1910 1 Bullard Vertical Boring and Turning Mill with Vertical Milling Attachment American
07/09/1910 1 Churchill 6 inch x 34 inch Plain Grinding Machine British
07/12/1910 1 Barnes 3 Spindle Drilling Machine American
19/12/1910 1 Baush 5 feet Radial Drilling Machine German
19/12/1910 1 Baush 37 inch Boring Mill German
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19/12/1910 1 Bullard 30 inch Boring Mill American
19/12/1910 1 Hendey 15 inch Shaper American
19/12/1910 1 Hendey 7 inch Lathe American
19/12/1910 2 8 inch Reed Lathes N.K.
19/12/1910 1 Telig Sonnenthal 16 inch Shaper German
07/02/1911 1 2 feet Planing Machine N.K.
08/02/1911 3 Barnes Sliding Head Drilling Machines American
15/02/1911 4 Redman 10.5 inch Sliding and Surfacing Lathes British
16/02/1911 1 Redman 14.5 inch Sliding and Surfacing Lathe British
20/02/1911 1 Churchill 10 inch x 60 inch Plain Grinding Machine British
20/02/1911 4 Churchill Horizontal Drilling and Tapping Machines British
20/02/1911 1 Cleveland New Model Automatic Screw Machine American
22/02/1911 1 Bardon and Oliver No. 2 Screw Machine (Lathe) American
22/02/1911 1 Churchill 20 inch Drilling Machine British
22/02/1911 1 Cincinnati Milling Machine with Rotary Table and Vertical Milling Head American
22/02/1911 1 Kempsmith Un-geared Milling Machine American
22/02/1911 1 MASS 20 inch Disc Grinder N.K.
22/02/1911 1 Segourney Drilling Machine American
03/03/1911 1 Brown and Sharpe No. 2 Surface Grinder American
03/03/1911 1 Cincinnati No. 2 High Power Milling Machine American
03/03/1911 1 Newlon Second Hand Milling Machine British
03/03/1911 1 Potter and Johnston No. 6A Automatic Chucking Lathe with 15 inch ScrollChuck American
15/03/1911 1 4 inch stroke Slotting Machine N.K.
18/03/1911 1 Redman Planing Machine 5 feet 6 inches wide x 4 feet high British
22/03/1911 1 Butler 12 inch stroke Slotting Machine British
26/04/1911 1 Brainard Second Hand No. 7 Milling Machine American
24/05/1911 2 Becker Brainard No. 3 Milling Machines American
24/05/1911 1 Churchill 4 inch x 24 inch Plain Grinding Machine British
24/05/1911 3 Churchill No. 1 Drilling Machines British
24/05/1911 1 Cincinnati No. 2 Milling Machine American
24/05/1911 1 Potter and Johnston No. 6A Chucking Lathe American
24/05/1911 1 Potter and Johnston No. 5A Chucking Lathe American
24/05/1911 3 Redman 8.5 inch x 8 feet bed Sliding and Surfacing Lathes British
24/05/1911 6 Redman 6.5 inch x 6 feet bed Sliding and Surfacing Lathes British
25/05/1911 1 Bullard Second Hand Boring Mill American
25/05/1911 1 Cleveland Second Hand 1.25 inch Automatic Screw Machine American
25/05/1911 2 Lang 24 inch Surfacing and Boring Lathes British
25/05/1911 4 Rego 20 in Drilling Machines N.K.
25/05/1911 1 Schuchardt and Schutte No. 0 Automatic Spur and Spiral Gear HobbingMachine German
31/05/1911 4 Type S.L. Hand Lathes 6 inch centres x 4 feet bed N.K.
31/05/1911 1 Redman Second Process Lathe British
20/06/1911 1 3 feet 6 inch Radial Drilling Machine N.K.
20/06/1911 1 5 inch x 5 feet Centre Lathe N.K.
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04/07/1911 1 Ward Two Spindle Sensitive Drilling Machine British
13/07/1911 4 Redman 10.5 inch raised to 12.5 inch centres x 14 feet bed sliding andsurfacing centre lathes. British
18/07/1911 1 Bullard Second Hand 34 inch Boring Mill American
03/08/1911 1 Colburn No. 1 Key Seating Machine American
16/08/1911 2 Bullard Second Hand 34 inch Boring Mills American
16/08/1911 1 Churchill 12 inch x 2.5 inch Ring Grinding Machine with Magnetic chuck. British
16/08/1911 1 Herbert Second Hand Centre Grinding Machine American
23/08/1911 1 Asquith 3 feet 6 inch Radial Drilling Machine British
26/08/1911 1 Becker Lincoln No. 7 Milling Machine American
16/10/1911 1 Herbert Four Spindle Patent Ball Bearing Machine British
25/10/1911 1 Clark Second Hand 6 inch x 5 feet Sliding and Surfacing Lathe N.K.
25/10/1911 4 Clark Second Hand 6 inch x 5 feet Sliding and Surfacing Lathes N.K.
25/10/1911 4 Warner and Swasey No. 2 Turret Lathe American
18/11/1911 1 Becker Second Hand No. 3 Vertical Milling Machine German
18/11/1911 1 Herbert Second Hand No. 3 Automatic Screw Machine British
29/01/1912 1 Potter and Johnston No. 5A Manufacturing Automatic Chucking Machine American
05/02/1912 1 Oliver Surface Planer and Column British
08/02/1912 1 Internal Grinding Machine German
23/02/1912 1 Oliver Oilstone Grinding Machine British
01/08/1912 2 Herbert No. 1 Hexagon Turret Lathes British
01/08/1912 1 Warner and Swasey No. 1 Turret Screw Machine 5/8 inch Diameter x 4 feetLong American
10/09/1912 1 Churchill Plain Grinding Machine 6 inch x 34 inch British
10/09/1912 1 Redman 7 inch Straight Bed Cutting Off and Shaving Lathe 4 feet 4 incheslong for Bars up to 1.75 inch Diameter British
16/09/1912 1 Schuchardt and Schutte No. 1 Patent Gear Hobbing Machine German
21/09/1912 1 Herbert Ball Bearing Sensitive Single Spindle Drilling Machine British
30/09/1912 1 Butler 24 inch Stroke Crank Shaping Machine British
30/09/1912 1 Butler 10 inch x 10 feet General Purpose Lathe British
28/12/1912 1 Lucas Universal Boring Machine American
26/06/1913 1 Berment – Niles Motor Driven Boring, Turning and Screw Cutting Lathe 25inch centres x 36 feet bed American
31/12/1913 1 Robinson 18 inch Combined Surface Planing and Thicknessing Machine British
27/04/1914 1 Sensitive Drilling Machine Type C14 N.K.
25/01/1915 1 Allen 8.5 inch x 8 feet 9 inch Sliding and Surfacing Lathe British
25/01/1915 1 Allen 5.5 inch x 8 feet Sliding and Surfacing Lathe British
25/01/1915 1 Heald Second Hand No. 75 Internal Grinding Machine American
25/01/1915 1 LaPointe No. 3 Broaching Machine American
24/03/1915 1 Herbert 2.25 inch x 24 inch x 12 inch Swing Flat Turret Lather British
04/05/1915 1 Churchill Standard 4 inch x 24 inch Plain Grinding Machine with No. 0 Drive British
03/06/1915 1 Norton 14 inch x 72 inch Plain Grinding Machine American
09/07/1915 1 14 inch x 6 feet Quick Standard Type Lathes N.K.
09/07/1915 2 14 inch x 6 feet Champion Standard Type Lathes N.K.
10/09/1915 1 Polishing Lathe No. 584C 10 inch height of centres, spindle 1.5 inch, 36inches long N.K.
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22/09/1915 1 No. 1.5 National Milling Machine with Back-Gear N.K.
28/09/1915 1 ACME 8 inch Hack Sawing Machine American
28/09/1915 1 Armstrong Blum No. 1 Hack sawing Machine American
01/10/1915 1 Brown and Sharpe 16 inch Gear Cutting Attachment American
17/11/1915 1 Ward 20 inch Stroke 'Steptoe' Back-Geared Shaping Machine British
14/03/1916 1 Churchill No. 12 Internal Grinding Machine British
14/03/1916 1 Churchill No. 2 Internal Grinding Machine British
22/03/1916 1 Churchill Plain Grinding Machine, 24 inch diameter swing, 32 inch diameterwheel, 12 feet Between Centres British
01/05/1916 1 Herbert No. 1 Patent Vertical Milling Machine Capacity 30 inch x 12.5 inch x20 inch height British
18/12/1916 1 Churchill Plain Grinding Machine 22 inch x 120 inch with K. M. CrankshaftEquipment British
19/12/1916 4 Butler 12/14 inch Stroke Double Headed Shaping Machines British
19/12/1916 4 Redman 10.5 inch Raised to 12.5 inch Centres Sliding and Surfacing Lathes British
21/12/1916 1 Norton 16 inch x 72 inch Plain Grinding Machine with Crankshaft Attachment American
21/12/1916 1 Norton 14 inch x 72 inch Plain Grinding Machine with Crankshaft Attachment American
19/02/1917 1 Heald Surface Grinder American
26/05/1917 1 Brown and Sharpe Crankshaft Grinder American
10/01/1918 3 Ward Chucking Lathe British
11/01/1918 1 Grinder N.K.
10/04/1918 1 Herbert No. 3 Combination Turret Lathe British
10/04/1918 1 Herbert No. 3 Combination Turret Lathe British
10/04/1918 1 Herbert No. 9 Combination Turret Lathe British
16/04/1918 1 Churchill 12 inch x 72 inch Model C Plain Grinder British
16/04/1918 1 Churchill 4 inch x 24 inch Model A Plain Grinder British
27/06/1918 1 No. 600 Die Filing Machine N.K.
09/09/1918 1 Churchill 12 inch Piston Ring and Surface Grinder with Magnetic Chuck British
24/09/1918 1 Churchill 12 inch x 36 inch Universal Grinder British
24/09/1918 2 Churchill 12 in x 72 inch Model C Plain Grinder British
24/09/1918 3 Herbert 12 inch/14 inch Stroke x 8 feet Box Bed Double Geared, Self Acting,Double Headed Shaping Machines. British
24/09/1918 6 Redman 10.5 inch Centres Raised to 12.5 inch centres box-end, Straight Bed14 feet length centre lathes British
Source: Firms’ Order Books, The Museum of Science and Industry in Manchester, L. Gardner and Sons
Collection. Archive Ref. MS0185 (paper), Location SM22/32.
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Appendix 2, Tables
Table 1 – Domestic Freight Transport in Great Britain by Mode (billion tonne kilometres)
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
Road 38 38 37 41 46 49 53 55
Rail 35 35 34 30 29 30 29 26
Water 20 22 21 21 21 20 22 24
Total 93 95 92 92 96 99 104 105
% Road 40.86 40.00 40.22 44.57 47.92 49.49 50.96 52.38
Source: Department of Trade and Industry
Table 2 – Road Lengths in Great Britain (miles)
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
Trunk 13,309 13,309 13,311 13.372 13,401 13,580 13,628 13,654
Motorway 0 0 0 0 13 153 219 243
Source: Department of Trade and Industry
Table 3 – United Kingdom Production of HCVs, 1955 to 1962
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
HGVs 24,272 25,353 24,018 30,257 48,907 73,138 75,334 65,394
Buses 9,657 10,500 12,905 15,071 8,596 10,064 9,908 10,878
Total 33,929 35,853 36,923 45,328 57,503 74,953 85,242 76,272
Source: Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, The Motor Industry of Great Britain, World
Automotive Statistics, (London: Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, various annual editions)
Table 4 – United Kingdom Registrations of HGVs, 1956 – 1962
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
2,102 2,753 2,924 3,418 5,265 6,317 6,238
Source: Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, The Motor Industry of Great Britain, World
Automotive Statistics, (London: Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, various annual editions)
Table 5 – Gardner Automotive Engine Sales as Per cent of Total Build, 1956 - 1965
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Total Build 5,033 4,289 3,225 3,793 4,600 4,631 4,508 7,712 4,724 4,505
Auto. Sales 3,414 2,818 2,112 2,713 2,948 3,326 3,610 3,752 3,794 3,562
Per cent Auto. 67.83 65.52 65.49 71.53 64.09 71.82 80.08 79.63 80.31 81.07
Source: Vintage Engine Register quoted in Edge, Legendary Excellence, p. 206
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Appendix 2, Tables (continued)
Table 6 – Gardner Automotive Engine Sales as Per cent of Total Build, 1966 - 1975
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Total Build 4,433 5,021 5,329 5,560 5,707 6,189 5,680 2,937 3,479 3,868
Auto. Sales 3,628 4,168 4,595 4,987 5,155 5,594 5,381 2,555 2,948 3,469
Per cent Auto. 81.84 83.01 86.23 89.69 90.33 90.39 94.74 86.99 84.74 89.68
Source: Vintage Engine Register quoted in Edge, Legendary Excellence, p. 206
Table 7 – Gardner Automotive Engine Sales by Customer, 1955 - 1962
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
Atkinson 419 540 349 327 403 504 590 612
Bristol 417 528 539 515 626 485 533 645
Daimler 167 351 202 152 156 100 271 378
ERF 412 476 436 273 452 509 613 641
Foden 575 712 585 464 603 713 794 762
Guy 696 594 524 275 335 399 238 288
Scammell 85 130 89 49 74 164 191 207
Seddon 0 83 86 57 64 73 96 77
Total 2,771 3,414 2,810 2,112 2,713 2,948 3,326 3,610
Source: Vintage Engine Register quoted in Edge, Legendary Excellence, p. 206
Table 8 – Gardner Automotive Engine Sales as a Per cent of UK HCV Production, 1955 –
1962
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
UK Production 33,929 35,853 36,923 45,328 57,503 74,953 85,242 76,272
Gardner Sales 2,771 3,414 2,818 2,112 2,713 2,948 3,326 3,610
% Gardner 8.17 9.52 7.63 4.66 4.72 3.54 3.90 4.73
Source: Vintage Engine Register quoted in Edge, Legendary Excellence, p. 206; Society of Motor
Manufacturers and Traders, The Motor Industry of Great Britain, World Automotive Statistics, (London:
Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, various annual editions.
Table 9 – Gardner Automotive Engine Sales as a Per cent of UK HCV Production, 1963 –
1970
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
UK Production 124,589 87,559 138,685 136,664 117,725 124,023 149,252 161,945
Gardner Sales 3,752 3,794 3,652 3,628 4,168 4,592 4,987 5,155
% Gardner 3.01 4.33 2.63 2.65 3.54 3.70 3.34 3.18
Source: Vintage Engine Register quoted in Edge, Legendary Excellence, p. 206; Society of Motor
Manufacturers and Traders, The Motor Industry of Great Britain, World Automotive Statistics, (London:
Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, various annual editions
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Table 10 – Survey of selected Manchester-based manufacturing engineering firms listed in
Slater’s, 1870 – 1910
1870 1880 1890 1900 1910
Electrical Equipment Makers 0 1 20 83 172
Engineers, Machinists etc. 68 136 131 196 187
Food Processing Machinery Makers 5 7 16 13 17
Hydraulic Equipment Makers 10 14 8 11 8
Internal Combustion Engine and Motor Vehicle Makers 0 1 2 9 52
Machine Tool Makers 53 45 45 33 38
Railway Equipment Makers 12 9 7 10 27
Steam Engines Makers 33 35 37 35 46
Textile Machinery Makers 59 54 60 48 46
Total 240 302 326 438 593
Source: Slater’s Royal National Commercial Directory of Manchester and Salford With Their Vicinities,
(Manchester: Isaac Slater, 1870 - 1910) – published annually
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Appendix 3, The Manchester Piecework Agreement
Transcript of the Memorandum of Agreement Relative to Piecework Regulations in
Manchester and District arrived at between the Manchester Engineering Employers and the
Engineering Trade Unions at the Local Conference held on 8 January 1918, submitted to a
Ballot Vote of Members, and accepted by them.
1. Each workman's day rate shall be guaranteed, apart from and irrespective of his
piecework earnings.
2. Overtime, nightshift, and holiday allowances to piecework prices; only the actual
hours worked on the job to be charged against the piece price of the job on which the
workman has worked.
3. The piece prices to be paid shall be fixed by mutual arrangement between the duly
appointed representative of the employer and the workman or workmen concerned.
4. In order to arrive at mutual satisfactory piecework prices the employer shall have the
right to demonstrate the actual time required to perform any operation or job or
supervise and time any workman for this purpose. When a job has to be timed, for
the purpose of fixing a price, the time shall be reckoned from first taking the job in
hand, to putting it on the floor in a finished condition, the employer undertaking that in
demonstrating or timing a job or operation, no workman shall be tyrannized or
intimidated in any way. It shall be optional whether setting up time for any operation
shall be calculated in the piece prices arranged, or separately, or paid for at day time
rates.
5. In the event of the employers' representative and the workman failing to agree to the
piece price to be paid, the question shall then be submitted for settlement to the
management by a committee consisting of representatives of the department
concerned. In the event of this procedure failing to arrive at a satisfactory price, the
work in question shall then be declared as done as day work.
6. It is agreed that there shall be no limit on piecework earnings.
7. Piece prices once fixed shall not be altered accept by mutual arrangement as defined
in clause 5, or unless there be a change in the method of manufacture, or alterations
in the piece prices as governed by the general rise and fall in wages.
8. It is agreed that cross-bookings when working piecework is inimical to the fixing of
satisfactory piecework prices, and both workmen and employers will use every effort
to prevent this practice occurring.
9. All piecework results shall be balanced weekly except in cases where jobs extend for
more than one week, when they will be balanced the week following completion.
10. Waiting time, standing time, through temporary breakdowns and other causes over
which the employers or workmen have no control, shall be paid for at the day rate
and any time so paid for shall not be charged against the price of the piecework
done.
11. All piecework balances to be paid through the office of the firm in proportion to the
workman's rate of wages and the hours he has worked on the job.
12. All piecework prices, together with the particular job or operation, shall be recorded in
a place to which the actual workman concerned shall have easy access for
examination.
Source: 'Vanguard', May 1947. GB1008, Working Class Movement Library, L Gardner and Sons
Collection
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Appendix 4, Gardner Notice to Employees, 12 May 1971
Transcript of a communiqué issued by the Works Manager's Office, L. Gardner and Sons
Limited, dated 12 May 1971
To The Secretary Convener
Application for Production Bonus based on engine output
We refer to your application of 15 April for a Production Bonus based on engine output.
It is true that last year turned out to be financially a good year for the Firm, but any
production bonus scheme based on this fact alone, would logically require a repayment by
the workers to the Firm in a bad year.
In our opinion, the increased profits were due largely to the fact that we increased the price
of Engines and Spares.
Moreover, when it was agreed in November 1970 to reduce the normal overtime worked,
immediate steps were taken to cover such lost time by increasing Outside Machining,
increasing the labour force, and switching of labour. Increased profits are, therefore, in spite
of, rather than because of a reduction in hours worked, and the reduction in hours has
simply put money which you could have earned into other peoples pockets.
If the workers have, in fact, increased their effort, as you suggest, then they will pro-rata
have increased their earnings, and have been sufficiently rewarded thereby.
Having said all that, the Management are nevertheless appreciative of the fact that
everyone, workers and staff, shop stewards and all grades of Management have contributed
to the smooth running of the Factory and consequently they propose to pay a Production
Bonus as requested based upon engine output. As we have said many time, this is not really
a true criterion as it ignores (1) Spares which form a substantial portion of our output and (2)
variation of engine types. Nevertheless, engine production for this particular purpose has the
virtue of simplicity.
The bonus will be based on engines built over 2,760 from 5 July to 31 December 1971
(inclusive) and will be paid at the rate of 10 new pence per engine for adults and 5 new
pence for young people under 20 and part-time hourly-paid employees.
The figure of 2,760 is based on 120 engines for 23 weeks and assumes that the demand for
maximum output will continue over this period. There are actually 116 working days in this
period - i.e. 23 weeks and 1 day.
The conditions on which such bonus will be paid are as follows:-
To all hourly-paid workers in Works and Foundries employed on 31 December 1971 - to be
paid as soon as possible after 31 December.
No industrial trouble or action of any kind in the Works or Foundries (other than the official
negotiating procedure.)
Payment of such bonus will be limited to this particular half year.
Payment will be subject to tax.
Payment will be computed as follows:-
The average number of engines per week over the 23 week period will be calculated and will
be related to Table 1 below. Persons having less than a full 23 week entitlement will then
have their bonus calculated as shown below:
Example: A man with three weeks or part week’s absence (assuming an average of 125
engines for the 23 week period) would receive -
20/23 of £11.50 = £10.00
When all persons having less than the maximum entitlement have been calculated, the
residual sum will be equally divided amongst all hourly paid employees.
Source: L Gardner and Sons Collection, Working Class Movement Library, Salford
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Appendix 5, The AMS
Description
The system consisted of 4 [German] Bohle machining centres all interlinked
with a common track with self-loading systems, operated by 2 or 3 workers.
A [British] Mollart gun-drilling machine provided rapid drilling of the main bearing
studs and side tie-bolt holes. It also incorporated a multi-drill head to
simultaneously drill 26 holes in the chaincase end of the crankcase. This
machine was a stand-alone machine, loaded from the nearby track. Completed
parts were replaced on the track and were then transferred to the next
operation.
The next operation, the [British built, American owned] EXLO (Ex-Cell-O) boring
machine was again a stand-alone machine which rough bored the camshaft and
all the chaincase end bores. Completed parts were then returned to the track
and were transferred to the [British] KTM line.
The KTM line consisted of 7 machining centres, 3 of which rotated about a Z
axis (Index machines), and allowed milling, drilling and tapping of 4 faces. 4
other KTM's rotated about the X axis (Trunion (Trunnion) machines), allowing
milling, drilling and tapping of the top and bottom of the part.
The crancase (crankcase) only needed to go on any 1 Index machine and 1
Trunion (Trunnion) machine, so a computerized loading management system
was incorporated in this track section to manage the part loading. A storage
area was built into the track to allow storage of the parts awaiting the next
available machine.
The crankcases were then offloaded and sent for de-burring. This was a manual
job, which was later improved with the change from traditional hand files to the
use of air tools for some tasks.
A wash machine then cleaned the component free of swarf.
After this a crankshaft bearing cap was bolted on to complete the crankbore,
this was performed using auto-presses and auto-stud torque track.
Finally the component was finish bored in the crankbore, cambore, and all the
chaincase end bores using another EXLO boring machine.
Quality checks were performed by myself at all the key stages. My main tool
was a 5-foot digital height gauge which served us well although care had to be
taken when setting up the workpiece to ensure accurate results. We later
purchased a [Japanese] Mitutoyo CMM [computer controlled inspection
machine] which allowed 3-axis checks with minimum set-up. In order to speed-
up inspection a file was created for each type of crankcase, where every hole,
bore, machined face was given a check number and the corresponding X - Y - Z
co-ordinates were logged. In addition the thread size/bore size or any other
feature was added. This allowed for logical and thorough inspection.
As the reduction in crankcases required meant that the line was vastly under
used, we had to invest further in the plant to allow other major components to
be machined.
Source: Peter Chadwick, Bolton to Maurice Halton, Horwich, 16 March 2004
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Appendix 5, The AMS (continued)
Schematic Diagram of the New Crankcase Machining Facility (undated)
Source: The Gardner Collection, sundry documents, Working Class Movement Library, Salford.
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